Narrative:

Initial takeoff clearance off of runway 12L was heading 120 degrees to 5000 ft. Airplane was very light with very few passenger. After briefly leveling at 5000 ft, st louis departure gave the following clearance. 'Air carrier X climb and maintain 6000 ft, turn left heading 010 degrees and intercept the card 6 departure.' the captain was flying and instructed me to put it in the box. I looked at the SID, and the departure showed a course that was 026 outbound out of csx and 023 inbound to cap. I looked at the heading between the 2 on the legs page. It indicated 026. I inserted an intercept leg to cap with an inbound course of 026. The captain told me to hold on and make sure it was right before I put it in. I looked at the navigation display and noticed that the captain had raw data up, and the FMC had a line with a 026 course out of csx. This did not line up with the 026 inbound line to cap. I then tried a 023 intercept to cap, but that did not line up with the 026 display out of csx either. I asked the captain what he wanted me to put in. He said that he wanted me to make sure it was right before I put it in. I told him that I had done what I thought was correct and asked him specifically what he wanted. At this point, he started to go heads down to fly raw data even though we were still about 5 mi from a benign intercept. I noticed that the altitude was rapidly going through 5800 ft, and I said 'here comes 6.' the captain started a slow level off and when I saw the altitude rapidly going through 6100 ft I said much louder 'watch your altitude!' the captain then yelled at me to 'hey, chill out!' we finally topped out at 6500 ft, and ATC came across the radio and said 'air carrier X, say altitude! We're showing you 500 ft high with an assigned altitude of 6000 ft. Air carrier X climb now to 13000 ft.' once we started climbing again, an ATC supervisor came on the radio and told us that we didn't have to worry about the incident, that there had been some traffic, but it had not become a factor. After we leveled at 13000 ft, the captain yelled at me that I needed to just 'chill out.' he said that I was 'not in charge.' I asked him what he meant. He said that I was not listening to his instructions for the FMC. I told him what I had done, and asked him specifically what I should have done. At this point he pulled his departure out of his bag, since he didn't have it out for the flight. After looking at the depiction, he couldn't tell me specifically what he wanted other than that I should have made sure it was right before I put it in. There were significant CRM issues that led up to this event. I was concerned about the crew environment after the first day of the trip and discussed it with the captain to try to resolve things. The captain has a tendency to not follow SOP, do extremely cursory briefs, and not kept the first officer in the loop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW BECOMES TASK SATURATED ON DEP FROM STL AND HAS AN ALT EXCURSION WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PROGRAM THE FMC.

Narrative: INITIAL TKOF CLRNC OFF OF RWY 12L WAS HDG 120 DEGS TO 5000 FT. AIRPLANE WAS VERY LIGHT WITH VERY FEW PAX. AFTER BRIEFLY LEVELING AT 5000 FT, ST LOUIS DEP GAVE THE FOLLOWING CLRNC. 'ACR X CLB AND MAINTAIN 6000 FT, TURN L HDG 010 DEGS AND INTERCEPT THE CARD 6 DEP.' THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND INSTRUCTED ME TO PUT IT IN THE BOX. I LOOKED AT THE SID, AND THE DEP SHOWED A COURSE THAT WAS 026 OUTBOUND OUT OF CSX AND 023 INBOUND TO CAP. I LOOKED AT THE HDG BTWN THE 2 ON THE LEGS PAGE. IT INDICATED 026. I INSERTED AN INTERCEPT LEG TO CAP WITH AN INBOUND COURSE OF 026. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO HOLD ON AND MAKE SURE IT WAS RIGHT BEFORE I PUT IT IN. I LOOKED AT THE NAV DISPLAY AND NOTICED THAT THE CAPT HAD RAW DATA UP, AND THE FMC HAD A LINE WITH A 026 COURSE OUT OF CSX. THIS DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE 026 INBOUND LINE TO CAP. I THEN TRIED A 023 INTERCEPT TO CAP, BUT THAT DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE 026 DISPLAY OUT OF CSX EITHER. I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT HE WANTED ME TO PUT IN. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO MAKE SURE IT WAS RIGHT BEFORE I PUT IT IN. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD DONE WHAT I THOUGHT WAS CORRECT AND ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE WANTED. AT THIS POINT, HE STARTED TO GO HEADS DOWN TO FLY RAW DATA EVEN THOUGH WE WERE STILL ABOUT 5 MI FROM A BENIGN INTERCEPT. I NOTICED THAT THE ALT WAS RAPIDLY GOING THROUGH 5800 FT, AND I SAID 'HERE COMES 6.' THE CAPT STARTED A SLOW LEVEL OFF AND WHEN I SAW THE ALT RAPIDLY GOING THROUGH 6100 FT I SAID MUCH LOUDER 'WATCH YOUR ALT!' THE CAPT THEN YELLED AT ME TO 'HEY, CHILL OUT!' WE FINALLY TOPPED OUT AT 6500 FT, AND ATC CAME ACROSS THE RADIO AND SAID 'ACR X, SAY ALT! WE'RE SHOWING YOU 500 FT HIGH WITH AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 6000 FT. ACR X CLB NOW TO 13000 FT.' ONCE WE STARTED CLBING AGAIN, AN ATC SUPVR CAME ON THE RADIO AND TOLD US THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THE INCIDENT, THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME TFC, BUT IT HAD NOT BECOME A FACTOR. AFTER WE LEVELED AT 13000 FT, THE CAPT YELLED AT ME THAT I NEEDED TO JUST 'CHILL OUT.' HE SAID THAT I WAS 'NOT IN CHARGE.' I ASKED HIM WHAT HE MEANT. HE SAID THAT I WAS NOT LISTENING TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FMC. I TOLD HIM WHAT I HAD DONE, AND ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE. AT THIS POINT HE PULLED HIS DEP OUT OF HIS BAG, SINCE HE DIDN'T HAVE IT OUT FOR THE FLT. AFTER LOOKING AT THE DEPICTION, HE COULDN'T TELL ME SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE WANTED OTHER THAN THAT I SHOULD HAVE MADE SURE IT WAS RIGHT BEFORE I PUT IT IN. THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CRM ISSUES THAT LED UP TO THIS EVENT. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CREW ENVIRONMENT AFTER THE FIRST DAY OF THE TRIP AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE CAPT TO TRY TO RESOLVE THINGS. THE CAPT HAS A TENDENCY TO NOT FOLLOW SOP, DO EXTREMELY CURSORY BRIEFS, AND NOT KEPT THE FO IN THE LOOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.