A B737-200 was dispatched in non compliance with the crew and passenger emergency oxygen cylinder va...

Attributes
ACN	579207
Time
Date	200304
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : maintenance
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	maintenance : technician
Qualification	technician : powerplant technician : airframe
ASRS Report	579207
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	maintenance : technician
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : crew oxygen test indication
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : schedule pressure contributing factor : work cards performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : installation performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Maintenance Human Performance Chart Or Publication Aircraft
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative:

Aircraft X had a #1 engine hydraulic pressure-line rupture. Myself and another mechanic stayed overtime to right&right the line. While waiting for the line to arrive, we were asked to perform an evening check. I noticed the crew and passenger oxygen were reading approximately 1450 psi, at which time I started to right&right the throttles. The bottles were turned off, and bands were removed when the other mechanic doing the evening check walked up and asked what the bottles were reading. After telling him, he informed me that the dispatch limits, he thought, were 1300 psi, and they didn't need charging. Also, he said the line for our hydraulic leak had arrived. Being in a remote area, I called a supervisor to confirm the limits, and they were 1300 psi. The bottles were re-secured with the bands. In a rush to get back to the hydraulic line failure, I failed to open the oxygen valves completely. I was asked the next day if I worked on the oxygen bottles, and told what happened, at which time I called duty control.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE CREW AND PAX EMER OXYGEN CYLINDER VALVE TURNED OFF.

Narrative: ACFT X HAD A #1 ENG HYDRAULIC PRESSURE-LINE RUPTURE. MYSELF AND ANOTHER MECH STAYED OVERTIME TO R&R THE LINE. WHILE WAITING FOR THE LINE TO ARRIVE, WE WERE ASKED TO PERFORM AN EVENING CHK. I NOTICED THE CREW AND PAX OXYGEN WERE READING APPROX 1450 PSI, AT WHICH TIME I STARTED TO R&R THE THROTTLES. THE BOTTLES WERE TURNED OFF, AND BANDS WERE REMOVED WHEN THE OTHER MECH DOING THE EVENING CHK WALKED UP AND ASKED WHAT THE BOTTLES WERE READING. AFTER TELLING HIM, HE INFORMED ME THAT THE DISPATCH LIMITS, HE THOUGHT, WERE 1300 PSI, AND THEY DIDN'T NEED CHARGING. ALSO, HE SAID THE LINE FOR OUR HYDRAULIC LEAK HAD ARRIVED. BEING IN A REMOTE AREA, I CALLED A SUPVR TO CONFIRM THE LIMITS, AND THEY WERE 1300 PSI. THE BOTTLES WERE RE-SECURED WITH THE BANDS. IN A RUSH TO GET BACK TO THE HYDRAULIC LINE FAILURE, I FAILED TO OPEN THE OXYGEN VALVES COMPLETELY. I WAS ASKED THE NEXT DAY IF I WORKED ON THE OXYGEN BOTTLES, AND TOLD WHAT HAPPENED, AT WHICH TIME I CALLED DUTY CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B737-200 was dispatched in non compliance with the crew and passenger emergency oxygen cylinder valve turned off.