Narrative:

While on a visual approach to albany, GA, we were handed off from ZJX to albany tower when we were approximately 5 NM from albany. When we checked in, both the captain and first officer believed that albany tower cleared us to land. During the remainder of the visual approach we received no further contact from the tower. Landing was made without incident. When clear of the runway we contacted the tower for taxi clearance to the ramp. The controller said that he had requested we contact him on a 3 mi final so he could give us clearance to land. He said he made this request when we checked on 8 mi out. Neither the captain or first officer remember this request. Both the captain and first officer have made many flts to aby and the controller handles several company flts each day. All of the communications occurred during a high workload phase of flight getting the aircraft slowed and configured for landing. The high workload and familiarity may have contributed to misinterp of the clearance from the tower. The tower made no further attempts to contact the aircraft after initial check in which may also have occurred due to his familiarity with company operations. All flight crews need to exercise extra diligence when under familiar conditions, particularly during high workload environments. Both controllers and flight crews need to question one another if they believe there is any doubt about interpretation of or adherence to a clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CRJ ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO CONTACT ABY ATCT ON 3 MI FINAL AS DIRECTED. MAY HAVE LANDED WITHOUT LNDG CLRNC.

Narrative: WHILE ON A VISUAL APCH TO ALBANY, GA, WE WERE HANDED OFF FROM ZJX TO ALBANY TWR WHEN WE WERE APPROX 5 NM FROM ALBANY. WHEN WE CHKED IN, BOTH THE CAPT AND FO BELIEVED THAT ALBANY TWR CLRED US TO LAND. DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE VISUAL APCH WE RECEIVED NO FURTHER CONTACT FROM THE TWR. LNDG WAS MADE WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHEN CLR OF THE RWY WE CONTACTED THE TWR FOR TAXI CLRNC TO THE RAMP. THE CTLR SAID THAT HE HAD REQUESTED WE CONTACT HIM ON A 3 MI FINAL SO HE COULD GIVE US CLRNC TO LAND. HE SAID HE MADE THIS REQUEST WHEN WE CHKED ON 8 MI OUT. NEITHER THE CAPT OR FO REMEMBER THIS REQUEST. BOTH THE CAPT AND FO HAVE MADE MANY FLTS TO ABY AND THE CTLR HANDLES SEVERAL COMPANY FLTS EACH DAY. ALL OF THE COMS OCCURRED DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE OF FLT GETTING THE ACFT SLOWED AND CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. THE HIGH WORKLOAD AND FAMILIARITY MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO MISINTERP OF THE CLRNC FROM THE TWR. THE TWR MADE NO FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE ACFT AFTER INITIAL CHK IN WHICH MAY ALSO HAVE OCCURRED DUE TO HIS FAMILIARITY WITH COMPANY OPS. ALL FLT CREWS NEED TO EXERCISE EXTRA DILIGENCE WHEN UNDER FAMILIAR CONDITIONS, PARTICULARLY DURING HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENTS. BOTH CTLRS AND FLT CREWS NEED TO QUESTION ONE ANOTHER IF THEY BELIEVE THERE IS ANY DOUBT ABOUT INTERP OF OR ADHERENCE TO A CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.