Narrative:

On an IFR departure, in VMC conditions with the first officer being PF and the captain operating the radios, we received our departure clearance that instructed us to fly a heading of 180 degrees and climb to 2000 ft. After departing los alamitos, tower pointed out some traffic that was flying from west to east that was at our 12 O'clock position before handing us over to socal departure. The captain checked in with socal and I believed we were cleared up to 3000 ft at that point. Upon reaching approximately 2600 ft, socal asked us what our assigned altitude was. I held up 3 fingers to the captain to indicate 3000 ft, but the captain shook his head, indicating 'no,' and told socal we had overshot our altitude. At that point, I leveled off at 2800 ft, still in VMC, and the captain asked socal what altitude they wanted us to maintain. Socal responded by giving us a heading change. After the flight, the captain called and spoke with an operations manager. The manager stated that she would be sending a primary report to the long beach FSDO and the FSDO would be contacting us. Looking back on this scenario, I should have confirmed with the captain to verify that we were cleared up to 3000 ft before I continued the climb. Further discussions with the captain and the company manager about this incident have resulted in the situation of a system of altitude callouts to be used by the PNF. Supplemental information from acn 582808: I was looking at and writing down some information pertaining to the operation when socal called and asked what our assigned altitude was. I told socal we had flown through it and was expecting them to let us know what altitude they wanted us at. The first officer thought he had heard an assigned altitude of 3000 ft. I had not gone back down to 2000 ft at this time because I did not know if that was what the controller wanted. Thinking about corrective actions and looking back on the scenario, I should have been giving more attention to the flying and communication aspects rather than other non-flying operational matters. Also, I could have called out altitudes for the first officer which would have communicated/clarified to him that our assigned altitude was 2000 ft not 3000 ft. I was tired and due to the routine of the operation and departure and having flown it with the first officer numerous times was just expecting normal procedures. Also prior to takeoff I usually call out initial heading and altitude but cannot recall if that was done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE18T FLT CREW OVERSHOOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT AFTER DEP FROM SLI.

Narrative: ON AN IFR DEP, IN VMC CONDITIONS WITH THE FO BEING PF AND THE CAPT OPERATING THE RADIOS, WE RECEIVED OUR DEP CLRNC THAT INSTRUCTED US TO FLY A HEADING OF 180 DEGS AND CLB TO 2000 FT. AFTER DEPARTING LOS ALAMITOS, TWR POINTED OUT SOME TFC THAT WAS FLYING FROM W TO E THAT WAS AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS BEFORE HANDING US OVER TO SOCAL DEP. THE CAPT CHKED IN WITH SOCAL AND I BELIEVED WE WERE CLRED UP TO 3000 FT AT THAT POINT. UPON REACHING APPROX 2600 FT, SOCAL ASKED US WHAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS. I HELD UP 3 FINGERS TO THE CAPT TO INDICATE 3000 FT, BUT THE CAPT SHOOK HIS HEAD, INDICATING 'NO,' AND TOLD SOCAL WE HAD OVERSHOT OUR ALT. AT THAT POINT, I LEVELED OFF AT 2800 FT, STILL IN VMC, AND THE CAPT ASKED SOCAL WHAT ALT THEY WANTED US TO MAINTAIN. SOCAL RESPONDED BY GIVING US A HEADING CHANGE. AFTER THE FLT, THE CAPT CALLED AND SPOKE WITH AN OPS MGR. THE MGR STATED THAT SHE WOULD BE SENDING A PRIMARY RPT TO THE LONG BEACH FSDO AND THE FSDO WOULD BE CONTACTING US. LOOKING BACK ON THIS SCENARIO, I SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED WITH THE CAPT TO VERIFY THAT WE WERE CLRED UP TO 3000 FT BEFORE I CONTINUED THE CLB. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CAPT AND THE COMPANY MGR ABOUT THIS INCIDENT HAVE RESULTED IN THE SIT OF A SYS OF ALT CALLOUTS TO BE USED BY THE PNF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 582808: I WAS LOOKING AT AND WRITING DOWN SOME INFO PERTAINING TO THE OP WHEN SOCAL CALLED AND ASKED WHAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS. I TOLD SOCAL WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH IT AND WAS EXPECTING THEM TO LET US KNOW WHAT ALT THEY WANTED US AT. THE FO THOUGHT HE HAD HEARD AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 3000 FT. I HAD NOT GONE BACK DOWN TO 2000 FT AT THIS TIME BECAUSE I DID NOT KNOW IF THAT WAS WHAT THE CTLR WANTED. THINKING ABOUT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND LOOKING BACK ON THE SCENARIO, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVING MORE ATTN TO THE FLYING AND COM ASPECTS RATHER THAN OTHER NON-FLYING OPERATIONAL MATTERS. ALSO, I COULD HAVE CALLED OUT ALTS FOR THE FO WHICH WOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED/CLARIFIED TO HIM THAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS 2000 FT NOT 3000 FT. I WAS TIRED AND DUE TO THE ROUTINE OF THE OP AND DEP AND HAVING FLOWN IT WITH THE FO NUMEROUS TIMES WAS JUST EXPECTING NORMAL PROCS. ALSO PRIOR TO TKOF I USUALLY CALL OUT INITIAL HEADING AND ALT BUT CANNOT RECALL IF THAT WAS DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.