Narrative:

We were on approach into denver, in a right downwind for runway 16L. We were instructed to make our turn to final above 8000 ft, and cleared for the visual approach to runway 16L. I turned base leg at 9200 ft, and started my turn to final above 8000 ft. I noticed an aircraft approaching from the east and had my first officer question the controller as to where he was going. When my first officer asked us what the other aircraft was doing, the controller stated he was on an approach to runway 16R. This led to some confusion, as this would mean we were going to cross paths and create a conflict in the execution of our approach. I tightened the turn to final and made a modified dogleg. I tried to cross in front of this aircraft, and create more separation. I asked the first officer to question the controller again, since the runway he claimed this aircraft was going to was closed. It was at this point, we got a 'climb' RA. We followed the RA guidance and cleared the conflict, which turned out to be a separate aircraft that was below us, on approach to runway 16R. When we told the approach controller we were following a TCASII RA, he told us he had instructed us to maintain 8000 ft until on final. Upon looking at our altitude, we were now at 7500 ft. After following the TCASII, I determined that a safe approach and landing could still be made, and landed the plane. All SOP's were followed. The first officer stated that our closest vertical separation was 200 ft. The other aircraft that caused our TCASII RA, was an FAA king air, conducting practice approachs to runway 16R. It was never pointed out to us until we had our TCASII event. I believe some confusion existed that we were unaware of. We were watching 1 aircraft, while the controller assumed we were talking about the other aircraft, which he had not told us about. Also, some confusion existed as to the altitude we were to maintain. I understood my instructions to be that I could start descent below 8000 ft after I started my turn to final. In retrospect, I believe the controller wanted us above 8000 ft until on final. So there was a communication issue that was involved. However, the issue that is more disturbing to me is that we were cleared for a visual approach, to cross over an aircraft that was never pointed out to us, that was conducting an approach to a runway that was closed and unlit. I believe errors were made by both the crew and the controller, ours being that we got distraction by both external and internal conflicts, and descended below 8000 ft. The controller erred by not pointing out an aircraft that was to cross our path in close proximity, while making an approach to a runway that is notamed closed, while clearing us for a visual approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CAPT RESPONDED TO A TCASII RA, WHILE ON APCH TO RWY 16L AT DEN.

Narrative: WE WERE ON APCH INTO DENVER, IN A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16L. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE OUR TURN TO FINAL ABOVE 8000 FT, AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16L. I TURNED BASE LEG AT 9200 FT, AND STARTED MY TURN TO FINAL ABOVE 8000 FT. I NOTICED AN ACFT APCHING FROM THE E AND HAD MY FO QUESTION THE CTLR AS TO WHERE HE WAS GOING. WHEN MY FO ASKED US WHAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS DOING, THE CTLR STATED HE WAS ON AN APCH TO RWY 16R. THIS LED TO SOME CONFUSION, AS THIS WOULD MEAN WE WERE GOING TO CROSS PATHS AND CREATE A CONFLICT IN THE EXECUTION OF OUR APCH. I TIGHTENED THE TURN TO FINAL AND MADE A MODIFIED DOGLEG. I TRIED TO CROSS IN FRONT OF THIS ACFT, AND CREATE MORE SEPARATION. I ASKED THE FO TO QUESTION THE CTLR AGAIN, SINCE THE RWY HE CLAIMED THIS ACFT WAS GOING TO WAS CLOSED. IT WAS AT THIS POINT, WE GOT A 'CLB' RA. WE FOLLOWED THE RA GUIDANCE AND CLRED THE CONFLICT, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE A SEPARATE ACFT THAT WAS BELOW US, ON APCH TO RWY 16R. WHEN WE TOLD THE APCH CTLR WE WERE FOLLOWING A TCASII RA, HE TOLD US HE HAD INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT UNTIL ON FINAL. UPON LOOKING AT OUR ALT, WE WERE NOW AT 7500 FT. AFTER FOLLOWING THE TCASII, I DETERMINED THAT A SAFE APCH AND LNDG COULD STILL BE MADE, AND LANDED THE PLANE. ALL SOP'S WERE FOLLOWED. THE FO STATED THAT OUR CLOSEST VERT SEPARATION WAS 200 FT. THE OTHER ACFT THAT CAUSED OUR TCASII RA, WAS AN FAA KING AIR, CONDUCTING PRACTICE APCHS TO RWY 16R. IT WAS NEVER POINTED OUT TO US UNTIL WE HAD OUR TCASII EVENT. I BELIEVE SOME CONFUSION EXISTED THAT WE WERE UNAWARE OF. WE WERE WATCHING 1 ACFT, WHILE THE CTLR ASSUMED WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE OTHER ACFT, WHICH HE HAD NOT TOLD US ABOUT. ALSO, SOME CONFUSION EXISTED AS TO THE ALT WE WERE TO MAINTAIN. I UNDERSTOOD MY INSTRUCTIONS TO BE THAT I COULD START DSCNT BELOW 8000 FT AFTER I STARTED MY TURN TO FINAL. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THE CTLR WANTED US ABOVE 8000 FT UNTIL ON FINAL. SO THERE WAS A COM ISSUE THAT WAS INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE THAT IS MORE DISTURBING TO ME IS THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH, TO CROSS OVER AN ACFT THAT WAS NEVER POINTED OUT TO US, THAT WAS CONDUCTING AN APCH TO A RWY THAT WAS CLOSED AND UNLIT. I BELIEVE ERRORS WERE MADE BY BOTH THE CREW AND THE CTLR, OURS BEING THAT WE GOT DISTR BY BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS, AND DSNDED BELOW 8000 FT. THE CTLR ERRED BY NOT POINTING OUT AN ACFT THAT WAS TO CROSS OUR PATH IN CLOSE PROX, WHILE MAKING AN APCH TO A RWY THAT IS NOTAMED CLOSED, WHILE CLRING US FOR A VISUAL APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.