Narrative:

I was flying a PA-32 on an instrument flight plan from pdk to cub with 1 passenger onboard, returning from a business meeting the previous evening. We departed pdk at approximately XA30 local time. The WX at pdk was mist with 3 mi visibility. While in the climb, the battery level indicator on my engine monitor began flashing, indicating a level of 10800 ft where the normal level is around 12000 ft. The alternator appeared to be functioning properly, and while climbing and leveling out at our filed cruising altitude of 9000 ft, I troubleshot the problem. During this time, I turned off all non-essential system to preserve battery power. As we passed ahn, the aircraft suddenly lost all electrical power. I carry a portable moving map GPS and got it up and running to provide course guidance to our destination. Once this task was accomplished, I got out a backup handheld navigation communication and got it set to the proper ZTL frequency and plugged my headset into its adaptors. I then attempted to contact ZTL on the handheld to advise them of the situation. After my initial transmission, center advised that the transmission was weak and unreadable. I troubleshot this for a few mins, but could not discover the problem. The aircraft was trimmed and stayed on altitude pretty well, but had a slight left turning tendency. There was an undercast starting around 3000 ft. We were flying to the east into the sun, and with the midsummer haze, there was no horizon. As a result, I was flying on instruments while continuing to troubleshoot the electrical and handheld problems. At this point, I was planning to fly a lost communications approach into cub, as I had the flight time on my wristwatch timer and knew what time ATC should expect our approach to commence. The undercast complicated this problem as I was not confident about flying the localizer approach into cub using the handheld, as it seemed to be performing poorly. Another problem was the fact that my direct route went right through cae's busy airspace. To get through the undercast safely, while staying as clear of cae as practical, I decided to descend over lake murray, which is a large lake located north of my route. Although I could not hear anything on the handheld, I suspected that my transmissions might be making it through, so I announced my intentions to descend out of 9000 ft over the columbia approach frequency. During the descent, I continued to announce altitudes passing. After the first couple I reasoned that my transmissions might be stepped on or be cluttering up the approach frequency, so I announced that I was switching to announce on 121.5. Passing through 3000 ft, the reception on the handheld suddenly began to work again. After contacting approach and advising of my intention to descend through the undercast over the lake to 1000 ft, they were very helpful and obviously thankful to be able to know the altitude to associate with the aircraft's primary return on their radar. We broke out of the undercast at about 1100 ft over the lake, and were able to fly visually to cub. About 5 mi out of cub, approach switched me to unicom. Upon switching to unicom and announcing a 5 mi final to runway 13, the handheld started acting up again, and I could not receive any transmissions. In the absence of the indicator lights, I lowered the gear using the emergency procedure to ensure that it was down. On about a 1 to 2 mi final, I suddenly noticed a C-172 on a right base for runway 13. I did a 360 degree turn and came in behind the cessna. The landing was normal except for the fact that I held off full touchdown with engine power until I had tested that the mains seemed to be down and locked. Later, the a&P at cub discovered that the cause of the electrical failure was a bad battery. The lessons that I will take away from this experience primarily concern the battery pwred backup equipment. Keeping fresh batteries in them is not enough. They need to be periodically tested in flight to ensure that each system works properly. And when these backup system are needed, they need to be positioned so as to be ergonomically usable. The handheld with the antenna on a cord with a suction cup works well enough, but I need to find a clamp for the portable GPS that will place it in my field of vision for easy scanning while flying the aircraft in IFR conditions. Finally, I need to fly periodic practice localizer approachs using the handheld for guidance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT AND PAX OF PA32 EXPERIENCED COMPLETE ELECTRICAL AND COM FAILURE ON IFR FLT FROM PDK TO CUB. CONTINUED TO DEST GENERALLY USING APPROPRIATE LOST COM PROCS.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING A PA-32 ON AN INST FLT PLAN FROM PDK TO CUB WITH 1 PAX ONBOARD, RETURNING FROM A BUSINESS MEETING THE PREVIOUS EVENING. WE DEPARTED PDK AT APPROX XA30 LCL TIME. THE WX AT PDK WAS MIST WITH 3 MI VISIBILITY. WHILE IN THE CLB, THE BATTERY LEVEL INDICATOR ON MY ENG MONITOR BEGAN FLASHING, INDICATING A LEVEL OF 10800 FT WHERE THE NORMAL LEVEL IS AROUND 12000 FT. THE ALTERNATOR APPEARED TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, AND WHILE CLBING AND LEVELING OUT AT OUR FILED CRUISING ALT OF 9000 FT, I TROUBLESHOT THE PROB. DURING THIS TIME, I TURNED OFF ALL NON-ESSENTIAL SYS TO PRESERVE BATTERY PWR. AS WE PASSED AHN, THE ACFT SUDDENLY LOST ALL ELECTRICAL PWR. I CARRY A PORTABLE MOVING MAP GPS AND GOT IT UP AND RUNNING TO PROVIDE COURSE GUIDANCE TO OUR DEST. ONCE THIS TASK WAS ACCOMPLISHED, I GOT OUT A BACKUP HANDHELD NAV COM AND GOT IT SET TO THE PROPER ZTL FREQ AND PLUGGED MY HEADSET INTO ITS ADAPTORS. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ZTL ON THE HANDHELD TO ADVISE THEM OF THE SIT. AFTER MY INITIAL XMISSION, CTR ADVISED THAT THE XMISSION WAS WEAK AND UNREADABLE. I TROUBLESHOT THIS FOR A FEW MINS, BUT COULD NOT DISCOVER THE PROB. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED AND STAYED ON ALT PRETTY WELL, BUT HAD A SLIGHT L TURNING TENDENCY. THERE WAS AN UNDERCAST STARTING AROUND 3000 FT. WE WERE FLYING TO THE E INTO THE SUN, AND WITH THE MIDSUMMER HAZE, THERE WAS NO HORIZON. AS A RESULT, I WAS FLYING ON INSTS WHILE CONTINUING TO TROUBLESHOOT THE ELECTRICAL AND HANDHELD PROBS. AT THIS POINT, I WAS PLANNING TO FLY A LOST COMS APCH INTO CUB, AS I HAD THE FLT TIME ON MY WRISTWATCH TIMER AND KNEW WHAT TIME ATC SHOULD EXPECT OUR APCH TO COMMENCE. THE UNDERCAST COMPLICATED THIS PROB AS I WAS NOT CONFIDENT ABOUT FLYING THE LOC APCH INTO CUB USING THE HANDHELD, AS IT SEEMED TO BE PERFORMING POORLY. ANOTHER PROB WAS THE FACT THAT MY DIRECT RTE WENT RIGHT THROUGH CAE'S BUSY AIRSPACE. TO GET THROUGH THE UNDERCAST SAFELY, WHILE STAYING AS CLR OF CAE AS PRACTICAL, I DECIDED TO DSND OVER LAKE MURRAY, WHICH IS A LARGE LAKE LOCATED N OF MY RTE. ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT HEAR ANYTHING ON THE HANDHELD, I SUSPECTED THAT MY TRANSMISSIONS MIGHT BE MAKING IT THROUGH, SO I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS TO DSND OUT OF 9000 FT OVER THE COLUMBIA APCH FREQ. DURING THE DSCNT, I CONTINUED TO ANNOUNCE ALTS PASSING. AFTER THE FIRST COUPLE I REASONED THAT MY TRANSMISSIONS MIGHT BE STEPPED ON OR BE CLUTTERING UP THE APCH FREQ, SO I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS SWITCHING TO ANNOUNCE ON 121.5. PASSING THROUGH 3000 FT, THE RECEPTION ON THE HANDHELD SUDDENLY BEGAN TO WORK AGAIN. AFTER CONTACTING APCH AND ADVISING OF MY INTENTION TO DSND THROUGH THE UNDERCAST OVER THE LAKE TO 1000 FT, THEY WERE VERY HELPFUL AND OBVIOUSLY THANKFUL TO BE ABLE TO KNOW THE ALT TO ASSOCIATE WITH THE ACFT'S PRIMARY RETURN ON THEIR RADAR. WE BROKE OUT OF THE UNDERCAST AT ABOUT 1100 FT OVER THE LAKE, AND WERE ABLE TO FLY VISUALLY TO CUB. ABOUT 5 MI OUT OF CUB, APCH SWITCHED ME TO UNICOM. UPON SWITCHING TO UNICOM AND ANNOUNCING A 5 MI FINAL TO RWY 13, THE HANDHELD STARTED ACTING UP AGAIN, AND I COULD NOT RECEIVE ANY TRANSMISSIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE INDICATOR LIGHTS, I LOWERED THE GEAR USING THE EMER PROC TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS DOWN. ON ABOUT A 1 TO 2 MI FINAL, I SUDDENLY NOTICED A C-172 ON A R BASE FOR RWY 13. I DID A 360 DEG TURN AND CAME IN BEHIND THE CESSNA. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT I HELD OFF FULL TOUCHDOWN WITH ENG PWR UNTIL I HAD TESTED THAT THE MAINS SEEMED TO BE DOWN AND LOCKED. LATER, THE A&P AT CUB DISCOVERED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE WAS A BAD BATTERY. THE LESSONS THAT I WILL TAKE AWAY FROM THIS EXPERIENCE PRIMARILY CONCERN THE BATTERY PWRED BACKUP EQUIP. KEEPING FRESH BATTERIES IN THEM IS NOT ENOUGH. THEY NEED TO BE PERIODICALLY TESTED IN FLT TO ENSURE THAT EACH SYS WORKS PROPERLY. AND WHEN THESE BACKUP SYS ARE NEEDED, THEY NEED TO BE POSITIONED SO AS TO BE ERGONOMICALLY USABLE. THE HANDHELD WITH THE ANTENNA ON A CORD WITH A SUCTION CUP WORKS WELL ENOUGH, BUT I NEED TO FIND A CLAMP FOR THE PORTABLE GPS THAT WILL PLACE IT IN MY FIELD OF VISION FOR EASY SCANNING WHILE FLYING THE ACFT IN IFR CONDITIONS. FINALLY, I NEED TO FLY PERIODIC PRACTICE LOC APCHS USING THE HANDHELD FOR GUIDANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.