Narrative:

The flight was dispatched from anc to lax. The captain was the PNF. The first officer was the PF. En route, the crew briefed for an approach and arrival to runway 25L. The flight was cleared for the sadde 6 arrival and received radar vectors for the visual approach to runway 25L. The localizer frequency was tuned and the MCP was configured for the runway 25L ILS approach for course and GS guidance, as briefed. The WX was good and not a factor. The aircraft was configured with 30 degree flaps and minimum autobrakes were selected. During the approach, course, GS, and airspeed control wre maintained within limits. However, during the landing phase, the sink rate increased and was not arrested before touchdown. The aircraft contacted the runway on the main landing gear much firmer than normal, bounced, and then settled back onto the runway. During the bounce, the pitch was arrested to prevent the nose gear and tail from impacting the runway. Roll, pitch, and yaw control were maintained to allow the aircraft to settle onto the main gear and complete a normal rollout. The flap were left in the extended position as a precautionary measure. Upon block-in, maintenance was advised, a logbook entry was made, and operations notified. A walkaround inspection by the crew did not reveal any noticeable damage. The crew debriefed and discussed ways to prevent this from happening again. Solutions discussed: the PF stated that he 'chased' the flight director below 100 ft AGL (he descended onto it) and the flight engineer stated that he saw 1100 FPM rate of descent passing 50 ft AGL. 1) use the cues (course/GS, etc) available to get airspeed and rate of descent stabilized early on the approach and make a smooth transition to landing. If the aircraft drifts above the GS, determine if the aircraft can still land within the desired touchdown zone. If not, execute a go around. 2) if a crew member observes something that is not right, such as a high rate of descent, speak up so corrective action can be taken immediately. 3) the PNF could have done a better job of monitoring the PF's progress, observing an increased rate of descent below 100 ft and taking corrective action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-200 CARGO FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A HARD LNDG AFTER A VISUAL WITH ILS BACKUP TO RWY 25L AT LAX, CA.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS DISPATCHED FROM ANC TO LAX. THE CAPT WAS THE PNF. THE FO WAS THE PF. ENRTE, THE CREW BRIEFED FOR AN APCH AND ARR TO RWY 25L. THE FLT WAS CLRED FOR THE SADDE 6 ARR AND RECEIVED RADAR VECTORS FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25L. THE LOC FREQ WAS TUNED AND THE MCP WAS CONFIGURED FOR THE RWY 25L ILS APCH FOR COURSE AND GS GUIDANCE, AS BRIEFED. THE WX WAS GOOD AND NOT A FACTOR. THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED WITH 30 DEG FLAPS AND MINIMUM AUTOBRAKES WERE SELECTED. DURING THE APCH, COURSE, GS, AND AIRSPD CTL WRE MAINTAINED WITHIN LIMITS. HOWEVER, DURING THE LNDG PHASE, THE SINK RATE INCREASED AND WAS NOT ARRESTED BEFORE TOUCHDOWN. THE ACFT CONTACTED THE RWY ON THE MAIN LNDG GEAR MUCH FIRMER THAN NORMAL, BOUNCED, AND THEN SETTLED BACK ONTO THE RWY. DURING THE BOUNCE, THE PITCH WAS ARRESTED TO PREVENT THE NOSE GEAR AND TAIL FROM IMPACTING THE RWY. ROLL, PITCH, AND YAW CTL WERE MAINTAINED TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO SETTLE ONTO THE MAIN GEAR AND COMPLETE A NORMAL ROLLOUT. THE FLAP WERE LEFT IN THE EXTENDED POS AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. UPON BLOCK-IN, MAINT WAS ADVISED, A LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE, AND OPS NOTIFIED. A WALKAROUND INSPECTION BY THE CREW DID NOT REVEAL ANY NOTICEABLE DAMAGE. THE CREW DEBRIEFED AND DISCUSSED WAYS TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. SOLUTIONS DISCUSSED: THE PF STATED THAT HE 'CHASED' THE FLT DIRECTOR BELOW 100 FT AGL (HE DSNDED ONTO IT) AND THE FE STATED THAT HE SAW 1100 FPM RATE OF DSCNT PASSING 50 FT AGL. 1) USE THE CUES (COURSE/GS, ETC) AVAILABLE TO GET AIRSPD AND RATE OF DSCNT STABILIZED EARLY ON THE APCH AND MAKE A SMOOTH TRANSITION TO LNDG. IF THE ACFT DRIFTS ABOVE THE GS, DETERMINE IF THE ACFT CAN STILL LAND WITHIN THE DESIRED TOUCHDOWN ZONE. IF NOT, EXECUTE A GAR. 2) IF A CREW MEMBER OBSERVES SOMETHING THAT IS NOT RIGHT, SUCH AS A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT, SPEAK UP SO CORRECTIVE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY. 3) THE PNF COULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF MONITORING THE PF'S PROGRESS, OBSERVING AN INCREASED RATE OF DSCNT BELOW 100 FT AND TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.