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Attributes | |
ACN | 579742 |
Time | |
Date | 200304 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : rjaa.airport |
State Reference | FO |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing : roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 579742 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : turbulence other anomaly other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : person 6 |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Weather Flight Crew Human Performance Environmental Factor Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
Grease fire on brakes on left wing gear upon arrival at gate. Landing runway 16R at narita. Winds 230 degrees/21 KTS gusting 32+ KTS moderate turbulence reported below 1500 ft on final with +/-15 to 20 KTS airspeed deviation reported. Attempted to use flaps 30 degrees but winds never dropped off and gross weight of 618000 pounds, with the required addition of 20 KTS precluded the use of 30 degrees, further aggravating the speed problem. Reference for landing weight was 158000 pounds with a target approach speed of 178 KTS. Speed was bled off over the threshold but existence of moderate turbulence to within ft of the ground would not allow reduction to reference speed at touchdown. Autobrakes had been selected to level 3 and were used along with reverse thrust. Manual braking was then used to slow for a turnoff at taxiway A9. On taxi in the EICAS message 'brake heat' was displayed. Synoptic showed left brakes much hotter than right brakes, the range being approximately level 5 on the left and level 2-3 on the right. These values continued to rise reaching a maximum of level 6-8 on the left and level 2-3 on the right upon reaching the gate. We called ramp and told them that we had hot brakes and to tell maintenance that we could not set the brakes and would need to be chocked. After taxi in (planned use of ground power) brakes were manually awaiting the chocks. Taxi and landing lights were constantly flashed in an attempt to get maintenance to plug in and communication. Brakes that were smoking had their attention and they never chocked the aircraft for approximately 4-5 mins. With the engines running (ground power was not attached due to more pressing problems for them) brakes had to be held manually in order to keep the aircraft from possibly moving as the jetbridge approached. This I'm sure further aggravated the situation, not allowing for some additional cooling. Maintenance could be seen in the reflection of the terminal using the fire bottle on the left gear in what I assumed was an attempt to cool the hot brakes. A technician later said there were some flames from what he suspected was accumulated grease. Passenger were deplaned normally using the jetbridge and were unaware of the situation. An emergency evacuate/evacuation was not required or even warranted. Aggravating conditions that contributed to this was the ferrying of over 100000 pounds of fuel. This would not have been a problem except for the high winds and turbulence which required a higher than normal approach speed. I feel the excessive heating of the left brakes was due to an attempt to maintain directional control during rollout due to extreme WX-vaning from the 70 degree right crosswind. Turbulence approachs at narita are a common problem and though reported, usually end up being less severe than reported. This time, however, it was equal to or greater than reported and never abated. In retrospect I would have used absolute maximum reversing and used the displaced threshold of runway 34L for additional roll. The braking used, however, to turn off at taxiway A9 did not seem excessive at the time and only the left brakes overheated. A valuable lesson learned.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B744 LNDG IN STRONG XWINDS AND TURB AT RJAA OVERHEATED BRAKES WHICH IGNITED GREASE ON GEAR. EXTINGUISHED AT GATE.
Narrative: GREASE FIRE ON BRAKES ON L WING GEAR UPON ARR AT GATE. LNDG RWY 16R AT NARITA. WINDS 230 DEGS/21 KTS GUSTING 32+ KTS MODERATE TURB RPTED BELOW 1500 FT ON FINAL WITH +/-15 TO 20 KTS AIRSPD DEV RPTED. ATTEMPTED TO USE FLAPS 30 DEGS BUT WINDS NEVER DROPPED OFF AND GROSS WT OF 618000 LBS, WITH THE REQUIRED ADDITION OF 20 KTS PRECLUDED THE USE OF 30 DEGS, FURTHER AGGRAVATING THE SPD PROB. REF FOR LNDG WT WAS 158000 LBS WITH A TARGET APCH SPD OF 178 KTS. SPD WAS BLED OFF OVER THE THRESHOLD BUT EXISTENCE OF MODERATE TURB TO WITHIN FT OF THE GND WOULD NOT ALLOW REDUCTION TO REF SPD AT TOUCHDOWN. AUTOBRAKES HAD BEEN SELECTED TO LEVEL 3 AND WERE USED ALONG WITH REVERSE THRUST. MANUAL BRAKING WAS THEN USED TO SLOW FOR A TURNOFF AT TXWY A9. ON TAXI IN THE EICAS MESSAGE 'BRAKE HEAT' WAS DISPLAYED. SYNOPTIC SHOWED L BRAKES MUCH HOTTER THAN R BRAKES, THE RANGE BEING APPROX LEVEL 5 ON THE L AND LEVEL 2-3 ON THE R. THESE VALUES CONTINUED TO RISE REACHING A MAX OF LEVEL 6-8 ON THE L AND LEVEL 2-3 ON THE R UPON REACHING THE GATE. WE CALLED RAMP AND TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD HOT BRAKES AND TO TELL MAINT THAT WE COULD NOT SET THE BRAKES AND WOULD NEED TO BE CHOCKED. AFTER TAXI IN (PLANNED USE OF GND PWR) BRAKES WERE MANUALLY AWAITING THE CHOCKS. TAXI AND LNDG LIGHTS WERE CONSTANTLY FLASHED IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET MAINT TO PLUG IN AND COM. BRAKES THAT WERE SMOKING HAD THEIR ATTN AND THEY NEVER CHOCKED THE ACFT FOR APPROX 4-5 MINS. WITH THE ENGS RUNNING (GND PWR WAS NOT ATTACHED DUE TO MORE PRESSING PROBS FOR THEM) BRAKES HAD TO BE HELD MANUALLY IN ORDER TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM POSSIBLY MOVING AS THE JETBRIDGE APCHED. THIS I'M SURE FURTHER AGGRAVATED THE SIT, NOT ALLOWING FOR SOME ADDITIONAL COOLING. MAINT COULD BE SEEN IN THE REFLECTION OF THE TERMINAL USING THE FIRE BOTTLE ON THE L GEAR IN WHAT I ASSUMED WAS AN ATTEMPT TO COOL THE HOT BRAKES. A TECHNICIAN LATER SAID THERE WERE SOME FLAMES FROM WHAT HE SUSPECTED WAS ACCUMULATED GREASE. PAX WERE DEPLANED NORMALLY USING THE JETBRIDGE AND WERE UNAWARE OF THE SIT. AN EMER EVAC WAS NOT REQUIRED OR EVEN WARRANTED. AGGRAVATING CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WAS THE FERRYING OF OVER 100000 LBS OF FUEL. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB EXCEPT FOR THE HIGH WINDS AND TURB WHICH REQUIRED A HIGHER THAN NORMAL APCH SPD. I FEEL THE EXCESSIVE HEATING OF THE L BRAKES WAS DUE TO AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL DURING ROLLOUT DUE TO EXTREME WX-VANING FROM THE 70 DEG R XWIND. TURB APCHS AT NARITA ARE A COMMON PROB AND THOUGH RPTED, USUALLY END UP BEING LESS SEVERE THAN RPTED. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, IT WAS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN RPTED AND NEVER ABATED. IN RETROSPECT I WOULD HAVE USED ABSOLUTE MAX REVERSING AND USED THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF RWY 34L FOR ADDITIONAL ROLL. THE BRAKING USED, HOWEVER, TO TURN OFF AT TXWY A9 DID NOT SEEM EXCESSIVE AT THE TIME AND ONLY THE L BRAKES OVERHEATED. A VALUABLE LESSON LEARNED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.