Narrative:

Approximately 7 miles from the airport, the original landing clearance was for midfield entry at left downwind for runway 16. On downwind it was amended to lahso ('land 16, hold short 11'), which I acknowledged. However, while turning base, the clearance was changed to short final and high speed ('to the numbers') because of an approaching jet. Because of the necessary rapid descent, I was not able to slow down the airplane enough and it came in too fast and bounced hard. Since the second bounce was even harder, I decided to abort the landing and go around. I could not inform the controller immediately of my intentions, since he was talking to another aircraft, but I assumed that he was watching anyway. However, this may not have been the case, since a second later he asked me whether I was holding short of runway 11. At that point, I told him that I was going around, to which he responded that I should have informed him earlier. I had my hands full raising the flaps and flying the airplane, but managed to acknowledge the transmission. I had been aware that another aircraft was cleared for touch-and-go on runway 11 and kept looking out for the traffic. Since I was not able to see the other aircraft, I kept my airplane close to the runway and only climbed after the intersection. However, I did not see the other aircraft and understand that he climbed over my airplane to avoid a mid-air collision. Since it is very important in my aircraft to establish the final approach speed and attitude well in advance it was my mistake not to cancel the lahso clearance after the landing instructions had been changed to a short (and fast) final approach. At this stage I should have informed the tower of my inability to hold short. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the other aircraft was a C172 with an instructor and two students on board. He said during go around the tower controller instructed him to stay low and told the C172 to climb straight ahead. Both aircraft crossed the intersection approximately the same time with C172 about 50 ft higher. After landing the reporter said the controller summoned both pilots to the tower to review and discuss the incident. At the conclusion of the meeting, the reporter said that he was made to feel that the conflict was his fault and was asked if he had learned anything from the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SR20 PLT LNDG HPN ACCEPTS A LAND AND HOLD SHORT CLRNC, BUT ABORTS THE LNDG AFTER BOUNCING TWICE WITH TOO MUCH SPEED. THE GAR RESULTED IN A CONFLICT WITH A C172 OPERATING ON THE CROSS RWY.

Narrative: APPROX 7 MILES FROM THE ARPT, THE ORIGINAL LNDG CLRNC WAS FOR MIDFIELD ENTRY AT L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16. ON DOWNWIND IT WAS AMENDED TO LAHSO ('LAND 16, HOLD SHORT 11'), WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED. HOWEVER, WHILE TURNING BASE, THE CLRNC WAS CHANGED TO SHORT FINAL AND HIGH SPEED ('TO THE NUMBERS') BECAUSE OF AN APCHING JET. BECAUSE OF THE NECESSARY RAPID DSCNT, I WAS NOT ABLE TO SLOW DOWN THE AIRPLANE ENOUGH AND IT CAME IN TOO FAST AND BOUNCED HARD. SINCE THE SECOND BOUNCE WAS EVEN HARDER, I DECIDED TO ABORT THE LNDG AND GAR. I COULD NOT INFORM THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY OF MY INTENTIONS, SINCE HE WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT, BUT I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS WATCHING ANYWAY. HOWEVER, THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE CASE, SINCE A SECOND LATER HE ASKED ME WHETHER I WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 11. AT THAT POINT, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS GOING AROUND, TO WHICH HE RESPONDED THAT I SHOULD HAVE INFORMED HIM EARLIER. I HAD MY HANDS FULL RAISING THE FLAPS AND FLYING THE AIRPLANE, BUT MANAGED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE XMISSION. I HAD BEEN AWARE THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TOUCH-AND-GO ON RWY 11 AND KEPT LOOKING OUT FOR THE TFC. SINCE I WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE THE OTHER ACFT, I KEPT MY AIRPLANE CLOSE TO THE RWY AND ONLY CLBED AFTER THE INTXN. HOWEVER, I DID NOT SEE THE OTHER ACFT AND UNDERSTAND THAT HE CLBED OVER MY AIRPLANE TO AVOID A MID-AIR COLLISION. SINCE IT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN MY ACFT TO ESTABLISH THE FINAL APCH SPEED AND ATTITUDE WELL IN ADVANCE IT WAS MY MISTAKE NOT TO CANCEL THE LAHSO CLRNC AFTER THE LNDG INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A SHORT (AND FAST) FINAL APCH. AT THIS STAGE I SHOULD HAVE INFORMED THE TWR OF MY INABILITY TO HOLD SHORT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE OTHER ACFT WAS A C172 WITH AN INSTRUCTOR AND TWO STUDENTS ON BOARD. HE SAID DURING GAR THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED HIM TO STAY LOW AND TOLD THE C172 TO CLB STRAIGHT AHEAD. BOTH ACFT CROSSED THE INTXN APPROX THE SAME TIME WITH C172 ABOUT 50 FT HIGHER. AFTER LNDG THE RPTR SAID THE CTLR SUMMONED BOTH PLTS TO THE TWR TO REVIEW AND DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS MADE TO FEEL THAT THE CONFLICT WAS HIS FAULT AND WAS ASKED IF HE HAD LEARNED ANYTHING FROM THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.