Narrative:

On ILS runway 35 approach to mht at decision altitude, I began to initiate a go around at the same time that the captain called 'runway in sight.' still in the landing confign with the runway acquired visually, I aborted the go around and resumed the approach to land. Approaching the transition to flare, we received a GPWS mode 1 alert (sink rate). I corrected the momentary deviation and the captain deemed it safe to continue. Aircraft landing and rollout were normal. Runway 35 at mht is sloped and results in misleading clues at night and in low visibility conditions (1 mi at the time of the approach). Also, the MALSR and PAPI were not operating at the time of landing, even though they were not notamed OTS. The captain and I debriefed at length and agreed that even though the maneuver to land was not at any time in doubt, continuing the go around would have been a more prudent course of action. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the crew called the duty dispatcher supervisor. After investigation, he indicated the NOTAMS had automatically dropped out of the NOTAMS on the list for mht. The air carrier was changed. The automatic dropout feature to insure that this does not occur again. Reporter indicated that a number of other air carrier flts were not able to get in. He suspects that they also did not know of the inoperative PAPI or approach lights. The tower controller made no mention of the inoperative lights at any time they were on the frequency, and no mention was made on the ATIS frequency. The reporter indicates the 'hump' on the runway is at midfield, and is noted on the air carrier mht 10-7 pages.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW, DID NOT HAVE INOP PAPI AND MALSR APCH LIGHT SYS NOTED ON THE COMPANY PROVIDED NOTAM PAPERWORK. THE INOP NOTAMS HAD DROPPED OUT PROGRAMMATICALLY. FLT CREW CONDUCTED LNDG AFTER GPWS ALERT AND ABORTED GAR.

Narrative: ON ILS RWY 35 APCH TO MHT AT DECISION ALT, I BEGAN TO INITIATE A GAR AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE CAPT CALLED 'RWY IN SIGHT.' STILL IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITH THE RWY ACQUIRED VISUALLY, I ABORTED THE GAR AND RESUMED THE APCH TO LAND. APCHING THE TRANSITION TO FLARE, WE RECEIVED A GPWS MODE 1 ALERT (SINK RATE). I CORRECTED THE MOMENTARY DEV AND THE CAPT DEEMED IT SAFE TO CONTINUE. ACFT LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. RWY 35 AT MHT IS SLOPED AND RESULTS IN MISLEADING CLUES AT NIGHT AND IN LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS (1 MI AT THE TIME OF THE APCH). ALSO, THE MALSR AND PAPI WERE NOT OPERATING AT THE TIME OF LNDG, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT NOTAMED OTS. THE CAPT AND I DEBRIEFED AT LENGTH AND AGREED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE MANEUVER TO LAND WAS NOT AT ANY TIME IN DOUBT, CONTINUING THE GAR WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW CALLED THE DUTY DISPATCHER SUPVR. AFTER INVESTIGATION, HE INDICATED THE NOTAMS HAD AUTOMATICALLY DROPPED OUT OF THE NOTAMS ON THE LIST FOR MHT. THE ACR WAS CHANGED. THE AUTO DROPOUT FEATURE TO INSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT OCCUR AGAIN. RPTR INDICATED THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER ACR FLTS WERE NOT ABLE TO GET IN. HE SUSPECTS THAT THEY ALSO DID NOT KNOW OF THE INOP PAPI OR APCH LIGHTS. THE TWR CTLR MADE NO MENTION OF THE INOP LIGHTS AT ANY TIME THEY WERE ON THE FREQ, AND NO MENTION WAS MADE ON THE ATIS FREQ. THE RPTR INDICATES THE 'HUMP' ON THE RWY IS AT MIDFIELD, AND IS NOTED ON THE ACR MHT 10-7 PAGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.