Narrative:

Flight was from geg. Aircraft had been at geg for 2 nights to fix a write-up concerning the air-ground sensor (written up as system in the flight mode on the ground). Normal preflight, start, taxi, and takeoff roll. After takeoff, the landing gear lever could not be raised above the 'off' position. Following the QRH, we put the gear lever down and retracted the flaps. As the flaps reached the up position, the configuration warning horn sounded. I flew the aircraft for a visual downwind to return to geg; the captain completed the QRH checklist for gear lever will not move up after takeoff, following the appropriate steps for the takeoff warning horn sounding when the flaps are up. Per the final steps of the checklist, after confirming 'down, 3 green,' he pulled the blue-collared circuit breakers referenced in the checklist. As we extended the flaps for landing, the gear horn sounded (steady) as the flaps extended past position 15. This was not something expected from the notes in the QRH; they referenced nuisance stick shakers and such things on the ground, but made no mention of anomalous warnings in flight. Weighing the distraction of listening to the warning horn from about 1300 ft AGL down to the runway, we elected to push in the blue-collared circuit breaker's again, which gave us '3 green' and silenced the horn. Upon touchdown, we felt strong braking and realized that the autobrake switch was still in the rejected takeoff position. We selected the automatic brake switch to the off position, and the braking ceased until we braked the airplane normally from 80 knots down to taxi speed. The rest of the roll-out, taxi-in, and shutdown were normal. We were well below our maximum landing weight, and the opc showed that we were well below maximum quick-turn weight for the conditions and that we had ample stopping margin (even had we only used 'min braking'). Recommendations: 1) the 'gear lever will not move up after takeoff' checklist should include a reminder to select the autobrakes to the off position. The normal pilot flow is to select them off after flaps are up and the landing gear lever is moved down from the 'up' position to the 'off' position. With the malfunction we experienced, these cues are not present; flaps do not remain in the up position, the gear lever goes back to the down position, and the crew is actuating these controllers as part of the troubleshooting directed by QRH checklist. There is no point that the normal flow of confirming that the flaps indicate up, moving the landing gear lever down to 'off,' and then turning off the autobrake is ever performed. A step (or note) in the QRH to confirm that the autobrakes are selected off would have prevented the firm braking we experienced immediately after touchdown. 2) the QRH should address the nuisance confign warning horn in flight that we received after resetting landing flaps, and provide a course of action to silence it. The QRH addresses various nuisances on the ground, and how to alleviate them, but there is no reference to a nuisance warning horn in flight. I don't know if this horn would always occur during this procedure, or if it was only due to a specific combination of malfunctions in the air ground sensor system that day, but its presence surprised us, and we didn't have any guidance addressing it. Such guidance would be a useful addition to the QRH.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR BECAUSE OF AN AIR-GND SENSOR FAILURE. THE CREW HAS SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE QRH CHKLIST.

Narrative: FLT WAS FROM GEG. ACFT HAD BEEN AT GEG FOR 2 NIGHTS TO FIX A WRITE-UP CONCERNING THE AIR-GND SENSOR (WRITTEN UP AS SYS IN THE FLT MODE ON THE GND). NORMAL PREFLT, START, TAXI, AND TKOF ROLL. AFTER TKOF, THE LNDG GEAR LEVER COULD NOT BE RAISED ABOVE THE 'OFF' POS. FOLLOWING THE QRH, WE PUT THE GEAR LEVER DOWN AND RETRACTED THE FLAPS. AS THE FLAPS REACHED THE UP POS, THE CONFIGURATION WARNING HORN SOUNDED. I FLEW THE ACFT FOR A VISUAL DOWNWIND TO RETURN TO GEG; THE CAPT COMPLETED THE QRH CHKLIST FOR GEAR LEVER WILL NOT MOVE UP AFTER TKOF, FOLLOWING THE APPROPRIATE STEPS FOR THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDING WHEN THE FLAPS ARE UP. PER THE FINAL STEPS OF THE CHKLIST, AFTER CONFIRMING 'DOWN, 3 GREEN,' HE PULLED THE BLUE-COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS REFERENCED IN THE CHKLIST. AS WE EXTENDED THE FLAPS FOR LNDG, THE GEAR HORN SOUNDED (STEADY) AS THE FLAPS EXTENDED PAST POS 15. THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING EXPECTED FROM THE NOTES IN THE QRH; THEY REFERENCED NUISANCE STICK SHAKERS AND SUCH THINGS ON THE GND, BUT MADE NO MENTION OF ANOMALOUS WARNINGS IN FLT. WEIGHING THE DISTR OF LISTENING TO THE WARNING HORN FROM ABOUT 1300 FT AGL DOWN TO THE RWY, WE ELECTED TO PUSH IN THE BLUE-COLLARED CB'S AGAIN, WHICH GAVE US '3 GREEN' AND SILENCED THE HORN. UPON TOUCHDOWN, WE FELT STRONG BRAKING AND REALIZED THAT THE AUTOBRAKE SWITCH WAS STILL IN THE RTO POS. WE SELECTED THE AUTO BRAKE SWITCH TO THE OFF POS, AND THE BRAKING CEASED UNTIL WE BRAKED THE AIRPLANE NORMALLY FROM 80 KNOTS DOWN TO TAXI SPD. THE REST OF THE ROLL-OUT, TAXI-IN, AND SHUTDOWN WERE NORMAL. WE WERE WELL BELOW OUR MAX LNDG WEIGHT, AND THE OPC SHOWED THAT WE WERE WELL BELOW MAX QUICK-TURN WEIGHT FOR THE CONDITIONS AND THAT WE HAD AMPLE STOPPING MARGIN (EVEN HAD WE ONLY USED 'MIN BRAKING'). RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) THE 'GEAR LEVER WILL NOT MOVE UP AFTER TKOF' CHKLIST SHOULD INCLUDE A REMINDER TO SELECT THE AUTOBRAKES TO THE OFF POS. THE NORMAL PLT FLOW IS TO SELECT THEM OFF AFTER FLAPS ARE UP AND THE LNDG GEAR LEVER IS MOVED DOWN FROM THE 'UP' POS TO THE 'OFF' POS. WITH THE MALFUNCTION WE EXPERIENCED, THESE CUES ARE NOT PRESENT; FLAPS DO NOT REMAIN IN THE UP POS, THE GEAR LEVER GOES BACK TO THE DOWN POS, AND THE CREW IS ACTUATING THESE CTLRS AS PART OF THE TROUBLESHOOTING DIRECTED BY QRH CHKLIST. THERE IS NO POINT THAT THE NORMAL FLOW OF CONFIRMING THAT THE FLAPS INDICATE UP, MOVING THE LNDG GEAR LEVER DOWN TO 'OFF,' AND THEN TURNING OFF THE AUTOBRAKE IS EVER PERFORMED. A STEP (OR NOTE) IN THE QRH TO CONFIRM THAT THE AUTOBRAKES ARE SELECTED OFF WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FIRM BRAKING WE EXPERIENCED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TOUCHDOWN. 2) THE QRH SHOULD ADDRESS THE NUISANCE CONFIGN WARNING HORN IN FLT THAT WE RECEIVED AFTER RESETTING LNDG FLAPS, AND PROVIDE A COURSE OF ACTION TO SILENCE IT. THE QRH ADDRESSES VARIOUS NUISANCES ON THE GND, AND HOW TO ALLEVIATE THEM, BUT THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO A NUISANCE WARNING HORN IN FLT. I DON'T KNOW IF THIS HORN WOULD ALWAYS OCCUR DURING THIS PROC, OR IF IT WAS ONLY DUE TO A SPECIFIC COMBINATION OF MALFUNCTIONS IN THE AIR GND SENSOR SYS THAT DAY, BUT ITS PRESENCE SURPRISED US, AND WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY GUIDANCE ADDRESSING IT. SUCH GUIDANCE WOULD BE A USEFUL ADDITION TO THE QRH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.