Narrative:

Our mission was to ferry 8 ah-64A apache aircraft from charleston, sc, to boise, identification, with our first remain overnight being at stl. During the planning phase in boise, I determined that not all of our charts were current and some were nearly 2 yrs out of date. The air mission commander made the decision that we did not require all current charts. He would be using a handheld GPS with a current database. Due to maintenance factors, the air mission commander was part of a group of 6 ah-64A apaches that had arrived stl ahead of our flight of 2. I was the PIC in the lead aircraft, flight of 2. My copilot had all of our maps in the front seat and was responsible for navigation and tuning up the required frequencys. It is not possible to pass maps or other items from the front seat to the back seat or vice versa in an apache, nor is it possible to see the maps from another seat. During the planning phase in boise, we had drawn course lines on the maps to aid in navigation. In this case, we had terminated the course line well short of stl so as not to obscure data on the map. As chance would have it, the course line terminated very near cps. I knew that our destination was stl and that we would be passing near cps. My copilot was not familiar with st louis, and only knew that we were going to 'the st louis airport' and that it was located 'downtown.' the way our TCA chart was folded, he could not see stl, only cps with our course line terminating nearby. In his mind, cps met all the criteria for 'the st louis airport.' it was 'downtown,' it was named downtown, and our course line terminated nearby. We began attempting to contact st louis approach at 35 NM from stl at about 700 ft AGL. We found out later that all of the approach frequencys were out of date. We were not in class B airspace yet, so I elected to continue inbound while we used every approach frequency we could find. After no success, I directed my copilot to look up the connection between stl and cps. I, of course, did not understand that he was confused about where we were going. I contacted stl tower, and he gave us a transponder code. My copilot assumed (wrongly) that we were now relieved of any burden of co-coordinating for flying through other airspace. My copilot was navigating, following along on the map and was expecting to land at cps. About this time, I saw cps about 3 mi to our right front and asked if it was class D airspace. My copilot responded that it was class B airspace. (Still confused about which airport we were going to.) he saw cps on the map well in advance, but when we contacted tower (stl tower unfortunately), he had thought everything was set. This began several mins of conversation between he and I while we figured out what was going on. Additional confusion was being generated in his mind when our GPS steer to stl and distance-to-go did not agree with what he was seeing on the ground. (We had the correct coordinates for stl loaded.) he unfolded the map, saw stl as I was explaining that there is a 'down st louis' (I couldn't remember the exact name) airport south of the river, but I wasn't sure if it was tower controled or not. By now we were about 1 mi west of cps and abeam. At that particular moment, I saw no activity and no tower, and thought 'I guess it's uncontrolled.' about 30 seconds later, we saw 2 aircraft on approach to land at cps. Our flight may have caused one of the aircraft to deviate a little, but I don't think we ever came any closer than about 1/3 of a mi. At this time, I think cps tower contacted st louis TRACON, who contacted stl tower, who contacted us and directed us to contact cps tower. By the time all that took place, we were clearing cps airspace to the north and I knew that it was not practical or useful to leave stl's frequency. We landed at stl uneventfully and were directed to make a phone call to cps tower. I explained the sequence of events that led up to the confusion in our aircraft to the tower supervisor and after a long conversation, I think she understood that we knew what to do and that an unusual sequence of events led up to my copilot and I being confused and initially not communicating clearly what it was we thought we were doing and where we were going. I did not tell the tower supervisor about our 0UT dated pubs. I ensured that when we departed stl every publication on that aircraft was current and that we will never make that mistake again. Had we contacted approach at the 35 NM area, we would have been vectored around cps or instructed to contact cps tower well in advance, despite my copilot's confusion. In addition, during our pretkof brief, I am going into a little more detail to ensure that we both know where we are going. Had I been navigating with the maps in my seat, I would have seen cps on the map well in advance and circumvented or contacted cps tower, but as I stated earlier, we don't have the option of changing duties like that unless we have 2 complete sets of pubs -- one for each seat. Not practical for a long cross country.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT OF 2 H64 ACFT PENETRATED CLASS D AIRSPACE OVER CPS ARPT.

Narrative: OUR MISSION WAS TO FERRY 8 AH-64A APACHE ACFT FROM CHARLESTON, SC, TO BOISE, ID, WITH OUR FIRST REMAIN OVERNIGHT BEING AT STL. DURING THE PLANNING PHASE IN BOISE, I DETERMINED THAT NOT ALL OF OUR CHARTS WERE CURRENT AND SOME WERE NEARLY 2 YRS OUT OF DATE. THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER MADE THE DECISION THAT WE DID NOT REQUIRE ALL CURRENT CHARTS. HE WOULD BE USING A HANDHELD GPS WITH A CURRENT DATABASE. DUE TO MAINT FACTORS, THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER WAS PART OF A GROUP OF 6 AH-64A APACHES THAT HAD ARRIVED STL AHEAD OF OUR FLT OF 2. I WAS THE PIC IN THE LEAD ACFT, FLT OF 2. MY COPLT HAD ALL OF OUR MAPS IN THE FRONT SEAT AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR NAV AND TUNING UP THE REQUIRED FREQS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PASS MAPS OR OTHER ITEMS FROM THE FRONT SEAT TO THE BACK SEAT OR VICE VERSA IN AN APACHE, NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO SEE THE MAPS FROM ANOTHER SEAT. DURING THE PLANNING PHASE IN BOISE, WE HAD DRAWN COURSE LINES ON THE MAPS TO AID IN NAV. IN THIS CASE, WE HAD TERMINATED THE COURSE LINE WELL SHORT OF STL SO AS NOT TO OBSCURE DATA ON THE MAP. AS CHANCE WOULD HAVE IT, THE COURSE LINE TERMINATED VERY NEAR CPS. I KNEW THAT OUR DEST WAS STL AND THAT WE WOULD BE PASSING NEAR CPS. MY COPLT WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ST LOUIS, AND ONLY KNEW THAT WE WERE GOING TO 'THE ST LOUIS ARPT' AND THAT IT WAS LOCATED 'DOWNTOWN.' THE WAY OUR TCA CHART WAS FOLDED, HE COULD NOT SEE STL, ONLY CPS WITH OUR COURSE LINE TERMINATING NEARBY. IN HIS MIND, CPS MET ALL THE CRITERIA FOR 'THE ST LOUIS ARPT.' IT WAS 'DOWNTOWN,' IT WAS NAMED DOWNTOWN, AND OUR COURSE LINE TERMINATED NEARBY. WE BEGAN ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT ST LOUIS APCH AT 35 NM FROM STL AT ABOUT 700 FT AGL. WE FOUND OUT LATER THAT ALL OF THE APCH FREQS WERE OUT OF DATE. WE WERE NOT IN CLASS B AIRSPACE YET, SO I ELECTED TO CONTINUE INBOUND WHILE WE USED EVERY APCH FREQ WE COULD FIND. AFTER NO SUCCESS, I DIRECTED MY COPLT TO LOOK UP THE CONNECTION BTWN STL AND CPS. I, OF COURSE, DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT HE WAS CONFUSED ABOUT WHERE WE WERE GOING. I CONTACTED STL TWR, AND HE GAVE US A XPONDER CODE. MY COPLT ASSUMED (WRONGLY) THAT WE WERE NOW RELIEVED OF ANY BURDEN OF CO-COORDINATING FOR FLYING THROUGH OTHER AIRSPACE. MY COPLT WAS NAVING, FOLLOWING ALONG ON THE MAP AND WAS EXPECTING TO LAND AT CPS. ABOUT THIS TIME, I SAW CPS ABOUT 3 MI TO OUR R FRONT AND ASKED IF IT WAS CLASS D AIRSPACE. MY COPLT RESPONDED THAT IT WAS CLASS B AIRSPACE. (STILL CONFUSED ABOUT WHICH ARPT WE WERE GOING TO.) HE SAW CPS ON THE MAP WELL IN ADVANCE, BUT WHEN WE CONTACTED TWR (STL TWR UNFORTUNATELY), HE HAD THOUGHT EVERYTHING WAS SET. THIS BEGAN SEVERAL MINS OF CONVERSATION BTWN HE AND I WHILE WE FIGURED OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. ADDITIONAL CONFUSION WAS BEING GENERATED IN HIS MIND WHEN OUR GPS STEER TO STL AND DISTANCE-TO-GO DID NOT AGREE WITH WHAT HE WAS SEEING ON THE GND. (WE HAD THE CORRECT COORDINATES FOR STL LOADED.) HE UNFOLDED THE MAP, SAW STL AS I WAS EXPLAINING THAT THERE IS A 'DOWN ST LOUIS' (I COULDN'T REMEMBER THE EXACT NAME) ARPT S OF THE RIVER, BUT I WASN'T SURE IF IT WAS TWR CTLED OR NOT. BY NOW WE WERE ABOUT 1 MI W OF CPS AND ABEAM. AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT, I SAW NO ACTIVITY AND NO TWR, AND THOUGHT 'I GUESS IT'S UNCTLED.' ABOUT 30 SECONDS LATER, WE SAW 2 ACFT ON APCH TO LAND AT CPS. OUR FLT MAY HAVE CAUSED ONE OF THE ACFT TO DEVIATE A LITTLE, BUT I DON'T THINK WE EVER CAME ANY CLOSER THAN ABOUT 1/3 OF A MI. AT THIS TIME, I THINK CPS TWR CONTACTED ST LOUIS TRACON, WHO CONTACTED STL TWR, WHO CONTACTED US AND DIRECTED US TO CONTACT CPS TWR. BY THE TIME ALL THAT TOOK PLACE, WE WERE CLRING CPS AIRSPACE TO THE N AND I KNEW THAT IT WAS NOT PRACTICAL OR USEFUL TO LEAVE STL'S FREQ. WE LANDED AT STL UNEVENTFULLY AND WERE DIRECTED TO MAKE A PHONE CALL TO CPS TWR. I EXPLAINED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE CONFUSION IN OUR ACFT TO THE TWR SUPVR AND AFTER A LONG CONVERSATION, I THINK SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE KNEW WHAT TO DO AND THAT AN UNUSUAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LED UP TO MY COPLT AND I BEING CONFUSED AND INITIALLY NOT COMMUNICATING CLRLY WHAT IT WAS WE THOUGHT WE WERE DOING AND WHERE WE WERE GOING. I DID NOT TELL THE TWR SUPVR ABOUT OUR 0UT DATED PUBS. I ENSURED THAT WHEN WE DEPARTED STL EVERY PUB ON THAT ACFT WAS CURRENT AND THAT WE WILL NEVER MAKE THAT MISTAKE AGAIN. HAD WE CONTACTED APCH AT THE 35 NM AREA, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN VECTORED AROUND CPS OR INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT CPS TWR WELL IN ADVANCE, DESPITE MY COPLT'S CONFUSION. IN ADDITION, DURING OUR PRETKOF BRIEF, I AM GOING INTO A LITTLE MORE DETAIL TO ENSURE THAT WE BOTH KNOW WHERE WE ARE GOING. HAD I BEEN NAVING WITH THE MAPS IN MY SEAT, I WOULD HAVE SEEN CPS ON THE MAP WELL IN ADVANCE AND CIRCUMVENTED OR CONTACTED CPS TWR, BUT AS I STATED EARLIER, WE DON'T HAVE THE OPTION OF CHANGING DUTIES LIKE THAT UNLESS WE HAVE 2 COMPLETE SETS OF PUBS -- ONE FOR EACH SEAT. NOT PRACTICAL FOR A LONG XCOUNTRY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.