Narrative:

The WX was VFR with haze and the sun low on the horizon to the west. Traffic was very light. Entering downwind for runway 27L, we were informed that it would be a short approach. The first officer was flying and briefed a visual runway 27L. The descent and approach checks had been completed and the ILS runway 27L idented. We were cleared for a visual approach with a turn outside the marker (OM). The first officer completed the turn to final. I noted a 20 KT crosswind out of the south. The landing checks were completed, the approach was stabilized, and I called '1000 ft cleared to land.' at 500 ft it appeared to me that the first officer was lining up on the parallel taxiway just south of the runway. I inquired if he was looking at the runway. He appeared surprised and banked the aircraft toward the runway. I felt the approach was not stabilized at that point and immediately said 'go around.' the first officer complied and initiated a go around. The return and subsequent landing were uneventful. At the gate after the flight, I debriefed the first officer on what had happened. He stated: 1) his flight director had not displayed what he had expected to see and he had 'target fixated' on the flight director. 2) the glare from the setting sun in the haze was a distraction. 3) at the point I brought the alignment to his attention, he was not aware he was aligning with a taxiway. In my opinion, CRM was working in our cockpit. I recognized the problem, communicated with the first officer, and we initiated proper action. However, with better CRM the go around could have been avoided. During our debrief the first officer confirmed that, had he recognized the fact he was concerned about the discrepancy between the visual picture and the instrumentation, our communication would have been enhanced, and I could have worked the flight director problem and removed the distraction. Contributing to my sense of well being were 2 additional factors. 1) we fly hundreds of visual approachs a yr to these runways and we had the runway in sight from the time we turned downwind. 2) the first officer is one of our senior, very competent first officer's and my trust in his abilities allowed me to relax during what appeared to be a routine visual. Lastly, the first officer's 'bank to the runway' action surprised me. To prevent this from happening again, I will change my brief to emphasize the need for verbal articulation of any problem no matter how insignificant it may seem at the moment. The approach could have been easily completed without any electronic aids. In this case, the backup information became a point for target fixation at a critical phase in the flight. Supplemental information from acn 578964: WX in atl, clear. Landing west, runway 27L. Wind, 12-16 KTS, right crosswind visual, 5+ mi in haze. Sun low on horizontal, my vision was somewhat reduced by a setting sun. After being cleared a visual approach to runway 27L, a left turn was made about 2 mi outside the FAF. About 1 mi outside the FAF (while backing up the visual approach with the ILS). Both flight director steering bars went out of view. The pitch bars were still operations normal. While trying to correct the flight directors, my attention began to focus on inside of the aircraft, rather than flying the visual approach. Inside the FAF, I gave up on trying to fix the flight directors and focused on flying the aircraft. At about 500 ft AGL we recognized that I, in fact, was lined up on the taxiway to the left of runway 27L instead of the runway. At that point a right turn was started to realign with runway 27L, but with the right crosswind and short proximity to the landing threshold, a missed approach was executed. We were vectored around for another visual approach to runway 27L which resulted in an uneventful land and taxi back to the gate. In the approach/landing segment, if you don't need it, just forget it and fly the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CREW LINED UP TO LAND ON A PARALLEL TXWY INSTEAD OF THE RWY AT ATL.

Narrative: THE WX WAS VFR WITH HAZE AND THE SUN LOW ON THE HORIZON TO THE W. TFC WAS VERY LIGHT. ENTERING DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27L, WE WERE INFORMED THAT IT WOULD BE A SHORT APCH. THE FO WAS FLYING AND BRIEFED A VISUAL RWY 27L. THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKS HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND THE ILS RWY 27L IDENTED. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH WITH A TURN OUTSIDE THE MARKER (OM). THE FO COMPLETED THE TURN TO FINAL. I NOTED A 20 KT XWIND OUT OF THE S. THE LNDG CHKS WERE COMPLETED, THE APCH WAS STABILIZED, AND I CALLED '1000 FT CLRED TO LAND.' AT 500 FT IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE FO WAS LINING UP ON THE PARALLEL TXWY JUST S OF THE RWY. I INQUIRED IF HE WAS LOOKING AT THE RWY. HE APPEARED SURPRISED AND BANKED THE ACFT TOWARD THE RWY. I FELT THE APCH WAS NOT STABILIZED AT THAT POINT AND IMMEDIATELY SAID 'GO AROUND.' THE FO COMPLIED AND INITIATED A GAR. THE RETURN AND SUBSEQUENT LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. AT THE GATE AFTER THE FLT, I DEBRIEFED THE FO ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE STATED: 1) HIS FLT DIRECTOR HAD NOT DISPLAYED WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED TO SEE AND HE HAD 'TARGET FIXATED' ON THE FLT DIRECTOR. 2) THE GLARE FROM THE SETTING SUN IN THE HAZE WAS A DISTR. 3) AT THE POINT I BROUGHT THE ALIGNMENT TO HIS ATTN, HE WAS NOT AWARE HE WAS ALIGNING WITH A TXWY. IN MY OPINION, CRM WAS WORKING IN OUR COCKPIT. I RECOGNIZED THE PROB, COMMUNICATED WITH THE FO, AND WE INITIATED PROPER ACTION. HOWEVER, WITH BETTER CRM THE GAR COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. DURING OUR DEBRIEF THE FO CONFIRMED THAT, HAD HE RECOGNIZED THE FACT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE VISUAL PICTURE AND THE INSTRUMENTATION, OUR COM WOULD HAVE BEEN ENHANCED, AND I COULD HAVE WORKED THE FLT DIRECTOR PROB AND REMOVED THE DISTR. CONTRIBUTING TO MY SENSE OF WELL BEING WERE 2 ADDITIONAL FACTORS. 1) WE FLY HUNDREDS OF VISUAL APCHS A YR TO THESE RWYS AND WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT FROM THE TIME WE TURNED DOWNWIND. 2) THE FO IS ONE OF OUR SENIOR, VERY COMPETENT FO'S AND MY TRUST IN HIS ABILITIES ALLOWED ME TO RELAX DURING WHAT APPEARED TO BE A ROUTINE VISUAL. LASTLY, THE FO'S 'BANK TO THE RWY' ACTION SURPRISED ME. TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, I WILL CHANGE MY BRIEF TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR VERBAL ARTICULATION OF ANY PROB NO MATTER HOW INSIGNIFICANT IT MAY SEEM AT THE MOMENT. THE APCH COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY COMPLETED WITHOUT ANY ELECTRONIC AIDS. IN THIS CASE, THE BACKUP INFO BECAME A POINT FOR TARGET FIXATION AT A CRITICAL PHASE IN THE FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 578964: WX IN ATL, CLR. LNDG W, RWY 27L. WIND, 12-16 KTS, R XWIND VISUAL, 5+ MI IN HAZE. SUN LOW ON HORIZ, MY VISION WAS SOMEWHAT REDUCED BY A SETTING SUN. AFTER BEING CLRED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27L, A L TURN WAS MADE ABOUT 2 MI OUTSIDE THE FAF. ABOUT 1 MI OUTSIDE THE FAF (WHILE BACKING UP THE VISUAL APCH WITH THE ILS). BOTH FLT DIRECTOR STEERING BARS WENT OUT OF VIEW. THE PITCH BARS WERE STILL OPS NORMAL. WHILE TRYING TO CORRECT THE FLT DIRECTORS, MY ATTN BEGAN TO FOCUS ON INSIDE OF THE ACFT, RATHER THAN FLYING THE VISUAL APCH. INSIDE THE FAF, I GAVE UP ON TRYING TO FIX THE FLT DIRECTORS AND FOCUSED ON FLYING THE ACFT. AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL WE RECOGNIZED THAT I, IN FACT, WAS LINED UP ON THE TXWY TO THE L OF RWY 27L INSTEAD OF THE RWY. AT THAT POINT A R TURN WAS STARTED TO REALIGN WITH RWY 27L, BUT WITH THE R XWIND AND SHORT PROX TO THE LNDG THRESHOLD, A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED. WE WERE VECTORED AROUND FOR ANOTHER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27L WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNEVENTFUL LAND AND TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. IN THE APCH/LNDG SEGMENT, IF YOU DON'T NEED IT, JUST FORGET IT AND FLY THE AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.