Narrative:

The flight was initially delayed because of the late arrival of the captain, we departed 1/2 hour late. For this leg of the trip, I was the PF. After the initial departure, the flight progressed normally, till the approach phase of the trip. It was the arrival into the terminal area of and the approach that caused me great concern for the safety of the crew and aircraft. Here is my recount of the events which took place on this leg of the trip, beginning with arrival over the robbinsville VOR (rbv). 1) after crossing rbv, we were instructed to descend and maintain 2000 ft per ATC. It was decided at this point that our approach of choice, (per the current WX received from the on field AWOS) was the VOR runway 32, circle to land runway 14. The VOR approach was briefed accordingly and radios were setup for the approach. 2) shortly after this, new WX was received from the AWOS, by the captain. At this time the captain informed me that the WX had changed and that the minimums for the VOR approach were not met and therefore we should switch to the localizer runway 14 approach. I agreed and we quickly changed the radios to the proper settings for the localizer approach and mcguire approach was notified of our change. 3) at this point we were receiving radar vectors to intercept the final approach course. The aircraft was configured to flaps 20 degrees and gear down, while slowing to and then maintaining 140 KTS. The approach and before landing checklists were completed in the proper sequence. It is about this time that we were cleared for the approach and told 'maintain 2000 ft till established, cleared localizer runway 14 approach.' 4) very shortly thereafter, we intercepted the localizer and began our descent to 1600 ft. Upon crossing the FAF, the time was started and I began my descent at 140 KTS and 1000 FPM rate of descent. 5) when we arrived at the missed approach point, the runway environment was instantly in sight. Unfortunately, I was slightly high and the missed approach point is the threshold of the runway. So, when we 'broke out' we were directly over the runway. Being that I was the PF, and realizing that there was no way in which we could make a normal approach and landing I immediately initiated the missed approach callouts and procedure. I called 'set maximum power, flaps 7 degrees,' and advanced the power levers. 6) it was at this point that the captain grabbed the control yoke on his side and stated, 'it's ok I've got it,' at which time I once again stated 'missed approach!,' the captain then grabbed the power levers and reduced the power as to stop our climb. The captain decided that he was going to attempt to circle to runway 14 and land. There was never any positive xfer of controls or notification of what was happening. 7) the captain then drifted to the right of the runway (recognized by localizer needle deflection) and then descended back down to an altitude of 600 ft MSL. During this time the captain continued to state that he had the runway in view. I could not deny or verify that the captain did or did not have the runway in view. All that I can state is that I did not have the runway in view, and I was also looking out the captain's side window. 8) it was at that time I returned my scan to inside to assure that we were maintaining the proper altitude, and I made radio announcements on the CTAF frequency. The captain continued to circle and when he rolled out on final, the runway was in fact, in view. He proceeded to land, on runway 32, touching down long and turning around at the end of the runway, at which point he began a back-taxi. The captain then proceeded normally to the ramp, at which time I cancelled our IFR clearance with mcguire clearance, per the captain's orders. In conclusion, the captain's refusal to accept the PF's command of missed approach, and unauthorized circling approach, below circling minimums greatly endangered the crew and aircraft. The captain's actions were not only in violation of FARS, they were also a direct violation of our company operational specifications and normal procedures. It is because of his actions on this day that I have chosen to never fly with this individual again and I have elected to file this report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LAST MIN UNBRIEFED CHANGE OF PF ASSIGNMENT AT THE MISSED APCH POINT AT MDA WAS FOLLOWED BY A CIRCLING MANEUVER TO LAND. THE MISSED APCH HAD ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED AND BEGUN. THE ORIGINAL PF WAS CONCERNED.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS INITIALLY DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE LATE ARR OF THE CAPT, WE DEPARTED 1/2 HR LATE. FOR THIS LEG OF THE TRIP, I WAS THE PF. AFTER THE INITIAL DEP, THE FLT PROGRESSED NORMALLY, TILL THE APCH PHASE OF THE TRIP. IT WAS THE ARR INTO THE TERMINAL AREA OF AND THE APCH THAT CAUSED ME GREAT CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND ACFT. HERE IS MY RECOUNT OF THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THIS LEG OF THE TRIP, BEGINNING WITH ARR OVER THE ROBBINSVILLE VOR (RBV). 1) AFTER XING RBV, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT PER ATC. IT WAS DECIDED AT THIS POINT THAT OUR APCH OF CHOICE, (PER THE CURRENT WX RECEIVED FROM THE ON FIELD AWOS) WAS THE VOR RWY 32, CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 14. THE VOR APCH WAS BRIEFED ACCORDINGLY AND RADIOS WERE SETUP FOR THE APCH. 2) SHORTLY AFTER THIS, NEW WX WAS RECEIVED FROM THE AWOS, BY THE CAPT. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT THE WX HAD CHANGED AND THAT THE MINIMUMS FOR THE VOR APCH WERE NOT MET AND THEREFORE WE SHOULD SWITCH TO THE LOC RWY 14 APCH. I AGREED AND WE QUICKLY CHANGED THE RADIOS TO THE PROPER SETTINGS FOR THE LOC APCH AND MCGUIRE APCH WAS NOTIFIED OF OUR CHANGE. 3) AT THIS POINT WE WERE RECEIVING RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 20 DEGS AND GEAR DOWN, WHILE SLOWING TO AND THEN MAINTAINING 140 KTS. THE APCH AND BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED IN THE PROPER SEQUENCE. IT IS ABOUT THIS TIME THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND TOLD 'MAINTAIN 2000 FT TILL ESTABLISHED, CLRED LOC RWY 14 APCH.' 4) VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND BEGAN OUR DSCNT TO 1600 FT. UPON XING THE FAF, THE TIME WAS STARTED AND I BEGAN MY DSCNT AT 140 KTS AND 1000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT. 5) WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE MISSED APCH POINT, THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS INSTANTLY IN SIGHT. UNFORTUNATELY, I WAS SLIGHTLY HIGH AND THE MISSED APCH POINT IS THE THRESHOLD OF THE RWY. SO, WHEN WE 'BROKE OUT' WE WERE DIRECTLY OVER THE RWY. BEING THAT I WAS THE PF, AND REALIZING THAT THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH WE COULD MAKE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED THE MISSED APCH CALLOUTS AND PROC. I CALLED 'SET MAX PWR, FLAPS 7 DEGS,' AND ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS. 6) IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE CAPT GRABBED THE CTL YOKE ON HIS SIDE AND STATED, 'IT'S OK I'VE GOT IT,' AT WHICH TIME I ONCE AGAIN STATED 'MISSED APCH!,' THE CAPT THEN GRABBED THE PWR LEVERS AND REDUCED THE PWR AS TO STOP OUR CLB. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO ATTEMPT TO CIRCLE TO RWY 14 AND LAND. THERE WAS NEVER ANY POSITIVE XFER OF CTLS OR NOTIFICATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. 7) THE CAPT THEN DRIFTED TO THE R OF THE RWY (RECOGNIZED BY LOC NEEDLE DEFLECTION) AND THEN DSNDED BACK DOWN TO AN ALT OF 600 FT MSL. DURING THIS TIME THE CAPT CONTINUED TO STATE THAT HE HAD THE RWY IN VIEW. I COULD NOT DENY OR VERIFY THAT THE CAPT DID OR DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN VIEW. ALL THAT I CAN STATE IS THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN VIEW, AND I WAS ALSO LOOKING OUT THE CAPT'S SIDE WINDOW. 8) IT WAS AT THAT TIME I RETURNED MY SCAN TO INSIDE TO ASSURE THAT WE WERE MAINTAINING THE PROPER ALT, AND I MADE RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE CTAF FREQ. THE CAPT CONTINUED TO CIRCLE AND WHEN HE ROLLED OUT ON FINAL, THE RWY WAS IN FACT, IN VIEW. HE PROCEEDED TO LAND, ON RWY 32, TOUCHING DOWN LONG AND TURNING AROUND AT THE END OF THE RWY, AT WHICH POINT HE BEGAN A BACK-TAXI. THE CAPT THEN PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO THE RAMP, AT WHICH TIME I CANCELLED OUR IFR CLRNC WITH MCGUIRE CLRNC, PER THE CAPT'S ORDERS. IN CONCLUSION, THE CAPT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PF'S COMMAND OF MISSED APCH, AND UNAUTH CIRCLING APCH, BELOW CIRCLING MINIMUMS GREATLY ENDANGERED THE CREW AND ACFT. THE CAPT'S ACTIONS WERE NOT ONLY IN VIOLATION OF FARS, THEY WERE ALSO A DIRECT VIOLATION OF OUR COMPANY OPERATIONAL SPECS AND NORMAL PROCS. IT IS BECAUSE OF HIS ACTIONS ON THIS DAY THAT I HAVE CHOSEN TO NEVER FLY WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL AGAIN AND I HAVE ELECTED TO FILE THIS RPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.