Narrative:

Return for landing at departure airport after landing gear would not retract. Flight departed ZZZ1 on time. On departure, the landing gear handle would not raise past the 'off position.' I was the PF and gradually leveled the aircraft in anticipation of possibly returning to the departure airport. The captain notified the ZZZ1 tower that we might need to return. He then recycled the landing gear handle, and the gear raised normally. The captain notified the tower that all was well, and we continued to ZZZ without further incident. En route, we discussed the problem, and I suggested that a call to dispatch would be in order. The captain thought a phone call to maintenance control, once on the ground in ZZZ, would be sufficient. Upon landing in ZZZ, the captain did, indeed, call maintenance control and discuss the issue with them. Although I was not privy to the conversation, the captain told me that we were good to go. Of course, on takeoff out of ZZZ, the gear would not retract. This time, I was the PNF. The captain leveled the aircraft and notified the tower of our problem. I pulled the QRH and started to read through it. I told the captain we would have to raise the flaps and determine what kind of sensor failure we had. He stated that he would rather not troubleshoot the problem and just return to the departure airport and land, because we were now in icing conditions. He also tried to contact dispatch/maintenance through ZZZ operations to bring them into the loop. An approach descent check was called for by the captain, and the QRH was put away. The subsequent approach and landing to ZZZ was uneventful. Dispatch tried calling us back on VHF #2 on short final (500 ft AGL), and I told them we'd call them on the ground. The reason for this report is the very uncomfortable feeling I'm having for not insisting that the QRH be completed in it's entirety. If the malfunction turned out to be a landing gear lever lock problem, we could have overridden the lock and continued to ZZZ3. I understand the captain's desire to 'just get it on the ground,' but I still had that 'pit' in my stomach as we taxied back to the gate, that we had done something very wrong. Contributing factors for my decision to allow this situation to develop to unacceptable levels are a somewhat ambiguous QRH (at least in the heat of the battle). In fact, it wasn't until the next day that I was able to convince the captain that we could have handled the situation better. Also, was the thought in the back of my mind that -- it was company policy not to override the lever lock and to return to the departure airport. I think this 'steered' me into accepting the captain's decision to return without completing the QRH. The captain stated that he was under the impression that the override was not to be used unless performance (terrain) was an issue. The fact we were in icing conditions also had an influence on me. As I understand it, the aircraft was worked on by maintenance that night and departed the next day as a revenue flight only to return to ZZZ with the same problem. This time the crew completed the QRH and determined that the problem was the air/ground safety sensor. On the outside, this sort of justified our decision to return to ZZZ, but, obviously, did not justify our actions in arriving at the same conclusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: RETURN FOR LNDG AT DEP ARPT AFTER LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. FLT DEPARTED ZZZ1 ON TIME. ON DEP, THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE WOULD NOT RAISE PAST THE 'OFF POS.' I WAS THE PF AND GRADUALLY LEVELED THE ACFT IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLY RETURNING TO THE DEP ARPT. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE ZZZ1 TWR THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO RETURN. HE THEN RECYCLED THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE, AND THE GEAR RAISED NORMALLY. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT ALL WAS WELL, AND WE CONTINUED TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ENRTE, WE DISCUSSED THE PROB, AND I SUGGESTED THAT A CALL TO DISPATCH WOULD BE IN ORDER. THE CAPT THOUGHT A PHONE CALL TO MAINT CTL, ONCE ON THE GND IN ZZZ, WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. UPON LNDG IN ZZZ, THE CAPT DID, INDEED, CALL MAINT CTL AND DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THEM. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE CONVERSATION, THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT WE WERE GOOD TO GO. OF COURSE, ON TKOF OUT OF ZZZ, THE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. THIS TIME, I WAS THE PNF. THE CAPT LEVELED THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED THE TWR OF OUR PROB. I PULLED THE QRH AND STARTED TO READ THROUGH IT. I TOLD THE CAPT WE WOULD HAVE TO RAISE THE FLAPS AND DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF SENSOR FAILURE WE HAD. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RATHER NOT TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB AND JUST RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT AND LAND, BECAUSE WE WERE NOW IN ICING CONDITIONS. HE ALSO TRIED TO CONTACT DISPATCH/MAINT THROUGH ZZZ OPS TO BRING THEM INTO THE LOOP. AN APCH DSCNT CHK WAS CALLED FOR BY THE CAPT, AND THE QRH WAS PUT AWAY. THE SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG TO ZZZ WAS UNEVENTFUL. DISPATCH TRIED CALLING US BACK ON VHF #2 ON SHORT FINAL (500 FT AGL), AND I TOLD THEM WE'D CALL THEM ON THE GND. THE REASON FOR THIS RPT IS THE VERY UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING I'M HAVING FOR NOT INSISTING THAT THE QRH BE COMPLETED IN IT'S ENTIRETY. IF THE MALFUNCTION TURNED OUT TO BE A LNDG GEAR LEVER LOCK PROB, WE COULD HAVE OVERRIDDEN THE LOCK AND CONTINUED TO ZZZ3. I UNDERSTAND THE CAPT'S DESIRE TO 'JUST GET IT ON THE GND,' BUT I STILL HAD THAT 'PIT' IN MY STOMACH AS WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE, THAT WE HAD DONE SOMETHING VERY WRONG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR MY DECISION TO ALLOW THIS SIT TO DEVELOP TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS ARE A SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS QRH (AT LEAST IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE). IN FACT, IT WASN'T UNTIL THE NEXT DAY THAT I WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE CAPT THAT WE COULD HAVE HANDLED THE SIT BETTER. ALSO, WAS THE THOUGHT IN THE BACK OF MY MIND THAT -- IT WAS COMPANY POLICY NOT TO OVERRIDE THE LEVER LOCK AND TO RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT. I THINK THIS 'STEERED' ME INTO ACCEPTING THE CAPT'S DECISION TO RETURN WITHOUT COMPLETING THE QRH. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE OVERRIDE WAS NOT TO BE USED UNLESS PERFORMANCE (TERRAIN) WAS AN ISSUE. THE FACT WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS ALSO HAD AN INFLUENCE ON ME. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE ACFT WAS WORKED ON BY MAINT THAT NIGHT AND DEPARTED THE NEXT DAY AS A REVENUE FLT ONLY TO RETURN TO ZZZ WITH THE SAME PROB. THIS TIME THE CREW COMPLETED THE QRH AND DETERMINED THAT THE PROB WAS THE AIR/GND SAFETY SENSOR. ON THE OUTSIDE, THIS SORT OF JUSTIFIED OUR DECISION TO RETURN TO ZZZ, BUT, OBVIOUSLY, DID NOT JUSTIFY OUR ACTIONS IN ARRIVING AT THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.