Narrative:

During our landing rollout on runway 18R in cvg, we were instructed to turn left on kilo which we were just passing and could not make. Both the first officer and I believed kilo to be further down the runway. We accepted the clearance and the tower gave another aircraft takeoff clearance on runway 27, which crosses runway 18R just south of kilo in front of us. We realized our mistake while crossing runway 27 and were issued new taxi instructions while the other aircraft was given a cancellation of their takeoff clearance. We called the tower to discuss our actions, and told him what we believed went wrong. Contributing factors included: no mention of lahso procedures on the arrival ATIS. No mention of simultaneous operations on intersecting runways on the ATIS. Wet runway. Considerable tailwind at touchdown that was not reported on the ATIS which was 1 hour old. I believe the controller should have asked us if we could make kilo, which would have at least prompted us to find it before accepting the clearance. I believe it is very common to accept taxi instructions from controllers on the ground, and that we as pilots tend to 'trust' that they wouldn't give us instructions we couldn't comply with intentionally or otherwise. In retrospect, we should not accept any clearance before evaluatiing what it entails. Unfortunately, in our profession, we are forced to accept some risk in this area. Imagine being given taxi instructions, 'taxi via charlie, victor, and microphone to runway one...' and replying, 'standby' while you study your chart to see if you know where you are going. It seems as though nobody wants to 'admit' they don't know where they are going, so they just accept and figure it out on the way. Supplemental information from acn 591233: I responded out of habit because I assumed the next taxiway would be kilo. At the time I responded to tower we were doing 30 KTS. After I responded the captain and I were both looking for kilo, but all we saw was runway 27 and 9. We both then thought that kilo was on the south side of runway 27. I thought kilo would be in front of us. It however was at our 9 O'clock position and would have been very difficult for us to make due to the wet runway. Supplemental information from acn 590752: paperwork was filed on the pilot deviation/surface incident. Pilots must know where they are.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 ACCEPTS CLRNC TO EXIT RWY 18R AT TXWY KILO PRESUMING IT WAS FURTHER DOWN THE RWY. FLC MISSED TXWY KILO EXIT. TKOF CLRNC FOR B737 CANCELLED.

Narrative: DURING OUR LNDG ROLLOUT ON RWY 18R IN CVG, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN L ON KILO WHICH WE WERE JUST PASSING AND COULD NOT MAKE. BOTH THE FO AND I BELIEVED KILO TO BE FURTHER DOWN THE RWY. WE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC AND THE TWR GAVE ANOTHER ACFT TKOF CLRNC ON RWY 27, WHICH CROSSES RWY 18R JUST S OF KILO IN FRONT OF US. WE REALIZED OUR MISTAKE WHILE CROSSING RWY 27 AND WERE ISSUED NEW TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WHILE THE OTHER ACFT WAS GIVEN A CANCELLATION OF THEIR TKOF CLRNC. WE CALLED THE TWR TO DISCUSS OUR ACTIONS, AND TOLD HIM WHAT WE BELIEVED WENT WRONG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED: NO MENTION OF LAHSO PROCS ON THE ARR ATIS. NO MENTION OF SIMULTANEOUS OPS ON INTERSECTING RWYS ON THE ATIS. WET RWY. CONSIDERABLE TAILWIND AT TOUCHDOWN THAT WAS NOT RPTED ON THE ATIS WHICH WAS 1 HOUR OLD. I BELIEVE THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE ASKED US IF WE COULD MAKE KILO, WHICH WOULD HAVE AT LEAST PROMPTED US TO FIND IT BEFORE ACCEPTING THE CLRNC. I BELIEVE IT IS VERY COMMON TO ACCEPT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM CTLRS ON THE GND, AND THAT WE AS PLTS TEND TO 'TRUST' THAT THEY WOULDN'T GIVE US INSTRUCTIONS WE COULDN'T COMPLY WITH INTENTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CLRNC BEFORE EVALUATIING WHAT IT ENTAILS. UNFORTUNATELY, IN OUR PROFESSION, WE ARE FORCED TO ACCEPT SOME RISK IN THIS AREA. IMAGINE BEING GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, 'TAXI VIA CHARLIE, VICTOR, AND MIKE TO RWY ONE...' AND REPLYING, 'STANDBY' WHILE YOU STUDY YOUR CHART TO SEE IF YOU KNOW WHERE YOU ARE GOING. IT SEEMS AS THOUGH NOBODY WANTS TO 'ADMIT' THEY DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARE GOING, SO THEY JUST ACCEPT AND FIGURE IT OUT ON THE WAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 591233: I RESPONDED OUT OF HABIT BECAUSE I ASSUMED THE NEXT TXWY WOULD BE KILO. AT THE TIME I RESPONDED TO TWR WE WERE DOING 30 KTS. AFTER I RESPONDED THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH LOOKING FOR KILO, BUT ALL WE SAW WAS RWY 27 AND 9. WE BOTH THEN THOUGHT THAT KILO WAS ON THE S SIDE OF RWY 27. I THOUGHT KILO WOULD BE IN FRONT OF US. IT HOWEVER WAS AT OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS AND WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE DUE TO THE WET RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 590752: PAPERWORK WAS FILED ON THE PLT DEVIATION/SURFACE INCIDENT. PLTS MUST KNOW WHERE THEY ARE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.