Narrative:

We flew this aircraft on its second flight after the right engine was replaced. The takeoff from sfo was a packs-off, maximum thrust takeoff due to our gross weight. EPR was calculated by ACARS and the tmc to be 1.57, with an N1 of 104%. On initial takeoff roll, after pushing the EPR switch, the left engine settled at 1.57 EPR, 104% N1. The right engine settled at 1.54 EPR, 100.7% N1. The first officer tried fine-tuning the throttle, and by then we were at 80 KTS. I tried pushing the right throttle forward to get the required value of 1.57 EPR, but the throttle was already against the forward stop. The airplane was accelerating normally, so I did not deem it necessary to do a high speed abort for an EPR difference of .03. We reached V1, vr, V2, with plenty of runway left, and had a normal climb. However, climb out EPR was 1.67 on the left engine, but only 1.62 on the right. It was then that we noticed the difference on maximum available EPR (yellow tick mark) on the EPR gauge. At cruise, the EPR's were matched, but maximum available EPR was 1.70 on the left engine and 1.63 on the right. We sent an events record to mr X on climb out, along with an ACARS message. It was not until approximately 5 hours later that dispatch called us to tell us the reason for the difference on EPR readings. The right engine was programmed for a B747-400. We were already on the ETOPS area (over canada) and we decided it was safer to continue to ZZZZ.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B763 DISCOVER RECENTLY REPLACED ENG NOT PERFORMING TO SPECS. EVENTUAL DIAGNOSIS DETERMINES THAT COMPUTER PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS FOR THE ENG HAD BEEN SET TO THOSE REQUIRED FOR ANOTHER ACFT TYPE.

Narrative: WE FLEW THIS ACFT ON ITS SECOND FLT AFTER THE R ENG WAS REPLACED. THE TKOF FROM SFO WAS A PACKS-OFF, MAX THRUST TKOF DUE TO OUR GROSS WT. EPR WAS CALCULATED BY ACARS AND THE TMC TO BE 1.57, WITH AN N1 OF 104%. ON INITIAL TKOF ROLL, AFTER PUSHING THE EPR SWITCH, THE L ENG SETTLED AT 1.57 EPR, 104% N1. THE R ENG SETTLED AT 1.54 EPR, 100.7% N1. THE FO TRIED FINE-TUNING THE THROTTLE, AND BY THEN WE WERE AT 80 KTS. I TRIED PUSHING THE R THROTTLE FORWARD TO GET THE REQUIRED VALUE OF 1.57 EPR, BUT THE THROTTLE WAS ALREADY AGAINST THE FORWARD STOP. THE AIRPLANE WAS ACCELERATING NORMALLY, SO I DID NOT DEEM IT NECESSARY TO DO A HIGH SPD ABORT FOR AN EPR DIFFERENCE OF .03. WE REACHED V1, VR, V2, WITH PLENTY OF RWY LEFT, AND HAD A NORMAL CLB. HOWEVER, CLBOUT EPR WAS 1.67 ON THE L ENG, BUT ONLY 1.62 ON THE R. IT WAS THEN THAT WE NOTICED THE DIFFERENCE ON MAX AVAILABLE EPR (YELLOW TICK MARK) ON THE EPR GAUGE. AT CRUISE, THE EPR'S WERE MATCHED, BUT MAX AVAILABLE EPR WAS 1.70 ON THE L ENG AND 1.63 ON THE R. WE SENT AN EVENTS RECORD TO MR X ON CLBOUT, ALONG WITH AN ACARS MESSAGE. IT WAS NOT UNTIL APPROX 5 HRS LATER THAT DISPATCH CALLED US TO TELL US THE REASON FOR THE DIFFERENCE ON EPR READINGS. THE R ENG WAS PROGRAMMED FOR A B747-400. WE WERE ALREADY ON THE ETOPS AREA (OVER CANADA) AND WE DECIDED IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE TO ZZZZ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.