Narrative:

It was my first officer's leg to ric. The arrival ATIS stated there were a few clouds at 4500 ft and the ceiling was 15000 ft overcast. Visibility was 9 mi. The approachs in use were the ILS runway 16 and the VOR runway 20. As we arrived in the terminal area we could barely see the beacon and the lead-in lights for runway 16. We were set up for a right base for runway 16 and as we got closer, 3-4 mi, from runway 16, I decided to call the visual approach to runway 16 to save time. This may have rushed my first officer as I was helping with the approach with flaps, gear, and power settings. Once established on the approach, everything seemed normal and the landing touchdown seemed normal. As my first officer was making the rollout, I was making the calls for beta lights and 90 KTS (which allows the PF to apply reverse). It was at this point the control tower came over the frequency and told us to exit at taxiway C and proceed to hold short of runway 20 with him. This is when everything went south! As my first officer was continuing the rollout the aircraft started veering off to the right. Instead of me immediately doing anything about this, I thought my first officer would correct and I proceeded to answer the control tower with the taxi instructions, instead of staying on top of the situation. By this time the aircraft was continuing to veer to the right and my reactions at this point were incorrect for we went off the runway and 1 blade of the 4 bladed left propeller hit a runway edge light. At this point we went off of runway 16 on pavement (not grass) and we were finally stopped and I shut down the engines. The control tower asked several times if we were off the runway, and I made the judgement call and said yes. It wasn't too much longer that a regional jet landed on runway 16. They told the control tower that our aircraft was still on the runway. The lesson learned here was I should have told the control tower to close down runway 16. This would have prevented any further unsafe runway conditions. I was so focused on going off the runway and hitting the light, that I didn't think about my situational awareness, which could have caused more problems. Also, my trust in my first officer's flying abilities led to complacency and correct communications, instead of always being on top of the situation which may have averted this incident in the first place.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SA227 SUSTAINS PROP DAMAGE AS IT LEAVES RWY 16 AT RIC, VA, STRIKING A RWY LIGHT. A REGIONAL JET LNDG BEHIND THEM NOTIFIED TWR THAT THE SA227 WAS NOT COMPLETELY CLR OF THE RWY.

Narrative: IT WAS MY FO'S LEG TO RIC. THE ARR ATIS STATED THERE WERE A FEW CLOUDS AT 4500 FT AND THE CEILING WAS 15000 FT OVCST. VISIBILITY WAS 9 MI. THE APCHS IN USE WERE THE ILS RWY 16 AND THE VOR RWY 20. AS WE ARRIVED IN THE TERMINAL AREA WE COULD BARELY SEE THE BEACON AND THE LEAD-IN LIGHTS FOR RWY 16. WE WERE SET UP FOR A R BASE FOR RWY 16 AND AS WE GOT CLOSER, 3-4 MI, FROM RWY 16, I DECIDED TO CALL THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16 TO SAVE TIME. THIS MAY HAVE RUSHED MY FO AS I WAS HELPING WITH THE APCH WITH FLAPS, GEAR, AND PWR SETTINGS. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH, EVERYTHING SEEMED NORMAL AND THE LNDG TOUCHDOWN SEEMED NORMAL. AS MY FO WAS MAKING THE ROLLOUT, I WAS MAKING THE CALLS FOR BETA LIGHTS AND 90 KTS (WHICH ALLOWS THE PF TO APPLY REVERSE). IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE CTL TWR CAME OVER THE FREQ AND TOLD US TO EXIT AT TXWY C AND PROCEED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 20 WITH HIM. THIS IS WHEN EVERYTHING WENT S! AS MY FO WAS CONTINUING THE ROLLOUT THE ACFT STARTED VEERING OFF TO THE R. INSTEAD OF ME IMMEDIATELY DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THIS, I THOUGHT MY FO WOULD CORRECT AND I PROCEEDED TO ANSWER THE CTL TWR WITH THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, INSTEAD OF STAYING ON TOP OF THE SIT. BY THIS TIME THE ACFT WAS CONTINUING TO VEER TO THE R AND MY REACTIONS AT THIS POINT WERE INCORRECT FOR WE WENT OFF THE RWY AND 1 BLADE OF THE 4 BLADED L PROP HIT A RWY EDGE LIGHT. AT THIS POINT WE WENT OFF OF RWY 16 ON PAVEMENT (NOT GRASS) AND WE WERE FINALLY STOPPED AND I SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. THE CTL TWR ASKED SEVERAL TIMES IF WE WERE OFF THE RWY, AND I MADE THE JUDGEMENT CALL AND SAID YES. IT WASN'T TOO MUCH LONGER THAT A REGIONAL JET LANDED ON RWY 16. THEY TOLD THE CTL TWR THAT OUR ACFT WAS STILL ON THE RWY. THE LESSON LEARNED HERE WAS I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE CTL TWR TO CLOSE DOWN RWY 16. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED ANY FURTHER UNSAFE RWY CONDITIONS. I WAS SO FOCUSED ON GOING OFF THE RWY AND HITTING THE LIGHT, THAT I DIDN'T THINK ABOUT MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED MORE PROBS. ALSO, MY TRUST IN MY FO'S FLYING ABILITIES LED TO COMPLACENCY AND CORRECT COMS, INSTEAD OF ALWAYS BEING ON TOP OF THE SIT WHICH MAY HAVE AVERTED THIS INCIDENT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.