Narrative:

We were late getting into jfk due to maintenance. We accomplished a 21 min turn at jfk due to another aircraft coming in right behind us. Weight and balance was spun, and two people were moved forward. We taxied out with no aircraft handling difficulties. Takeoff and climb out were normal in smooth air. In cruise the trim warn light and trim down captions illuminated. The first officer continued flying and took the radios while I ran the QRH. We did this and noticed that the trim was full nose down, and he needed more. We could control the aircraft, but forward pressure was needed to maintain altitude. I re-spun the weight and balance, and came up with the same number I had before. We talked about it, and decided to ask the flight attendant if anyone was in the bathroom, or if people had gathered in the rear of the aircraft for some reason. She indicated that everyone was in their seats. Wanting to ensure aircraft controllability, I asked her to move two more people from the back to the front (C to a). She did this, and we were able to regain some trim authority. The first officer hand-flew the aircraft using the flight director to ZZZ (per QRH) and landed without incident. After shutdown, I asked operations to have a ramp supervisor audit the bags in the aft compartment for us. He did, and discovered that the count was one short, and also we had nine heavies, where the jfk ramp had indicated only four. This increased our aft weight significantly and likely contributed to our event. The heavies that were tagged were major air carrier heavies. The five untagged were felt to be well over 50 pounds by the ramp supervisor in ZZZ. The major air carrier heavies are over 70 pounds, although we are not told to discriminate between our heavies and their heavies. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback revealed that takeoff pitch trim setting was normal using the loading numbers provided by the company ramp personnel. With a passenger load of slightly more than 50%, the takeoff weight was approximately 750 pounds below allowable takeoff weight. It is common after loading to have to move passengers before departure to have a properly loaded aircraft based on the flight crew's computation of the weight and balance. Before departure the flight attendant, who was very new to the airline, was asked to move two passengers forward to comply with loading requirements. After the event the reporter wonders if they were actually moved before departure. In commenting about the designation of 'heavy' bags from the major carrier it is noted that the bags are normally from int'l connections, quite large and are indeed 'heavy.' it is also noted by many crews operating out of jfk that the station has a tendency to have a preference for loading the aft compartment when at all possible, leading to the common aft center of gravity when computations are done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A JETSTREAM 4100 CREW FINDS FULL NOSE DOWN PITCH TRIM TO BE INADEQUATE IN LEVEL CRUISE FLT.

Narrative: WE WERE LATE GETTING INTO JFK DUE TO MAINT. WE ACCOMPLISHED A 21 MIN TURN AT JFK DUE TO ANOTHER ACFT COMING IN RIGHT BEHIND US. WT AND BALANCE WAS SPUN, AND TWO PEOPLE WERE MOVED FORWARD. WE TAXIED OUT WITH NO ACFT HANDLING DIFFICULTIES. TKOF AND CLB OUT WERE NORMAL IN SMOOTH AIR. IN CRUISE THE TRIM WARN LIGHT AND TRIM DOWN CAPTIONS ILLUMINATED. THE FO CONTINUED FLYING AND TOOK THE RADIOS WHILE I RAN THE QRH. WE DID THIS AND NOTICED THAT THE TRIM WAS FULL NOSE DOWN, AND HE NEEDED MORE. WE COULD CONTROL THE ACFT, BUT FORWARD PRESSURE WAS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN ALTITUDE. I RE-SPUN THE WT AND BALANCE, AND CAME UP WITH THE SAME NUMBER I HAD BEFORE. WE TALKED ABOUT IT, AND DECIDED TO ASK THE FA IF ANYONE WAS IN THE BATHROOM, OR IF PEOPLE HAD GATHERED IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT FOR SOME REASON. SHE INDICATED THAT EVERYONE WAS IN THEIR SEATS. WANTING TO ENSURE ACFT CONTROLLABILITY, I ASKED HER TO MOVE TWO MORE PEOPLE FROM THE BACK TO THE FRONT (C TO A). SHE DID THIS, AND WE WERE ABLE TO REGAIN SOME TRIM AUTHORITY. THE FO HAND-FLEW THE ACFT USING THE FLT DIRECTOR TO ZZZ (PER QRH) AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER SHUTDOWN, I ASKED OPS TO HAVE A RAMP SUPERVISOR AUDIT THE BAGS IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT FOR US. HE DID, AND DISCOVERED THAT THE COUNT WAS ONE SHORT, AND ALSO WE HAD NINE HEAVIES, WHERE THE JFK RAMP HAD INDICATED ONLY FOUR. THIS INCREASED OUR AFT WT SIGNIFICANTLY AND LIKELY CONTRIBUTED TO OUR EVENT. THE HEAVIES THAT WERE TAGGED WERE MAJOR ACR HEAVIES. THE FIVE UNTAGGED WERE FELT TO BE WELL OVER 50 LBS BY THE RAMP SUPERVISOR IN ZZZ. THE MAJOR ACR HEAVIES ARE OVER 70 LBS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT TOLD TO DISCRIMINATE BTWN OUR HEAVIES AND THEIR HEAVIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK REVEALED THAT TKOF PITCH TRIM SETTING WAS NORMAL USING THE LOADING NUMBERS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY RAMP PERSONNEL. WITH A PAX LOAD OF SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 50%, THE TKOF WT WAS APPROX 750 LBS BELOW ALLOWABLE TKOF WT. IT IS COMMON AFTER LOADING TO HAVE TO MOVE PASSENGERS BEFORE DEPARTURE TO HAVE A PROPERLY LOADED ACFT BASED ON THE FLT CREW'S COMPUTATION OF THE WT AND BALANCE. BEFORE DEP THE FA, WHO WAS VERY NEW TO THE AIRLINE, WAS ASKED TO MOVE TWO PASSENGERS FORWARD TO COMPLY WITH LOADING REQUIREMENTS. AFTER THE EVENT THE RPTR WONDERS IF THEY WERE ACTUALLY MOVED BEFORE DEP. IN COMMENTING ABOUT THE DESIGNATION OF 'HEAVY' BAGS FROM THE MAJOR CARRIER IT IS NOTED THAT THE BAGS ARE NORMALLY FROM INT'L CONNECTIONS, QUITE LARGE AND ARE INDEED 'HEAVY.' IT IS ALSO NOTED BY MANY CREWS OPERATING OUT OF JFK THAT THE STATION HAS A TENDENCY TO HAVE A PREFERENCE FOR LOADING THE AFT COMPARTMENT WHEN AT ALL POSSIBLE, LEADING TO THE COMMON AFT CENTER OF GRAVITY WHEN COMPUTATIONS ARE DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.