Narrative:

Performing LOA/DME 19 approach to reagan national. We used CAT D minimums of 720 ft MDA, 2 1/4 mi visibility. I am a high minimums captain, thus, we add 100 ft to the MDA and 1/2 mi visibility. WX was advertised as 1000 ft ceiling, 3 mi visibility. At the missed approach point, the clouds were lower than reported, never saw the runway. So, we executed the missed approach. I called missed approach to tower (frequency was somewhat busy). The local controller, sounding somewhat surprised, asked if we were going around. I replied 'yes.' next tower transmission was an instruction for an immediate 120 degree heading along with 'traffic less than a mi.' during the go around, I was distraction by an increase in airspeed. The airplane was performing better than I expected. I then noticed that we were climbing through 2000-2100 ft. I briefly took control of the airplane to stop the climb while simultaneously receiving an instruction from tower to 'turn to 120 degree heading, maintain 3000 ft.' the first officer, during the go around, did see the conflicting traffic through the breaks in the clouds (he was below us, altitude unknown), however, no TCASII alert was ever received. It is believed that the traffic departed dca airport on a southerly course. This concerned us, because it seemed this traffic was intruding on our missed approach course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT MISSES APCH WHEN CEILING AT MISSED APCH POINT IS LOWER THEN RPTED.

Narrative: PERFORMING LOA/DME 19 APCH TO REAGAN NATIONAL. WE USED CAT D MINIMUMS OF 720 FT MDA, 2 1/4 MI VISIBILITY. I AM A HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT, THUS, WE ADD 100 FT TO THE MDA AND 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. WX WAS ADVERTISED AS 1000 FT CEILING, 3 MI VISIBILITY. AT THE MISSED APCH POINT, THE CLOUDS WERE LOWER THAN RPTED, NEVER SAW THE RWY. SO, WE EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH. I CALLED MISSED APCH TO TWR (FREQ WAS SOMEWHAT BUSY). THE LCL CTLR, SOUNDING SOMEWHAT SURPRISED, ASKED IF WE WERE GOING AROUND. I REPLIED 'YES.' NEXT TWR XMISSION WAS AN INSTRUCTION FOR AN IMMEDIATE 120 DEG HDG ALONG WITH 'TFC LESS THAN A MI.' DURING THE GAR, I WAS DISTR BY AN INCREASE IN AIRSPD. THE AIRPLANE WAS PERFORMING BETTER THAN I EXPECTED. I THEN NOTICED THAT WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 2000-2100 FT. I BRIEFLY TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE TO STOP THE CLB WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVING AN INSTRUCTION FROM TWR TO 'TURN TO 120 DEG HDG, MAINTAIN 3000 FT.' THE FO, DURING THE GAR, DID SEE THE CONFLICTING TFC THROUGH THE BREAKS IN THE CLOUDS (HE WAS BELOW US, ALT UNKNOWN), HOWEVER, NO TCASII ALERT WAS EVER RECEIVED. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE TFC DEPARTED DCA ARPT ON A SOUTHERLY COURSE. THIS CONCERNED US, BECAUSE IT SEEMED THIS TFC WAS INTRUDING ON OUR MISSED APCH COURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.