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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 576274 |
Time | |
Date | 200303 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : multi engine pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 158 flight time total : 9388 flight time type : 1632 |
ASRS Report | 576274 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | ground encounters : person non adherence : company policies other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Arriving into XXX, we were cleared in xx taxiway for gate #X. Gate #X uses the old style short jetbridge. As we approached the gate and straightened out our taxi path, we both assessed the gate area to be clear of all vehicles and obstructions. As we taxied in and reduced our speed to a slow walk, with the jetbridge off my left shoulder, my concentration was directed on the lead marshaler directly ahead. I was treating gate #X in a similar way as gate #Y, taxiing very slowly. As the marshaler brought the wands to vertical, I almost stopped. He gave me more move forward signals, and I moved forward just a little more, and then he closed his wands. I applied the final brake pressure to stop, and just as we were stopping, the aircraft vibrated a bit. Both the first officer and I remarked to each other and wondered if we hit a small patch of ice, because the feeling we got in the cockpit was the same as stopping on ice and skidding a foot or so. The marshalers gave me the 'chocks in' signal and gave no indication that anything was wrong. We completed all normal checklist items and opened the door. As the first officer said good-bye to the folks, I made a quick run to the assistant chief pilot's office (for paperwork), still unaware of any problem. When I returned to the aircraft about 5-10 mins later, my first officer told me that the wingtip had struck something and there was damage to the lower portion of the wingtip fence. I went outside to inspect the damage. When I arrived at the left wing, I could see the damage to the wingtip fence, but the vehicle that we were told had hit the wingtip had been moved away from the aircraft. I talked with a couple of ramp personnel, who said that a 'cherry picker' vehicle was next to the aircraft, and as we taxied in, the wing had hit the crane portion of the vehicle. He also said that someone was actually in the basket portion of the vehicle. Later, the ramp supervisor told me that there was a definite problem with the ramp personnel in marshalling us in, and that we were not at fault whatsoever. What struck me as strange was the fact that the vehicle was moved immediately after the incident. It was moved and parked about 50 ft away with its crane in the down position and no vehicle personnel were present, only ramp personnel. We also received conflicting stories as to whether the vehicle was moving or not. Ironically, I have been preaching to my first officer's the importance of a slow taxi speed and situational awareness in the ramp area. Also, the flight crew cannot be looking at their wingtips during the last 10-20 ft, since their attention is directed to the lead marshaler. This incident showed me that in this case, no matter how vigilant we are, there are some things we just can't control. I also can't think of anything we as the flight crew could have done differently. We obviously need more work with the marshalers and vehicle control in the ramp area. There has to be some level of trust with the marshalers, or they are useless as a safety tool. The recent irregularity and safety reports continue to come in stating these same problems in the ramp area, including poor marshalling, wing walkers not watching wings, bad lighting at night in the gate area, and poor gate numbers and taxi lines. I think we should address all of these issues promptly before a more serious incident occurs.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPT ON AN A320 HITTING A WINGTIP ON A CHERRY PICKER WHILE PARKING AT LGA, NY.
Narrative: ARRIVING INTO XXX, WE WERE CLRED IN XX TXWY FOR GATE #X. GATE #X USES THE OLD STYLE SHORT JETBRIDGE. AS WE APCHED THE GATE AND STRAIGHTENED OUT OUR TAXI PATH, WE BOTH ASSESSED THE GATE AREA TO BE CLR OF ALL VEHICLES AND OBSTRUCTIONS. AS WE TAXIED IN AND REDUCED OUR SPD TO A SLOW WALK, WITH THE JETBRIDGE OFF MY L SHOULDER, MY CONCENTRATION WAS DIRECTED ON THE LEAD MARSHALER DIRECTLY AHEAD. I WAS TREATING GATE #X IN A SIMILAR WAY AS GATE #Y, TAXIING VERY SLOWLY. AS THE MARSHALER BROUGHT THE WANDS TO VERT, I ALMOST STOPPED. HE GAVE ME MORE MOVE FORWARD SIGNALS, AND I MOVED FORWARD JUST A LITTLE MORE, AND THEN HE CLOSED HIS WANDS. I APPLIED THE FINAL BRAKE PRESSURE TO STOP, AND JUST AS WE WERE STOPPING, THE ACFT VIBRATED A BIT. BOTH THE FO AND I REMARKED TO EACH OTHER AND WONDERED IF WE HIT A SMALL PATCH OF ICE, BECAUSE THE FEELING WE GOT IN THE COCKPIT WAS THE SAME AS STOPPING ON ICE AND SKIDDING A FOOT OR SO. THE MARSHALERS GAVE ME THE 'CHOCKS IN' SIGNAL AND GAVE NO INDICATION THAT ANYTHING WAS WRONG. WE COMPLETED ALL NORMAL CHKLIST ITEMS AND OPENED THE DOOR. AS THE FO SAID GOOD-BYE TO THE FOLKS, I MADE A QUICK RUN TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE (FOR PAPERWORK), STILL UNAWARE OF ANY PROB. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE ACFT ABOUT 5-10 MINS LATER, MY FO TOLD ME THAT THE WINGTIP HAD STRUCK SOMETHING AND THERE WAS DAMAGE TO THE LOWER PORTION OF THE WINGTIP FENCE. I WENT OUTSIDE TO INSPECT THE DAMAGE. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE L WING, I COULD SEE THE DAMAGE TO THE WINGTIP FENCE, BUT THE VEHICLE THAT WE WERE TOLD HAD HIT THE WINGTIP HAD BEEN MOVED AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I TALKED WITH A COUPLE OF RAMP PERSONNEL, WHO SAID THAT A 'CHERRY PICKER' VEHICLE WAS NEXT TO THE ACFT, AND AS WE TAXIED IN, THE WING HAD HIT THE CRANE PORTION OF THE VEHICLE. HE ALSO SAID THAT SOMEONE WAS ACTUALLY IN THE BASKET PORTION OF THE VEHICLE. LATER, THE RAMP SUPVR TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS A DEFINITE PROB WITH THE RAMP PERSONNEL IN MARSHALLING US IN, AND THAT WE WERE NOT AT FAULT WHATSOEVER. WHAT STRUCK ME AS STRANGE WAS THE FACT THAT THE VEHICLE WAS MOVED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT. IT WAS MOVED AND PARKED ABOUT 50 FT AWAY WITH ITS CRANE IN THE DOWN POS AND NO VEHICLE PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT, ONLY RAMP PERSONNEL. WE ALSO RECEIVED CONFLICTING STORIES AS TO WHETHER THE VEHICLE WAS MOVING OR NOT. IRONICALLY, I HAVE BEEN PREACHING TO MY FO'S THE IMPORTANCE OF A SLOW TAXI SPD AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN THE RAMP AREA. ALSO, THE FLT CREW CANNOT BE LOOKING AT THEIR WINGTIPS DURING THE LAST 10-20 FT, SINCE THEIR ATTN IS DIRECTED TO THE LEAD MARSHALER. THIS INCIDENT SHOWED ME THAT IN THIS CASE, NO MATTER HOW VIGILANT WE ARE, THERE ARE SOME THINGS WE JUST CAN'T CTL. I ALSO CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING WE AS THE FLT CREW COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY. WE OBVIOUSLY NEED MORE WORK WITH THE MARSHALERS AND VEHICLE CTL IN THE RAMP AREA. THERE HAS TO BE SOME LEVEL OF TRUST WITH THE MARSHALERS, OR THEY ARE USELESS AS A SAFETY TOOL. THE RECENT IRREGULARITY AND SAFETY RPTS CONTINUE TO COME IN STATING THESE SAME PROBS IN THE RAMP AREA, INCLUDING POOR MARSHALLING, WING WALKERS NOT WATCHING WINGS, BAD LIGHTING AT NIGHT IN THE GATE AREA, AND POOR GATE NUMBERS AND TAXI LINES. I THINK WE SHOULD ADDRESS ALL OF THESE ISSUES PROMPTLY BEFORE A MORE SERIOUS INCIDENT OCCURS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.