Narrative:

On jun/thu/03 flight in CL604 from warsaw, poland (epwa) to gander, newfoundland (cyqx), the crew committed a gross navigation error in reykjavic control's airspace while in a radar environment and in radar contact. The cleared route segment through that airspace was from 62n20w to 60n30w to 57n40w, etc. An incorrect 62n30w waypoint was accidentally entered into the long range navigation system instead of the correct waypoint and that error was not detected by the crew during long range navigation waypoint/route checking and verification. The error was finally detected when reykjavic advised that we were 67 NM off course and that a gross navigation error would be filed. Factors that contributed to the error chain were: 1) electronic download (more accurate information) was expected but never received. The long range navigation waypoint entry was manually entered by the sic with the error being entered at that time on the ground prior to takeoff. 2) early departure prevented a thorough waypoint check on the ground. 3) distrs were present with difficulty in contacting oceanic clearance agency and receiving oceanic clearance, and correct and adequate cruise altitude. The crew was completely at fault since the error should have been discovered during our challenge and response long range navigation waypoint verification procedure after oceanic clearance was received. I believe that this problem could be solved and the error prevented by using a waypoint verification procedure wherein each pilot physically views each waypoint as shown on the flight plan, then as displayed on the long range navigation equipment, and then a verbal correctness agreement between the pilots is acknowledged. This of course, necessitates both pilots accomplishing this verification simultaneously alternatively, a double challenge and response verification could be employed wherein one pilot reads the waypoints aloud and the other pilot verifies the correctness of waypoints as entered into the long range navigation equipment. Then, another verbal verification is accomplished wherein the pilots switch roles of reader and verifier. I also believe it is essential that both pilots listen to, copy and agree upon the oceanic clearance. Supplemental information from acn 585796: crew too involved with whom to obtain oceanic clearance from and altitude capability of aircraft. Did not check entered flight plan close enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CL604 EXPERIENCED GROSS NAV ERROR OVER ICELAND WHEN INCORRECT LATITUDE WAS ENTERED AT AN ENRTE WAYPOINT. RADAR CTLR SLOW ON PICKING UP DEV AS THE NEXT WAYPOINT READ AT 20W WAS FROM FLT PLAN, 'IE, 60N 30W.'

Narrative: ON JUN/THU/03 FLT IN CL604 FROM WARSAW, POLAND (EPWA) TO GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND (CYQX), THE CREW COMMITTED A GROSS NAV ERROR IN REYKJAVIC CTL'S AIRSPACE WHILE IN A RADAR ENVIRONMENT AND IN RADAR CONTACT. THE CLRED RTE SEGMENT THROUGH THAT AIRSPACE WAS FROM 62N20W TO 60N30W TO 57N40W, ETC. AN INCORRECT 62N30W WAYPOINT WAS ACCIDENTALLY ENTERED INTO THE LONG RANGE NAV SYS INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT WAYPOINT AND THAT ERROR WAS NOT DETECTED BY THE CREW DURING LONG RANGE NAV WAYPOINT/RTE CHKING AND VERIFICATION. THE ERROR WAS FINALLY DETECTED WHEN REYKJAVIC ADVISED THAT WE WERE 67 NM OFF COURSE AND THAT A GROSS NAV ERROR WOULD BE FILED. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR CHAIN WERE: 1) ELECTRONIC DOWNLOAD (MORE ACCURATE INFO) WAS EXPECTED BUT NEVER RECEIVED. THE LONG RANGE NAV WAYPOINT ENTRY WAS MANUALLY ENTERED BY THE SIC WITH THE ERROR BEING ENTERED AT THAT TIME ON THE GND PRIOR TO TKOF. 2) EARLY DEP PREVENTED A THOROUGH WAYPOINT CHK ON THE GND. 3) DISTRS WERE PRESENT WITH DIFFICULTY IN CONTACTING OCEANIC CLRNC AGENCY AND RECEIVING OCEANIC CLRNC, AND CORRECT AND ADEQUATE CRUISE ALT. THE CREW WAS COMPLETELY AT FAULT SINCE THE ERROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED DURING OUR CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE LONG RANGE NAV WAYPOINT VERIFICATION PROC AFTER OCEANIC CLRNC WAS RECEIVED. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROB COULD BE SOLVED AND THE ERROR PREVENTED BY USING A WAYPOINT VERIFICATION PROC WHEREIN EACH PLT PHYSICALLY VIEWS EACH WAYPOINT AS SHOWN ON THE FLT PLAN, THEN AS DISPLAYED ON THE LONG RANGE NAV EQUIP, AND THEN A VERBAL CORRECTNESS AGREEMENT BTWN THE PLTS IS ACKNOWLEDGED. THIS OF COURSE, NECESSITATES BOTH PLTS ACCOMPLISHING THIS VERIFICATION SIMULTANEOUSLY ALTERNATIVELY, A DOUBLE CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE VERIFICATION COULD BE EMPLOYED WHEREIN ONE PLT READS THE WAYPOINTS ALOUD AND THE OTHER PLT VERIFIES THE CORRECTNESS OF WAYPOINTS AS ENTERED INTO THE LONG RANGE NAV EQUIP. THEN, ANOTHER VERBAL VERIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED WHEREIN THE PLTS SWITCH ROLES OF READER AND VERIFIER. I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH PLTS LISTEN TO, COPY AND AGREE UPON THE OCEANIC CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 585796: CREW TOO INVOLVED WITH WHOM TO OBTAIN OCEANIC CLRNC FROM AND ALT CAPABILITY OF ACFT. DID NOT CHK ENTERED FLT PLAN CLOSE ENOUGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.