Narrative:

Approaching the red table VOR (dbl), we were slowing for the approach to rifle. I had started the 'in range' checklist, completing most of the items on the list, when we received holding instructions only 1-2 mi from dbl, the holding fix. By the time I responded to ATC, we were nearly on top of the fix. I interrupted the checklist to prepare for the hold. After entry and turning inbound on the first turn, we received a vector to intercept the localizer for the ILS approach to rifle. The approach was completed normally to touchdown. When we landed on the wet runway 26 at rifle, we attempted to deploy the thrust reversers, which did not deploy. When I checked the switches, the 'unsafe to arm' lights were on. It took a few seconds to stow the levers and arm the reversers, but it was too late. With the very wet runway and downhill landing, we were unable to stop before the end of the runway. We exited the end of the runway at a relatively low speed hitting a runway end light. Unable to contact ATC to advise other aircraft behind us, we elected to taxi clear of the runway. Arriving at the ramp, we inspected the aircraft to find a slightly damaged right main gear door. Then with the aid of personnel at the airport, we reported the incident to the FAA in seattle. Upon reflection of the entire matter, it seems evident to me that I never completed the interrupted 'in range' checklist, thereby not arming the thrust reverse system prior to landing. Supplemental information from acn 574023: upon touchdown, brakes were applied simultaneously with the deployment of the ground and flight spoilers. I attempted to deploy the thrust reversers, which did not deploy. Rather, the 'unsafe to arm' lights illuminated. I applied maximum braking and the aircraft hydroplaned as we slowly decelerated through 100 KTS. Eventually, braking action was sufficient to the point that with application of maximum braking the antiskid system activated. Holding maximum braking, the aircraft came to a stop just off the end of the runway. Later discussion with the PNF revealed that a checklist was interrupted and the thrust reversing system was not armed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GND CONTACT WITH A RWY END LIGHT DURING A RWY EXCURSION AS A CPR CHALLENGER 601-3A REVERSERS FAIL TO DEPLOY ON A WET RWY AT RIL, CO.

Narrative: APCHING THE RED TABLE VOR (DBL), WE WERE SLOWING FOR THE APCH TO RIFLE. I HAD STARTED THE 'IN RANGE' CHKLIST, COMPLETING MOST OF THE ITEMS ON THE LIST, WHEN WE RECEIVED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS ONLY 1-2 MI FROM DBL, THE HOLDING FIX. BY THE TIME I RESPONDED TO ATC, WE WERE NEARLY ON TOP OF THE FIX. I INTERRUPTED THE CHKLIST TO PREPARE FOR THE HOLD. AFTER ENTRY AND TURNING INBOUND ON THE FIRST TURN, WE RECEIVED A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR THE ILS APCH TO RIFLE. THE APCH WAS COMPLETED NORMALLY TO TOUCHDOWN. WHEN WE LANDED ON THE WET RWY 26 AT RIFLE, WE ATTEMPTED TO DEPLOY THE THRUST REVERSERS, WHICH DID NOT DEPLOY. WHEN I CHKED THE SWITCHES, THE 'UNSAFE TO ARM' LIGHTS WERE ON. IT TOOK A FEW SECONDS TO STOW THE LEVERS AND ARM THE REVERSERS, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. WITH THE VERY WET RWY AND DOWNHILL LNDG, WE WERE UNABLE TO STOP BEFORE THE END OF THE RWY. WE EXITED THE END OF THE RWY AT A RELATIVELY LOW SPD HITTING A RWY END LIGHT. UNABLE TO CONTACT ATC TO ADVISE OTHER ACFT BEHIND US, WE ELECTED TO TAXI CLR OF THE RWY. ARRIVING AT THE RAMP, WE INSPECTED THE ACFT TO FIND A SLIGHTLY DAMAGED R MAIN GEAR DOOR. THEN WITH THE AID OF PERSONNEL AT THE ARPT, WE RPTED THE INCIDENT TO THE FAA IN SEATTLE. UPON REFLECTION OF THE ENTIRE MATTER, IT SEEMS EVIDENT TO ME THAT I NEVER COMPLETED THE INTERRUPTED 'IN RANGE' CHKLIST, THEREBY NOT ARMING THE THRUST REVERSE SYS PRIOR TO LNDG. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 574023: UPON TOUCHDOWN, BRAKES WERE APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE GND AND FLT SPOILERS. I ATTEMPTED TO DEPLOY THE THRUST REVERSERS, WHICH DID NOT DEPLOY. RATHER, THE 'UNSAFE TO ARM' LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. I APPLIED MAX BRAKING AND THE ACFT HYDROPLANED AS WE SLOWLY DECELERATED THROUGH 100 KTS. EVENTUALLY, BRAKING ACTION WAS SUFFICIENT TO THE POINT THAT WITH APPLICATION OF MAX BRAKING THE ANTISKID SYS ACTIVATED. HOLDING MAX BRAKING, THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP JUST OFF THE END OF THE RWY. LATER DISCUSSION WITH THE PNF REVEALED THAT A CHKLIST WAS INTERRUPTED AND THE THRUST REVERSING SYS WAS NOT ARMED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.