Narrative:

As with all events that occur a chain of occurrences happens that, when analyzed, leads to the causes for the event. I was pilot in command of my piper cherokee. My mother was a passenger and had not flown since she was 16 years old. She is now in her 80's. After a thorough prep of the aircraft, I plotted a course to the 115 radial off of huo. This radial would take me just north of the ADIZ zone for ny airspace over the hudson river. Then I would turn northeast along the east shore of the river to the bear mountain bridge. Continue on a northeast course to avoid west point restr zone, gain altitude and to 4500 ft begin a north westerly heading past the newburgh beacon bridge, continue northwest till I was outside stewart airspace, turn west and set up for a straight in approach to orange county, providing traffic was not a factor for the straight in. The first link in the chain was formed by choosing a radial that would bring me close to the ADIZ. Once the river came into view I realized that my intended course would have me change direction to the north close to the nuclear facility. Knowing the current state of heightened alert I decided to continue south down the river, without looking at my sectional. This decision was made based on my memory that class B airspace began just north of the tappan zee but south of croton point, both distinguishable waypoints. However, by not looking at the sectional I did not have the visual stimuli to trigger that I would be flying into an ADIZ area. I continued south toward tappan zee bridge until I was comfortable that my turn northward would not cause undue concerns around the nuclear facility. The analysis demonstrated that the following factors led up to the event. I should not have chosen a radial that brought me so close to the ADIZ. The flight should have been flown in the opposite direction, north from orange county, east to the hudson, down the east side of the river, intercepting the 110 degree radial of huguenot, then back to orange county. Prior to altering course to the south I should have looked at the sectional to determine the outskirts of the ADIZ and avoided the area. Instead of flying south towards the tappan zee bridge, upon seeing the power plant, I should have begun an immediate left turn, remaining on the west side of the river avoiding both the ADIZ and the power plant. Although I was monitoring 121.5, I received no message or warning that I was in or approaching the ADIZ. I understand there is no requirement for radar service to call me, but to prevent or minimize the incursions, a warning system should be developed using 121.5. I should not have allowed the emotions of flying my mother over our home town to cloud my judgement in flying so close to the ADIZ.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF PA28 OPERATED WITHIN NY ADIZ AIRSPACE WITHOUT CLRNC. APPARENTLY HIS TRANSGRESSIONS WENT UNNOTICED BY AUTHORITIES.

Narrative: AS WITH ALL EVENTS THAT OCCUR A CHAIN OF OCCURRENCES HAPPENS THAT, WHEN ANALYZED, LEADS TO THE CAUSES FOR THE EVENT. I WAS PLT IN COMMAND OF MY PIPER CHEROKEE. MY MOTHER WAS A PAX AND HAD NOT FLOWN SINCE SHE WAS 16 YEARS OLD. SHE IS NOW IN HER 80'S. AFTER A THOROUGH PREP OF THE ACFT, I PLOTTED A COURSE TO THE 115 RADIAL OFF OF HUO. THIS RADIAL WOULD TAKE ME JUST N OF THE ADIZ ZONE FOR NY AIRSPACE OVER THE HUDSON RIVER. THEN I WOULD TURN NE ALONG THE E SHORE OF THE RIVER TO THE BEAR MOUNTAIN BRIDGE. CONTINUE ON A NE COURSE TO AVOID WEST POINT RESTR ZONE, GAIN ALTITUDE AND TO 4500 FT BEGIN A N WESTERLY HDG PAST THE NEWBURGH BEACON BRIDGE, CONTINUE NW TILL I WAS OUTSIDE STEWART AIRSPACE, TURN W AND SET UP FOR A STRAIGHT IN APCH TO ORANGE COUNTY, PROVIDING TFC WAS NOT A FACTOR FOR THE STRAIGHT IN. THE FIRST LINK IN THE CHAIN WAS FORMED BY CHOOSING A RADIAL THAT WOULD BRING ME CLOSE TO THE ADIZ. ONCE THE RIVER CAME INTO VIEW I REALIZED THAT MY INTENDED COURSE WOULD HAVE ME CHANGE DIRECTION TO THE N CLOSE TO THE NUCLEAR FACILITY. KNOWING THE CURRENT STATE OF HEIGHTENED ALERT I DECIDED TO CONTINUE S DOWN THE RIVER, WITHOUT LOOKING AT MY SECTIONAL. THIS DECISION WAS MADE BASED ON MY MEMORY THAT CLASS B AIRSPACE BEGAN JUST N OF THE TAPPAN ZEE BUT S OF CROTON POINT, BOTH DISTINGUISHABLE WAYPOINTS. HOWEVER, BY NOT LOOKING AT THE SECTIONAL I DID NOT HAVE THE VISUAL STIMULI TO TRIGGER THAT I WOULD BE FLYING INTO AN ADIZ AREA. I CONTINUED S TOWARD TAPPAN ZEE BRIDGE UNTIL I WAS COMFORTABLE THAT MY TURN NORTHWARD WOULD NOT CAUSE UNDUE CONCERNS AROUND THE NUCLEAR FACILITY. THE ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS LED UP TO THE EVENT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE CHOSEN A RADIAL THAT BROUGHT ME SO CLOSE TO THE ADIZ. THE FLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION, N FROM ORANGE COUNTY, E TO THE HUDSON, DOWN THE EAST SIDE OF THE RIVER, INTERCEPTING THE 110 DEG RADIAL OF HUGUENOT, THEN BACK TO ORANGE COUNTY. PRIOR TO ALTERING COURSE TO THE S I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED AT THE SECTIONAL TO DETERMINE THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE ADIZ AND AVOIDED THE AREA. INSTEAD OF FLYING S TOWARDS THE TAPPAN ZEE BRIDGE, UPON SEEING THE PWR PLANT, I SHOULD HAVE BEGUN AN IMMEDIATE LEFT TURN, REMAINING ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE RIVER AVOIDING BOTH THE ADIZ AND THE PWR PLANT. ALTHOUGH I WAS MONITORING 121.5, I RECEIVED NO MESSAGE OR WARNING THAT I WAS IN OR APCHING THE ADIZ. I UNDERSTAND THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR RADAR SERVICE TO CALL ME, BUT TO PREVENT OR MINIMIZE THE INCURSIONS, A WARNING SYSTEM SHOULD BE DEVELOPED USING 121.5. I SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE EMOTIONS OF FLYING MY MOTHER OVER OUR HOME TOWN TO CLOUD MY JUDGEMENT IN FLYING SO CLOSE TO THE ADIZ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.