Narrative:

After an uneventful flight, we arrived on our ramp to be marshaled in to our gate. Due to a mechanical problem on another aircraft, this aircraft (a B727) was used instead of an airbus A300. Prior to turning in to the gate centerline, I observed 2 cargo dollies loaded with 1 container near the left side of the parking area. A wing walker was standing at the container with lighted wands raised indicating to the marshaler and me (captain) that the gate area was clear. Our gate areas have black/white painted outlines (foul lines) in which no equipment is supposed to be inside. In a post incident inspection, the dollies/container were inside the area but beyond the end of the foul line so it was not clear at night the gate was indeed fouled. The wing walker's extended wand indicated a clear gate, so we proceeded. Approximately 40 ft prior to our stopping point, while on centerline, our left wingtip contacted the container damaging the #1 slat and shattering the plexiglas cover on the navigation/strobe lights. We received a stop command from the marshaler after stopping on our own, followed by a command to continue about 1 min later. Before continuing I observed from my seat the container was clear and we could safely continue the final 40 ft to our parking spot. Contributing factors are as follows: 1) host ramp (iah) was expecting a different type aircraft in which wing would have cleared the container. 2) captain's L-3 window obscured in fog due to humidity, which obscured view to wingtip so any chance of seeing wing walker trying to signal marshaler to stop was impossible. Conclusion: 1) gate preparation protocol not followed by ramp personnel. 2) captain lulled into false belief gate was clear by wing walker and marshaler. 3) poor coordination of wing/wing walker. 4) captain/flight crew must still view situation with critical eye and not assume ground personnel were correct. Supplemental information from acn 584333: a short time later, we continued the taxi in to the stopping point which was approximately 40 ft from where we stopped. By that time the container had been knocked over and was clear of the aircraft. Company recently changed the policy of having mechanics marshall in aircraft. The ramp personnel may have had little experience marshalling in aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING A NIGHT OP, THE L WING OF A B727-200 CARGO FLT IS DAMAGED WHEN CONTACTING A CONTAINER SITTING ON A MISPARKED DOLLY ON THE RAMP INSIDE THE FOUL LINE AREA AT IAH, TX.

Narrative: AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL FLT, WE ARRIVED ON OUR RAMP TO BE MARSHALED IN TO OUR GATE. DUE TO A MECHANICAL PROB ON ANOTHER ACFT, THIS ACFT (A B727) WAS USED INSTEAD OF AN AIRBUS A300. PRIOR TO TURNING IN TO THE GATE CTRLINE, I OBSERVED 2 CARGO DOLLIES LOADED WITH 1 CONTAINER NEAR THE L SIDE OF THE PARKING AREA. A WING WALKER WAS STANDING AT THE CONTAINER WITH LIGHTED WANDS RAISED INDICATING TO THE MARSHALER AND ME (CAPT) THAT THE GATE AREA WAS CLR. OUR GATE AREAS HAVE BLACK/WHITE PAINTED OUTLINES (FOUL LINES) IN WHICH NO EQUIP IS SUPPOSED TO BE INSIDE. IN A POST INCIDENT INSPECTION, THE DOLLIES/CONTAINER WERE INSIDE THE AREA BUT BEYOND THE END OF THE FOUL LINE SO IT WAS NOT CLR AT NIGHT THE GATE WAS INDEED FOULED. THE WING WALKER'S EXTENDED WAND INDICATED A CLR GATE, SO WE PROCEEDED. APPROX 40 FT PRIOR TO OUR STOPPING POINT, WHILE ON CTRLINE, OUR L WINGTIP CONTACTED THE CONTAINER DAMAGING THE #1 SLAT AND SHATTERING THE PLEXIGLAS COVER ON THE NAV/STROBE LIGHTS. WE RECEIVED A STOP COMMAND FROM THE MARSHALER AFTER STOPPING ON OUR OWN, FOLLOWED BY A COMMAND TO CONTINUE ABOUT 1 MIN LATER. BEFORE CONTINUING I OBSERVED FROM MY SEAT THE CONTAINER WAS CLR AND WE COULD SAFELY CONTINUE THE FINAL 40 FT TO OUR PARKING SPOT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) HOST RAMP (IAH) WAS EXPECTING A DIFFERENT TYPE ACFT IN WHICH WING WOULD HAVE CLRED THE CONTAINER. 2) CAPT'S L-3 WINDOW OBSCURED IN FOG DUE TO HUMIDITY, WHICH OBSCURED VIEW TO WINGTIP SO ANY CHANCE OF SEEING WING WALKER TRYING TO SIGNAL MARSHALER TO STOP WAS IMPOSSIBLE. CONCLUSION: 1) GATE PREPARATION PROTOCOL NOT FOLLOWED BY RAMP PERSONNEL. 2) CAPT LULLED INTO FALSE BELIEF GATE WAS CLR BY WING WALKER AND MARSHALER. 3) POOR COORD OF WING/WING WALKER. 4) CAPT/FLT CREW MUST STILL VIEW SIT WITH CRITICAL EYE AND NOT ASSUME GND PERSONNEL WERE CORRECT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 584333: A SHORT TIME LATER, WE CONTINUED THE TAXI IN TO THE STOPPING POINT WHICH WAS APPROX 40 FT FROM WHERE WE STOPPED. BY THAT TIME THE CONTAINER HAD BEEN KNOCKED OVER AND WAS CLR OF THE ACFT. COMPANY RECENTLY CHANGED THE POLICY OF HAVING MECHS MARSHALL IN ACFT. THE RAMP PERSONNEL MAY HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE MARSHALLING IN ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.