Narrative:

This situation occurred in 2 phases. The first on a VOR 24 approach and later on a subsequent ILS approach, both to sgh. While separate, the confusion and environment of the first probably influenced the problem that arose on the second. Both will be described here. Subject aircraft (the only aircraft in the event) was on a routine instrument training flight shooting the VOR 24 approach to ksgh. The writer was the instructor and the PIC. The approach was conducted with appropriate coordination with dayton approach control, since the ksgh tower was in operation. Coordination had been effected to shoot the approach 'as published' (no radar vectors) with an ILS runway 24 at sgh to follow, all on a VFR clearance in VFR conditions. When established on the intermediate segment of the approach, we reported same to dayton approach. We were directed to continue the approach and to contact springfield tower. Previously, dayton had issued us non-standard/specific missed approach instructions (climb 150 degrees, climb to 3000 ft, and return to dayton approach) for the second approach, the ILS 24 at sgh. The initial call to sgh tower indicated '8 mi DME VOR 24, circle to runway 15, request the option.' (surface winds were directly down runway 15 at about 10-15 KTS). We were cleared for the circle and executed same at VOR 24 circling minimums. (At this point, tower made some remark about 'keeping our flight plan open,' which made little sense at the moment, since we were on a local VFR flight plan filed at ffo. (In retrospect, this should have told us that some misunderstanding was arising, but we were rather busy in the cockpit, and we did not challenge or correct it. Mistake #1.) cleared to land on runway 15 (and I cannot remember exactly how the landing clearance was worded), we touched down and advanced power for the takeoff. As we broke ground, the tower said, 'you can turn off on taxiway XXX or proceed to the intersection, and take taxiway ZZZ,' or words to that effect. As we got airborne, we explained that we were executing our previously issued missed approach on a heading of 150 degrees (the runway heading) to 3000 ft for vectors to the ILS to runway 24, again with dayton approach. At this point, the tower -- with some degree of exasperation -- said he had told approach that we were going to stop and that they (tower and approach) would coordination new departure instructions when we were ready to depart. We had never given anyone the impression we were doing anything, but shooting several approachs. How the idea of a stop or a taxi-back got into the process is a mystery to the cockpit crew. In any event, we now move to the second approach and the acknowledged error. We were vectored to and flew the ILS runway 24 approach to sgh. Cleared to continue the approach by dayton, we were xferred to sgh tower. We checked in (probably at about 8 DME), and were told to call at the final approach fix, ohmee (6.2 DME on sgh VORTAC). Some intense instruction now occurred in the cockpit, and we were late in making the final approach fix call. Mistake #2! We realized this, and reported at 2.9 DME. Tower was not happy with us. We completed the approach from this point, and departed the sgh class D feeling both embarrassed and unwelcome. From the informal feed-back I have received, I understand that springfield tower called our home operation and said that we 'did not understand ATC procedures,' and perhaps a bit more. I fully acknowledge the error in not reporting at the final approach fix as directed on the second approach, but I do not, as yet, understand why the tower was upset on the routine circle to land maneuver to runway 15 after the VOR to runway 24, since we clearly stated we intended to circle to runway 15 and requested the option for the landing. Cause of the problems: 1) on the VOR runway 24 approach: misunderstanding between the aircrew and the tower, and the cockpit crew not questioning the radio call and sorting out what our real intentions were on the approach/landing. 2) on the ILS runway 24 approach: don't miss required radio calls! Do not let cockpit instructional distrs override basic flight requirements. Contributing factors: a) cockpit instructional conversation. B) shift change in the tower between initial contact and the landing from the VOR approach (my conjecture).C) inattn to the radio call requirement at the FAF by the cockpit crew because of 'a' above. Corrective actions: 1) talk! Sort out possible misunderstandings whenever in the slightest doubt. 2) don't miss required radio calls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA28 INST INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT HAD MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE ATCT LCL CTLR, REGARDING TOUCH AND GO VERSUS FULL STOP AND COM DELAY IN POS RPTING AT THE FAF FIX AT SGH.

Narrative: THIS SIT OCCURRED IN 2 PHASES. THE FIRST ON A VOR 24 APCH AND LATER ON A SUBSEQUENT ILS APCH, BOTH TO SGH. WHILE SEPARATE, THE CONFUSION AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE FIRST PROBABLY INFLUENCED THE PROB THAT AROSE ON THE SECOND. BOTH WILL BE DESCRIBED HERE. SUBJECT ACFT (THE ONLY ACFT IN THE EVENT) WAS ON A ROUTINE INST TRAINING FLT SHOOTING THE VOR 24 APCH TO KSGH. THE WRITER WAS THE INSTRUCTOR AND THE PIC. THE APCH WAS CONDUCTED WITH APPROPRIATE COORD WITH DAYTON APCH CTL, SINCE THE KSGH TWR WAS IN OP. COORD HAD BEEN EFFECTED TO SHOOT THE APCH 'AS PUBLISHED' (NO RADAR VECTORS) WITH AN ILS RWY 24 AT SGH TO FOLLOW, ALL ON A VFR CLRNC IN VFR CONDITIONS. WHEN ESTABLISHED ON THE INTERMEDIATE SEGMENT OF THE APCH, WE RPTED SAME TO DAYTON APCH. WE WERE DIRECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND TO CONTACT SPRINGFIELD TWR. PREVIOUSLY, DAYTON HAD ISSUED US NON-STANDARD/SPECIFIC MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS (CLB 150 DEGS, CLB TO 3000 FT, AND RETURN TO DAYTON APCH) FOR THE SECOND APCH, THE ILS 24 AT SGH. THE INITIAL CALL TO SGH TWR INDICATED '8 MI DME VOR 24, CIRCLE TO RWY 15, REQUEST THE OPTION.' (SURFACE WINDS WERE DIRECTLY DOWN RWY 15 AT ABOUT 10-15 KTS). WE WERE CLRED FOR THE CIRCLE AND EXECUTED SAME AT VOR 24 CIRCLING MINIMUMS. (AT THIS POINT, TWR MADE SOME REMARK ABOUT 'KEEPING OUR FLT PLAN OPEN,' WHICH MADE LITTLE SENSE AT THE MOMENT, SINCE WE WERE ON A LCL VFR FLT PLAN FILED AT FFO. (IN RETROSPECT, THIS SHOULD HAVE TOLD US THAT SOME MISUNDERSTANDING WAS ARISING, BUT WE WERE RATHER BUSY IN THE COCKPIT, AND WE DID NOT CHALLENGE OR CORRECT IT. MISTAKE #1.) CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 15 (AND I CANNOT REMEMBER EXACTLY HOW THE LNDG CLRNC WAS WORDED), WE TOUCHED DOWN AND ADVANCED PWR FOR THE TKOF. AS WE BROKE GND, THE TWR SAID, 'YOU CAN TURN OFF ON TXWY XXX OR PROCEED TO THE INTXN, AND TAKE TXWY ZZZ,' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. AS WE GOT AIRBORNE, WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE EXECUTING OUR PREVIOUSLY ISSUED MISSED APCH ON A HDG OF 150 DEGS (THE RWY HDG) TO 3000 FT FOR VECTORS TO THE ILS TO RWY 24, AGAIN WITH DAYTON APCH. AT THIS POINT, THE TWR -- WITH SOME DEGREE OF EXASPERATION -- SAID HE HAD TOLD APCH THAT WE WERE GOING TO STOP AND THAT THEY (TWR AND APCH) WOULD COORD NEW DEP INSTRUCTIONS WHEN WE WERE READY TO DEPART. WE HAD NEVER GIVEN ANYONE THE IMPRESSION WE WERE DOING ANYTHING, BUT SHOOTING SEVERAL APCHS. HOW THE IDEA OF A STOP OR A TAXI-BACK GOT INTO THE PROCESS IS A MYSTERY TO THE COCKPIT CREW. IN ANY EVENT, WE NOW MOVE TO THE SECOND APCH AND THE ACKNOWLEDGED ERROR. WE WERE VECTORED TO AND FLEW THE ILS RWY 24 APCH TO SGH. CLRED TO CONTINUE THE APCH BY DAYTON, WE WERE XFERRED TO SGH TWR. WE CHKED IN (PROBABLY AT ABOUT 8 DME), AND WERE TOLD TO CALL AT THE FINAL APCH FIX, OHMEE (6.2 DME ON SGH VORTAC). SOME INTENSE INSTRUCTION NOW OCCURRED IN THE COCKPIT, AND WE WERE LATE IN MAKING THE FINAL APCH FIX CALL. MISTAKE #2! WE REALIZED THIS, AND RPTED AT 2.9 DME. TWR WAS NOT HAPPY WITH US. WE COMPLETED THE APCH FROM THIS POINT, AND DEPARTED THE SGH CLASS D FEELING BOTH EMBARRASSED AND UNWELCOME. FROM THE INFORMAL FEED-BACK I HAVE RECEIVED, I UNDERSTAND THAT SPRINGFIELD TWR CALLED OUR HOME OP AND SAID THAT WE 'DID NOT UNDERSTAND ATC PROCS,' AND PERHAPS A BIT MORE. I FULLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE ERROR IN NOT RPTING AT THE FINAL APCH FIX AS DIRECTED ON THE SECOND APCH, BUT I DO NOT, AS YET, UNDERSTAND WHY THE TWR WAS UPSET ON THE ROUTINE CIRCLE TO LAND MANEUVER TO RWY 15 AFTER THE VOR TO RWY 24, SINCE WE CLRLY STATED WE INTENDED TO CIRCLE TO RWY 15 AND REQUESTED THE OPTION FOR THE LNDG. CAUSE OF THE PROBS: 1) ON THE VOR RWY 24 APCH: MISUNDERSTANDING BTWN THE AIRCREW AND THE TWR, AND THE COCKPIT CREW NOT QUESTIONING THE RADIO CALL AND SORTING OUT WHAT OUR REAL INTENTIONS WERE ON THE APCH/LNDG. 2) ON THE ILS RWY 24 APCH: DON'T MISS REQUIRED RADIO CALLS! DO NOT LET COCKPIT INSTRUCTIONAL DISTRS OVERRIDE BASIC FLT REQUIREMENTS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: A) COCKPIT INSTRUCTIONAL CONVERSATION. B) SHIFT CHANGE IN THE TWR BTWN INITIAL CONTACT AND THE LNDG FROM THE VOR APCH (MY CONJECTURE).C) INATTN TO THE RADIO CALL REQUIREMENT AT THE FAF BY THE COCKPIT CREW BECAUSE OF 'A' ABOVE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) TALK! SORT OUT POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHENEVER IN THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT. 2) DON'T MISS REQUIRED RADIO CALLS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.