Narrative:

Upon taxi out to runway 33 at bdl crossed hold short line for runway 33. The aircraft previously had been on taxiway south. Tower advised us, after we announced our error, that we needed to call them when we reached ground in ewr, as regards a runway incursion. As first officer, I had looked at airport chart and gotten general idea of our taxi route. Captain had said aloud 'taxi to runway 33.' as we approached intersection of runway 1/19 and taxiway south, I looked down to my airport chart to get the tower frequency and to verify our departure frequency from our clearance. At this point, the captain initiated the turn onto runway 1/19 and, thus, crossed hold short line for runway 15/33. At this point I looked up and queried the captain as to where he was going. The captain proceeded to brake the airplane, but the aircraft was past the hold short line. Then realizing his error, he continued across the runway in order to clear the runway. We did verify the final was clear in both directions before crossing the runway. There were, at no time, any conflicts with other traffic. Human performance considerations: the captain told me afterward that he was mistakenly going to runway 24 not runway 33. Thus, the reason for believing he needed to cross runway 15/33. This was due to a previous experience we had taxiing at bdl. The exact time that he strayed from normal taxi path to runway 33 was when I looked down to get tower and departure frequency. Unfortunately, by the time I caught his error, it was too late and the runway incursion had already occurred. In hindsight I should have chosen a better time to get the frequencys I needed. I should have waited until we were clear of the area of taxiway south, runway 1/19. Additionally I should have trusted my instincts and gotten on the brakes myself when I realized the captain's error. It also may have been helpful if I would have said aloud 'taxi to runway 33' to the captain, in order to totally confirm our instructions. This would have been superior CRM. I intend to do this from now on, regardless of the complexity of taxi operations. It may have served well for the captain to have said 'clear to cross runway 15/33', before he initiated his turn. This would have prevented this incident. Lesson learned: as first officer on any aircraft, always be aware of what your captain is doing before he/she does it. Supplemental information from acn 571805: we had to do a xbleed start due to an inoperative APU. We started the other engine on taxiway south. After start, we made a left turn, and by the time we figured out that we were going the wrong way, the nose of the aircraft had crossed the hold short line of runway 33. We need to stay on top of situational awareness and pay attention!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION TAXIING AT BDL.

Narrative: UPON TAXI OUT TO RWY 33 AT BDL CROSSED HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 33. THE ACFT PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN ON TXWY S. TWR ADVISED US, AFTER WE ANNOUNCED OUR ERROR, THAT WE NEEDED TO CALL THEM WHEN WE REACHED GND IN EWR, AS REGARDS A RWY INCURSION. AS FO, I HAD LOOKED AT ARPT CHART AND GOTTEN GENERAL IDEA OF OUR TAXI RTE. CAPT HAD SAID ALOUD 'TAXI TO RWY 33.' AS WE APCHED INTXN OF RWY 1/19 AND TXWY S, I LOOKED DOWN TO MY ARPT CHART TO GET THE TWR FREQ AND TO VERIFY OUR DEP FREQ FROM OUR CLRNC. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT INITIATED THE TURN ONTO RWY 1/19 AND, THUS, CROSSED HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 15/33. AT THIS POINT I LOOKED UP AND QUERIED THE CAPT AS TO WHERE HE WAS GOING. THE CAPT PROCEEDED TO BRAKE THE AIRPLANE, BUT THE ACFT WAS PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THEN REALIZING HIS ERROR, HE CONTINUED ACROSS THE RWY IN ORDER TO CLR THE RWY. WE DID VERIFY THE FINAL WAS CLR IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BEFORE XING THE RWY. THERE WERE, AT NO TIME, ANY CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: THE CAPT TOLD ME AFTERWARD THAT HE WAS MISTAKENLY GOING TO RWY 24 NOT RWY 33. THUS, THE REASON FOR BELIEVING HE NEEDED TO CROSS RWY 15/33. THIS WAS DUE TO A PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WE HAD TAXIING AT BDL. THE EXACT TIME THAT HE STRAYED FROM NORMAL TAXI PATH TO RWY 33 WAS WHEN I LOOKED DOWN TO GET TWR AND DEP FREQ. UNFORTUNATELY, BY THE TIME I CAUGHT HIS ERROR, IT WAS TOO LATE AND THE RWY INCURSION HAD ALREADY OCCURRED. IN HINDSIGHT I SHOULD HAVE CHOSEN A BETTER TIME TO GET THE FREQS I NEEDED. I SHOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL WE WERE CLR OF THE AREA OF TXWY S, RWY 1/19. ADDITIONALLY I SHOULD HAVE TRUSTED MY INSTINCTS AND GOTTEN ON THE BRAKES MYSELF WHEN I REALIZED THE CAPT'S ERROR. IT ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF I WOULD HAVE SAID ALOUD 'TAXI TO RWY 33' TO THE CAPT, IN ORDER TO TOTALLY CONFIRM OUR INSTRUCTIONS. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN SUPERIOR CRM. I INTEND TO DO THIS FROM NOW ON, REGARDLESS OF THE COMPLEXITY OF TAXI OPS. IT MAY HAVE SERVED WELL FOR THE CAPT TO HAVE SAID 'CLR TO CROSS RWY 15/33', BEFORE HE INITIATED HIS TURN. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. LESSON LEARNED: AS FO ON ANY ACFT, ALWAYS BE AWARE OF WHAT YOUR CAPT IS DOING BEFORE HE/SHE DOES IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 571805: WE HAD TO DO A XBLEED START DUE TO AN INOP APU. WE STARTED THE OTHER ENG ON TXWY S. AFTER START, WE MADE A L TURN, AND BY THE TIME WE FIGURED OUT THAT WE WERE GOING THE WRONG WAY, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 33. WE NEED TO STAY ON TOP OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND PAY ATTN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.