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Critical conflict on approach between an A320 and another flight. This resulted in flight X, the A320, experiencing a flap overspd warning during the evasive action and activation of the toga on final to runway 35 at den, co.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 580164 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200304 |
| Day | Thu |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : dfw.airport |
| State Reference | CO |
| Altitude | msl single value : 8000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | IMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : d01.tracon |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | A320 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | other |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach |
| Route In Use | arrival : on vectors |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : d01.tracon |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | A320 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer instruction : instructor oversight : pic |
| ASRS Report | 580164 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain instruction : trainee |
| ASRS Report | 580166 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : airborne critical non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies other anomaly other anomaly other anomaly |
| Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : flap speed chime other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
| Resolutory Action | controller : separated traffic flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : overrode automation flight crew : regained aircraft control flight crew : returned to original clearance flight crew : took evasive action |
| Consequence | other other |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance Airspace Structure |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
During vectors to final we received a TCASII TA via the TCASII. ATC noticed the conflict and gave us a turn behind the airplane, however, it was not in time, and we received an RA. We initiated the RA. Once RA was over, approach asked us for a turn in the other direction. The captain, who was now hand flying, started the turn in the other direction. However, the airplane was still configured for the TCASII alert (toga thrust and flaps 1). The captain became task saturated in flying the heading and attitude that he forgot what the power setting was. Speed exceeded our flap setting by 20 KTS. A couple of factors involved. New captain on IOE (I was flying right seat), FAA in the jumpseat observing the new captain, ATC was working another airplane with similar call signs. I was busy backing up the captain in flying the airplane for the conflict, and then trying to get the airplane automation configured correctly again. The new captain did not recognize the thrust in toga, and was not familiar with recovery with flaps out (toga to climb detent, and then pull for speed). Finally got the airplane configured correctly, and continued with the approach. In the confusion, we did not activate and confirm, so we almost got another overspd. However, I was faster in getting the power back this time, and no overspd occurred. Supplemental information from acn 580166: as I nosed over, the aircraft immediately 'overspd' for the flaps, so I pulled off the throttles. I believe the speed achieved 240-250 KTS, but I could not be sure. I deployed speed brakes to slow, and notified my first officer that we were in toga mode so we could return to a proper confign. Maintenance was notified upon landing, and we said we had a 20 KT overspd to be conservative, as we could not be sure. ATC was working aircraft with similar call signs, and probably gave us a vector that was meant for aircraft Y. My TCASII training should include a RA in the landing confign so I would have been aware of the problem of flap overspd, as it happened almost immediately as I lowered the nose in the recovery.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRITICAL CONFLICT ON APCH BTWN AN A320 AND ANOTHER FLT. THIS RESULTED IN FLT X, THE A320, EXPERIENCING A FLAP OVERSPD WARNING DURING THE EVASIVE ACTION AND ACTIVATION OF THE TOGA ON FINAL TO RWY 35 AT DEN, CO.
Narrative: DURING VECTORS TO FINAL WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA VIA THE TCASII. ATC NOTICED THE CONFLICT AND GAVE US A TURN BEHIND THE AIRPLANE, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT IN TIME, AND WE RECEIVED AN RA. WE INITIATED THE RA. ONCE RA WAS OVER, APCH ASKED US FOR A TURN IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. THE CAPT, WHO WAS NOW HAND FLYING, STARTED THE TURN IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HOWEVER, THE AIRPLANE WAS STILL CONFIGURED FOR THE TCASII ALERT (TOGA THRUST AND FLAPS 1). THE CAPT BECAME TASK SATURATED IN FLYING THE HDG AND ATTITUDE THAT HE FORGOT WHAT THE PWR SETTING WAS. SPD EXCEEDED OUR FLAP SETTING BY 20 KTS. A COUPLE OF FACTORS INVOLVED. NEW CAPT ON IOE (I WAS FLYING R SEAT), FAA IN THE JUMPSEAT OBSERVING THE NEW CAPT, ATC WAS WORKING ANOTHER AIRPLANE WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS. I WAS BUSY BACKING UP THE CAPT IN FLYING THE AIRPLANE FOR THE CONFLICT, AND THEN TRYING TO GET THE AIRPLANE AUTOMATION CONFIGURED CORRECTLY AGAIN. THE NEW CAPT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE THRUST IN TOGA, AND WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH RECOVERY WITH FLAPS OUT (TOGA TO CLB DETENT, AND THEN PULL FOR SPD). FINALLY GOT THE AIRPLANE CONFIGURED CORRECTLY, AND CONTINUED WITH THE APCH. IN THE CONFUSION, WE DID NOT ACTIVATE AND CONFIRM, SO WE ALMOST GOT ANOTHER OVERSPD. HOWEVER, I WAS FASTER IN GETTING THE PWR BACK THIS TIME, AND NO OVERSPD OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 580166: AS I NOSED OVER, THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY 'OVERSPD' FOR THE FLAPS, SO I PULLED OFF THE THROTTLES. I BELIEVE THE SPD ACHIEVED 240-250 KTS, BUT I COULD NOT BE SURE. I DEPLOYED SPD BRAKES TO SLOW, AND NOTIFIED MY FO THAT WE WERE IN TOGA MODE SO WE COULD RETURN TO A PROPER CONFIGN. MAINT WAS NOTIFIED UPON LNDG, AND WE SAID WE HAD A 20 KT OVERSPD TO BE CONSERVATIVE, AS WE COULD NOT BE SURE. ATC WAS WORKING ACFT WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS, AND PROBABLY GAVE US A VECTOR THAT WAS MEANT FOR ACFT Y. MY TCASII TRAINING SHOULD INCLUDE A RA IN THE LNDG CONFIGN SO I WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE PROB OF FLAP OVERSPD, AS IT HAPPENED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AS I LOWERED THE NOSE IN THE RECOVERY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.