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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 581692 |
Time | |
Date | 200305 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ska.airport |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | msl single value : 4000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | other |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : geg.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-500 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | approach : visual arrival : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain instruction : trainee oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 10000 |
ASRS Report | 581692 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer instruction : instructor |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 3500 flight time type : 5 |
ASRS Report | 581694 |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry non adherence : clearance non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert flight crew : executed go around flight crew : exited penetrated airspace flight crew : returned to original clearance |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Company Flight Crew Human Performance Weather |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
This was a captain upgrade (uoe) event. I was the check airman in the right seat, while the upgrade pilot was in the left seat, flying. During descent into spokane (geg), ground not in sight because of overcast, we were vectored on a downwind leg. I was distracted by not being able to contact company to get our gate, despite numerous attempts. Approach vectored us on a dogleg to base, and gave us further descent. We broke into the clear, and I saw a runway, asking the pilot if he wanted to call the field in sight. I told approach, and we were then cleared for a visual to runway 21 and to contact tower. The PF configured to flaps 5 degrees, landing gear down, and rolled towards final. Tower cleared us to land, and we continued, also asking if they could contact company to find out our gate for us. It was about that time I realized the ILS course was not approaching center on the HSI with the runway almost lined up. We both realized we were lined up with fairchild AFB. At the same moment, tower called out. I told the pilot to continue the right turn back to downwind, and then told tower that we were doing to land at geg. They said no problem, cleared to land on runway 21. I called later to talk to the tower supervisor, and he said there was absolutely no problem or traffic conflict. Also says it happens quite often to have fairchild AFB mistaken for geg with the same runway alignment and easier to see larger runway. It's also mentioned to be aware of it in our charts. I fault myself for being distracted about the lack of company contact prior to landing, and during the PF in the left seat to call the airport visually after I mistakenly looked at fairchild AFB, especially since I have flown into geg dozens of times in the past yr or two. Had I not just looked at a runway, but taken in the entire field, it would have been easy to see the large ramp with numerous aircraft, the base complex, and lack of the 2 red and white checkerboard towers that were missing (an easily identifiable landmark at geg). I resolve to be more vigilant in discerning the proper field when cleared for a visual approach. Supplemental information from acn 581694: we began the landing confign process while in the right turn to base and final. The ADF was useless because we believed we were turning inside it. We didn't consult the FMC because we were now on a visual approach and I was trying to maintain sight of the airfield, which was tough because of the window confign of the B737. The ILS was showing left off course, which didn't make sense. We knew something was wrong, and were verifying that fact. Here is the chain that, if broken, would have prevented this from occurring: 1) the distraction with trying to contact company was an unnecessary annoyance. 2) if approach had let us down a little earlier, we would have seen the town, the base, and other features that might have allowed better airport identify. 3) the fact that the VOR is not on the airfield might have contributed, since most of our destinations do have vors on the field. It would have provided more positive orientation. 4) the nf had the ILS tuned for the ILS to runway 3. This provided us DME, but in this situation was a factor, since the runway we saw appeared to be the proper DME. 5) while we had the proper approach programmed into the FMC, we disregarded its guidance, since we knew we were looking at the right runway. 6) if approach had turned us loose with a 'you're 4 mi north of the airport, contact the tower...' that might have made us reconsider. Bottom line: our fault, not anyone else's.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-500 CREW BEGAN APCH TO SKA INSTEAD OF GEG.
Narrative: THIS WAS A CAPT UPGRADE (UOE) EVENT. I WAS THE CHK AIRMAN IN THE R SEAT, WHILE THE UPGRADE PLT WAS IN THE L SEAT, FLYING. DURING DSCNT INTO SPOKANE (GEG), GND NOT IN SIGHT BECAUSE OF OVCST, WE WERE VECTORED ON A DOWNWIND LEG. I WAS DISTRACTED BY NOT BEING ABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY TO GET OUR GATE, DESPITE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS. APCH VECTORED US ON A DOGLEG TO BASE, AND GAVE US FURTHER DSCNT. WE BROKE INTO THE CLR, AND I SAW A RWY, ASKING THE PLT IF HE WANTED TO CALL THE FIELD IN SIGHT. I TOLD APCH, AND WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 21 AND TO CONTACT TWR. THE PF CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 5 DEGS, LNDG GEAR DOWN, AND ROLLED TOWARDS FINAL. TWR CLRED US TO LAND, AND WE CONTINUED, ALSO ASKING IF THEY COULD CONTACT COMPANY TO FIND OUT OUR GATE FOR US. IT WAS ABOUT THAT TIME I REALIZED THE ILS COURSE WAS NOT APCHING CTR ON THE HSI WITH THE RWY ALMOST LINED UP. WE BOTH REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP WITH FAIRCHILD AFB. AT THE SAME MOMENT, TWR CALLED OUT. I TOLD THE PLT TO CONTINUE THE R TURN BACK TO DOWNWIND, AND THEN TOLD TWR THAT WE WERE DOING TO LAND AT GEG. THEY SAID NO PROB, CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 21. I CALLED LATER TO TALK TO THE TWR SUPVR, AND HE SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO PROB OR TFC CONFLICT. ALSO SAYS IT HAPPENS QUITE OFTEN TO HAVE FAIRCHILD AFB MISTAKEN FOR GEG WITH THE SAME RWY ALIGNMENT AND EASIER TO SEE LARGER RWY. IT'S ALSO MENTIONED TO BE AWARE OF IT IN OUR CHARTS. I FAULT MYSELF FOR BEING DISTRACTED ABOUT THE LACK OF COMPANY CONTACT PRIOR TO LNDG, AND DURING THE PF IN THE L SEAT TO CALL THE ARPT VISUALLY AFTER I MISTAKENLY LOOKED AT FAIRCHILD AFB, ESPECIALLY SINCE I HAVE FLOWN INTO GEG DOZENS OF TIMES IN THE PAST YR OR TWO. HAD I NOT JUST LOOKED AT A RWY, BUT TAKEN IN THE ENTIRE FIELD, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY TO SEE THE LARGE RAMP WITH NUMEROUS ACFT, THE BASE COMPLEX, AND LACK OF THE 2 RED AND WHITE CHECKERBOARD TWRS THAT WERE MISSING (AN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE LANDMARK AT GEG). I RESOLVE TO BE MORE VIGILANT IN DISCERNING THE PROPER FIELD WHEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 581694: WE BEGAN THE LNDG CONFIGN PROCESS WHILE IN THE R TURN TO BASE AND FINAL. THE ADF WAS USELESS BECAUSE WE BELIEVED WE WERE TURNING INSIDE IT. WE DIDN'T CONSULT THE FMC BECAUSE WE WERE NOW ON A VISUAL APCH AND I WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN SIGHT OF THE AIRFIELD, WHICH WAS TOUGH BECAUSE OF THE WINDOW CONFIGN OF THE B737. THE ILS WAS SHOWING L OFF COURSE, WHICH DIDN'T MAKE SENSE. WE KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG, AND WERE VERIFYING THAT FACT. HERE IS THE CHAIN THAT, IF BROKEN, WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM OCCURRING: 1) THE DISTR WITH TRYING TO CONTACT COMPANY WAS AN UNNECESSARY ANNOYANCE. 2) IF APCH HAD LET US DOWN A LITTLE EARLIER, WE WOULD HAVE SEEN THE TOWN, THE BASE, AND OTHER FEATURES THAT MIGHT HAVE ALLOWED BETTER ARPT IDENT. 3) THE FACT THAT THE VOR IS NOT ON THE AIRFIELD MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED, SINCE MOST OF OUR DESTS DO HAVE VORS ON THE FIELD. IT WOULD HAVE PROVIDED MORE POSITIVE ORIENTATION. 4) THE NF HAD THE ILS TUNED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 3. THIS PROVIDED US DME, BUT IN THIS SIT WAS A FACTOR, SINCE THE RWY WE SAW APPEARED TO BE THE PROPER DME. 5) WHILE WE HAD THE PROPER APCH PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC, WE DISREGARDED ITS GUIDANCE, SINCE WE KNEW WE WERE LOOKING AT THE RIGHT RWY. 6) IF APCH HAD TURNED US LOOSE WITH A 'YOU'RE 4 MI N OF THE ARPT, CONTACT THE TWR...' THAT MIGHT HAVE MADE US RECONSIDER. BOTTOM LINE: OUR FAULT, NOT ANYONE ELSE'S.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.