Narrative:

Lck overlays are: springfield overlays day with common boundaries and mixed stratums. Ape has B757 on a heading around slow moving FL310 traffic nwbound when spf has F900 turning direct karyl climbing to FL330. The d-side controller at day calls the d-side at ape to point out F900 climbing, he thinks, sebound. However, at the end of this statement, someone else on the tape says 'direct karyl.' the d-side at ape passes traffic as B757 on an assigned heading for ape traffic at FL310. D88 says traffic observed and d-ape pointout approved. The D88 controller advises his radar team member who stated 'that's not my traffic and drops the track' to his d-side D88. First, this to me was the worst mistake of the incident. However, there were others. The D88 pointout without knowing exactly what was going on, plus he (D88) controller was a 4 month certification and easily intimidated. 50 seconds down the road when F900 is within the lateral boundary of ape/lck sectors, the d-side at spf calls ape-right and asks, 'verify you got a pointout on F900.' ape-right thinking F900 is on a heading and after asking their own d-side if the traffic (B757) had been passed, subsequently ape-right answered affirmatively, or approved the pointout. The situation was tightening as F900 continued turning direct karyl. Had this been done timely/correctly, as in spf d-side saying, 'pointout F900,' I believe the B757 traffic would have been passed and the separation been saved! At the time of the coordination, the spf sector did not have communication with F900, the aircraft was already switched to lck super-high and really outside of coordinating a turn with lck. Lck had no control. Simply stated, too much assuming and not near enough control. Subsequently, the ape-right controller turns B757 west and we end up short on the separation side. Why is it safe to run totally unsupervised traffic over the oceans of the word 1000 ft apart above FL290 and not over the continental united states where adequate radar and flight following exist everywhere? It's like it is a big game to see how report conscious we can be instead of realizing that we need more altitudes and this alone would help immensely with separation errors (which is the only scale to evaluate success in our system). Being a terminal controller for yrs, it seems funny that in a terminal environment, we never have back-side deals and in the center, we have a 6 mi circle we protect all the way around the aircraft and I would say, half of our deals are back-side errors (in other words, the aircraft will never ever hit, and often it is very controled) as in this case. B757 was always going to be behind F900 and our vectors were worthless. Truly, this error could and should have been a non occurrence. However, we need help and the altitude would help and people honest and sensible enough to evaluate these errors and see how controled they are and allow for divergence and some back-side separation loss.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID INTRAFAC COORD BREAKDOWN WHEN INCOMPLETE COORD IS CONDUCTED BTWN 5 CTLRS WITH A CLBING F900 TO FL330, CONFLICTING WITH A B752 AT FL310 BEING VECTORED AROUND ANOTHER ACFT LEVEL FL310, EFFECTING 4 CTL SECTORS.

Narrative: LCK OVERLAYS ARE: SPRINGFIELD OVERLAYS DAY WITH COMMON BOUNDARIES AND MIXED STRATUMS. APE HAS B757 ON A HDG AROUND SLOW MOVING FL310 TFC NWBOUND WHEN SPF HAS F900 TURNING DIRECT KARYL CLBING TO FL330. THE D-SIDE CTLR AT DAY CALLS THE D-SIDE AT APE TO POINT OUT F900 CLBING, HE THINKS, SEBOUND. HOWEVER, AT THE END OF THIS STATEMENT, SOMEONE ELSE ON THE TAPE SAYS 'DIRECT KARYL.' THE D-SIDE AT APE PASSES TFC AS B757 ON AN ASSIGNED HDG FOR APE TFC AT FL310. D88 SAYS TFC OBSERVED AND D-APE POINTOUT APPROVED. THE D88 CTLR ADVISES HIS RADAR TEAM MEMBER WHO STATED 'THAT'S NOT MY TFC AND DROPS THE TRACK' TO HIS D-SIDE D88. FIRST, THIS TO ME WAS THE WORST MISTAKE OF THE INCIDENT. HOWEVER, THERE WERE OTHERS. THE D88 POINTOUT WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT WAS GOING ON, PLUS HE (D88) CTLR WAS A 4 MONTH CERTIFICATION AND EASILY INTIMIDATED. 50 SECONDS DOWN THE ROAD WHEN F900 IS WITHIN THE LATERAL BOUNDARY OF APE/LCK SECTORS, THE D-SIDE AT SPF CALLS APE-R AND ASKS, 'VERIFY YOU GOT A POINTOUT ON F900.' APE-R THINKING F900 IS ON A HDG AND AFTER ASKING THEIR OWN D-SIDE IF THE TFC (B757) HAD BEEN PASSED, SUBSEQUENTLY APE-R ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY, OR APPROVED THE POINTOUT. THE SIT WAS TIGHTENING AS F900 CONTINUED TURNING DIRECT KARYL. HAD THIS BEEN DONE TIMELY/CORRECTLY, AS IN SPF D-SIDE SAYING, 'POINTOUT F900,' I BELIEVE THE B757 TFC WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED AND THE SEPARATION BEEN SAVED! AT THE TIME OF THE COORD, THE SPF SECTOR DID NOT HAVE COM WITH F900, THE ACFT WAS ALREADY SWITCHED TO LCK SUPER-HIGH AND REALLY OUTSIDE OF COORDINATING A TURN WITH LCK. LCK HAD NO CTL. SIMPLY STATED, TOO MUCH ASSUMING AND NOT NEAR ENOUGH CTL. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE APE-R CTLR TURNS B757 W AND WE END UP SHORT ON THE SEPARATION SIDE. WHY IS IT SAFE TO RUN TOTALLY UNSUPERVISED TFC OVER THE OCEANS OF THE WORD 1000 FT APART ABOVE FL290 AND NOT OVER THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WHERE ADEQUATE RADAR AND FLT FOLLOWING EXIST EVERYWHERE? IT'S LIKE IT IS A BIG GAME TO SEE HOW RPT CONSCIOUS WE CAN BE INSTEAD OF REALIZING THAT WE NEED MORE ALTS AND THIS ALONE WOULD HELP IMMENSELY WITH SEPARATION ERRORS (WHICH IS THE ONLY SCALE TO EVALUATE SUCCESS IN OUR SYS). BEING A TERMINAL CTLR FOR YRS, IT SEEMS FUNNY THAT IN A TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT, WE NEVER HAVE BACK-SIDE DEALS AND IN THE CTR, WE HAVE A 6 MI CIRCLE WE PROTECT ALL THE WAY AROUND THE ACFT AND I WOULD SAY, HALF OF OUR DEALS ARE BACK-SIDE ERRORS (IN OTHER WORDS, THE ACFT WILL NEVER EVER HIT, AND OFTEN IT IS VERY CTLED) AS IN THIS CASE. B757 WAS ALWAYS GOING TO BE BEHIND F900 AND OUR VECTORS WERE WORTHLESS. TRULY, THIS ERROR COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN A NON OCCURRENCE. HOWEVER, WE NEED HELP AND THE ALT WOULD HELP AND PEOPLE HONEST AND SENSIBLE ENOUGH TO EVALUATE THESE ERRORS AND SEE HOW CTLED THEY ARE AND ALLOW FOR DIVERGENCE AND SOME BACK-SIDE SEPARATION LOSS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.