Narrative:

My crew and I were tasked to replace an idg oil filter and a fuel filter on #2 engine. We opened the cowls and started to lock out the thrust reversers prior to our filter changes. I started to pin the locking actuators and was advised that the paperwork said we only needed to pin the directional control valve so I stopped. We completed our assigned task and the aircraft left for ZZZ1 that evening. I was informed the next day the thrust reversers did not deploy in ZZZ1 due to the inadvertent pin left in the locking actuator. I believe that if the thrust reverser is deactivated or the system is worked on in any way, there should be an operational check of the thrust reverser and a corresponding logbook entry. This incident would have been prevented had these steps been in place.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: #2 THRUST REVERSER ON A330 FAILED TO DEPLOY ON LNDG DUE TO FAILURE OF MAINT CREW TO REMOVE A DIRECTIONAL CTL VALVE LOCKING PIN INSTALLED DURING ROUTINE SVCING OF THE ENG.

Narrative: MY CREW AND I WERE TASKED TO REPLACE AN IDG OIL FILTER AND A FUEL FILTER ON #2 ENG. WE OPENED THE COWLS AND STARTED TO LOCK OUT THE THRUST REVERSERS PRIOR TO OUR FILTER CHANGES. I STARTED TO PIN THE LOCKING ACTUATORS AND WAS ADVISED THAT THE PAPERWORK SAID WE ONLY NEEDED TO PIN THE DIRECTIONAL CTL VALVE SO I STOPPED. WE COMPLETED OUR ASSIGNED TASK AND THE ACFT LEFT FOR ZZZ1 THAT EVENING. I WAS INFORMED THE NEXT DAY THE THRUST REVERSERS DID NOT DEPLOY IN ZZZ1 DUE TO THE INADVERTENT PIN LEFT IN THE LOCKING ACTUATOR. I BELIEVE THAT IF THE THRUST REVERSER IS DEACTIVATED OR THE SYS IS WORKED ON IN ANY WAY, THERE SHOULD BE AN OPERATIONAL CHK OF THE THRUST REVERSER AND A CORRESPONDING LOGBOOK ENTRY. THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THESE STEPS BEEN IN PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.