Narrative:

On takeoff roll on runway 15, we came within 5 to 10 ft of colliding with a hughes 500 helicopter at about 20 ft into the air. The captain and I noticed the helicopter on taxi out parked on the ramp across the active runway from us. We were cleared for takeoff well before reaching the departure end of runway 15, which we thought unusual. I took control of the aircraft and released brakes after running the engines up to 1.4 EPR. Just after the captain called 90 KTS, tower cleared the helicopter for takeoff, which was about 2000 ft downfield from us on our right. The helicopter turned toward runway 15 and began a hover taxi toward the southeast, angling slightly toward the runway. Near the runway, he began to transition to forward flight at about 10 ft above the ground. We were at about his 6-7 O'clock position. The captain queried tower if they had just cleared the helicopter for takeoff. It was obvious to both of us that a collision was inevitable if the helicopter continued on present course. We would impact just above the runway at about the intersection of runway 15 and 08. We were approaching V1 and I felt we could no longer abort. I felt the longer I delayed rotation the better chance we had that the helicopter would change course or we could lift off past him somehow. The captain called to the helicopter on the radio to turn right. I felt I could no longer delay rotation, checked our speed which was approximately the rotation speed (about 140 KTS). The captain said rotate and turn. I rolled left just as we lifted off and just before passing the helicopter which was to our right (about 10 to 15 degree bank for 10 to 20 degree turn). The helicopter appeared to be banking away, but passed just above the right wing, I believe. Both the captain and I expected to impact the helicopter. The captain asked immediately if the helicopter was okay. The tower replied, 'yeah, he's fine, my fault.' safely airborne, I turned right to intercept the normal departure and clean up on schedule. The captain's quick thinking saved the day when he made calls to the tower and the helicopter to turn. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter was allegedly informed by company safety officer that ATC admitted their error. Reporter stated that both pilots believed a collision was inevitable, but hoped the immediate turn would lessen the impact. Supplemental information from acn 594824: as we accelerated through 90 KTS, the tower cleared the helicopter for takeoff with a southeast departure and cleared him to cross both runways. The helicopter was approximately 2000 ft ahead and to our right and was turning towards our runway while accelerating in ground effect. A successful abort was not possible from this point and I told the first officer to continue the takeoff. At vr I told the first officer to rotate and turn left. As he did I transmitted on tower frequency helicopter taking off, turn right turn right immediately as we turned left at approximately 20 ft AGL, the helicopter came up over our right wing in a steep climbing right turn. I asked the tower if the other aircraft was all right. The reply was, 'yes, he's okay, sorry about that, my fault.' callback conversation with reporter from acn 594824 revealed the following information: captain states that they were 90 KTS and increasing when they heard the tower clear the helicopter for takeoff. The captain verbalized concern to the first officer. The captain expected the helicopter to turn right to parallel the S80's direction of takeoff, but quickly realized the helicopter was going to intercept them over the runway surface. The captain verbalized to the first officer he thought a crash was imminent, but to hold the aircraft on the runway as long as possible and then be ready to turn when instructed. It was the captain's belief that to not turn, that the impact with the helicopter would force the S80 into the terminal, to turn left and climb might only hit the helicopter with their wheels or undercarriage and there might be some chance to save his aircraft. At approximately 132 KTS, the aircraft was resulting from ground effect and the captain told the first officer to climb and turn as quickly as possible. It was during this transition from rotation to being airborne, that the captain advised that he lost sight of the helicopter. Simultaneously as these events were taking place, the captain keyed the microphone, transmitting to the helicopter to turn right. When realizing that they did not feel any impact, the captain questioned the tower if the helicopter was all right, and received an affirmative, with acknowledgement of the controller's error and to change to departure control. In a later telephone conversation with tower personnel, the captain was advised that a separation procedure had been applied, the helicopter was told to turn to avoid the developing conflict with the departing S80. When questioned further by the captain, the reporter claims that no one from the tower could confirm that separation existed or could explain how the helicopter ended up on the other side of the runway. The captain was advised that 'no one saw that part of it.' the captain also questioned that if a controller transmitted a clearance for the helicopter to turn right prior to reaching runway 15, neither pilot heard a 'squeal' due to simultaneous xmissions normally heard in such an event. Supplemental information from acn 594714: I called burbank tower and reported I had ATIS and requested clearance southeast bound. The tower cleared me to depart and to cross 'both runways.' I was southeast bound about 75 to 200 ft AGL, crossing runway 15 when I heard on the radio, 'helicopter turn right, right, right.' I immediately turned right and saw a jet out of the corner of my eye. The jet then called and asked if the helicopter was all right. I said, I was, the tower then came on line and said, 'sorry guys that was my fault.' callback conversation with reporter from acn 594714 revealed the following information: pilot stated that he never saw the S80 until the wing crossed over his aircraft. The reporter called ground for departure hover taxi clearance, then was changed to local control for takeoff clearance, which was issued without hesitation. Pilot surmises that the reason he was not aware of the S80 was because of the call to ground control, then local control, with the S80 having already been cleared for takeoff and on departure roll. In later discussions with tower, reporter was advised that as the pilot of the S80 transmitted for 'helicopter, turn right,' another controller intervened and simultaneously transmitted on local control frequency for, 'helicopter, turn right, right, right'. The reporter alleged, 'had the aircraft been a B737, I would have been sucked into the engine. I don't know why we didn't hit each other.' comments were made to the reporter that the controller thought he was at the other FBO. The reporter discounts this because the two are adjoining buildings in the same ramp area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON TKOF FROM BUR RWY 15, AT APPROX 20 FT AGL, S80 CAPT TRANSMITS ON TWR FREQ TO A CONFLICTING H500 CROSSING AT THE DEP END RWY 15 TO TURN R, AS THE S80 TURNED L, MISSING THE H500 BY 10 FT.

Narrative: ON TKOF ROLL ON RWY 15, WE CAME WITHIN 5 TO 10 FT OF COLLIDING WITH A HUGHES 500 HELI AT ABOUT 20 FT INTO THE AIR. THE CAPT AND I NOTICED THE HELI ON TAXI OUT PARKED ON THE RAMP ACROSS THE ACTIVE RWY FROM US. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF WELL BEFORE REACHING THE DEP END OF RWY 15, WHICH WE THOUGHT UNUSUAL. I TOOK CONTROL OF THE ACFT AND RELEASED BRAKES AFTER RUNNING THE ENGINES UP TO 1.4 EPR. JUST AFTER THE CAPT CALLED 90 KTS, TWR CLRED THE HELI FOR TKOF, WHICH WAS ABOUT 2000 FT DOWNFIELD FROM US ON OUR R. THE HELI TURNED TOWARD RWY 15 AND BEGAN A HOVER TAXI TOWARD THE SE, ANGLING SLIGHTLY TOWARD THE RWY. NEAR THE RWY, HE BEGAN TO TRANSITION TO FORWARD FLT AT ABOUT 10 FT ABOVE THE GND. WE WERE AT ABOUT HIS 6-7 O'CLOCK POSITION. THE CAPT QUERIED TWR IF THEY HAD JUST CLRED THE HELI FOR TKOF. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO BOTH OF US THAT A COLLISION WAS INEVITABLE IF THE HELI CONTINUED ON PRESENT COURSE. WE WOULD IMPACT JUST ABOVE THE RWY AT ABOUT THE INTERSECTION OF RWY 15 AND 08. WE WERE APCHING V1 AND I FELT WE COULD NO LONGER ABORT. I FELT THE LONGER I DELAYED ROTATION THE BETTER CHANCE WE HAD THAT THE HELI WOULD CHANGE COURSE OR WE COULD LIFT OFF PAST HIM SOMEHOW. THE CAPT CALLED TO THE HELI ON THE RADIO TO TURN R. I FELT I COULD NO LONGER DELAY ROTATION, CHKED OUR SPEED WHICH WAS APPROX THE ROTATION SPEED (ABOUT 140 KTS). THE CAPT SAID ROTATE AND TURN. I ROLLED L JUST AS WE LIFTED OFF AND JUST BEFORE PASSING THE HELI WHICH WAS TO OUR R (ABOUT 10 TO 15 DEG BANK FOR 10 TO 20 DEG TURN). THE HELI APPEARED TO BE BANKING AWAY, BUT PASSED JUST ABOVE THE R WING, I BELIEVE. BOTH THE CAPT AND I EXPECTED TO IMPACT THE HELI. THE CAPT ASKED IMMEDIATELY IF THE HELI WAS OKAY. THE TWR REPLIED, 'YEAH, HE'S FINE, MY FAULT.' SAFELY AIRBORNE, I TURNED R TO INTERCEPT THE NORMAL DEP AND CLEAN UP ON SCHEDULE. THE CAPT'S QUICK THINKING SAVED THE DAY WHEN HE MADE CALLS TO THE TWR AND THE HELI TO TURN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WAS ALLEGEDLY INFORMED BY COMPANY SAFETY OFFICER THAT ATC ADMITTED THEIR ERROR. RPTR STATED THAT BOTH PLTS BELIEVED A COLLISION WAS INEVITABLE, BUT HOPED THE IMMEDIATE TURN WOULD LESSEN THE IMPACT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 594824: AS WE ACCELERATED THROUGH 90 KTS, THE TWR CLRED THE HELI FOR TKOF WITH A SE DEP AND CLRED HIM TO CROSS BOTH RWYS. THE HELI WAS APPROX 2000 FT AHEAD AND TO OUR R AND WAS TURNING TOWARDS OUR RWY WHILE ACCELERATING IN GND EFFECT. A SUCCESSFUL ABORT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FROM THIS POINT AND I TOLD THE FO TO CONTINUE THE TKOF. AT VR I TOLD THE FO TO ROTATE AND TURN L. AS HE DID I TRANSMITTED ON TWR FREQUENCY HELI TAKING OFF, TURN R TURN R IMMEDIATELY AS WE TURNED L AT APPROX 20 FT AGL, THE HELI CAME UP OVER OUR R WING IN A STEEP CLBING R TURN. I ASKED THE TWR IF THE OTHER ACFT WAS ALL RIGHT. THE REPLY WAS, 'YES, HE'S OKAY, SORRY ABOUT THAT, MY FAULT.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR FROM ACN 594824 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CAPT STATES THAT THEY WERE 90 KTS AND INCREASING WHEN THEY HEARD THE TWR CLR THE HELI FOR TKOF. THE CAPT VERBALIZED CONCERN TO THE FO. THE CAPT EXPECTED THE HELI TO TURN RIGHT TO PARALLEL THE S80'S DIRECTION OF TKOF, BUT QUICKLY REALIZED THE HELI WAS GOING TO INTERCEPT THEM OVER THE RWY SURFACE. THE CAPT VERBALIZED TO THE FO HE THOUGHT A CRASH WAS IMMINENT, BUT TO HOLD THE ACFT ON THE RWY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THEN BE READY TO TURN WHEN INSTRUCTED. IT WAS THE CAPT'S BELIEF THAT TO NOT TURN, THAT THE IMPACT WITH THE HELI WOULD FORCE THE S80 INTO THE TERMINAL, TO TURN L AND CLB MIGHT ONLY HIT THE HELI WITH THEIR WHEELS OR UNDERCARRIAGE AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHANCE TO SAVE HIS ACFT. AT APPROX 132 KTS, THE ACFT WAS RESULTING FROM GND EFFECT AND THE CAPT TOLD THE FO TO CLB AND TURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS DURING THIS TRANSITION FROM ROTATION TO BEING AIRBORNE, THAT THE CAPT ADVISED THAT HE LOST SIGHT OF THE HELI. SIMULTANEOUSLY AS THESE EVENTS WERE TAKING PLACE, THE CAPT KEYED THE MIKE, TRANSMITTING TO THE HELI TO TURN R. WHEN REALIZING THAT THEY DID NOT FEEL ANY IMPACT, THE CAPT QUESTIONED THE TWR IF THE HELI WAS ALL RIGHT, AND RECEIVED AN AFFIRMATIVE, WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CTLR'S ERROR AND TO CHANGE TO DEP CTL. IN A LATER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH TWR PERSONNEL, THE CAPT WAS ADVISED THAT A SEPARATION PROC HAD BEEN APPLIED, THE HELI WAS TOLD TO TURN TO AVOID THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT WITH THE DEPARTING S80. WHEN QUESTIONED FURTHER BY THE CAPT, THE RPTR CLAIMS THAT NO ONE FROM THE TWR COULD CONFIRM THAT SEPARATION EXISTED OR COULD EXPLAIN HOW THE HELI ENDED UP ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RWY. THE CAPT WAS ADVISED THAT 'NO ONE SAW THAT PART OF IT.' THE CAPT ALSO QUESTIONED THAT IF A CTLR XMITTED A CLRNC FOR THE HELI TO TURN R PRIOR TO REACHING RWY 15, NEITHER PLT HEARD A 'SQUEAL' DUE TO SIMULTANEOUS XMISSIONS NORMALLY HEARD IN SUCH AN EVENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 594714: I CALLED BURBANK TWR AND REPORTED I HAD ATIS AND REQUESTED CLRNC SE BOUND. THE TWR CLRED ME TO DEPART AND TO CROSS 'BOTH RWYS.' I WAS SE BOUND ABOUT 75 TO 200 FT AGL, CROSSING RWY 15 WHEN I HEARD ON THE RADIO, 'HELI TURN RIGHT, RIGHT, RIGHT.' I IMMEDIATELY TURNED R AND SAW A JET OUT OF THE CORNER OF MY EYE. THE JET THEN CALLED AND ASKED IF THE HELI WAS ALL RIGHT. I SAID, I WAS, THE TWR THEN CAME ON LINE AND SAID, 'SORRY GUYS THAT WAS MY FAULT.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR FROM ACN 594714 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT STATED THAT HE NEVER SAW THE S80 UNTIL THE WING CROSSED OVER HIS ACFT. THE RPTR CALLED GND FOR DEP HOVER TAXI CLRNC, THEN WAS CHANGED TO LC FOR TKOF CLRNC, WHICH WAS ISSUED WITHOUT HESITATION. PLT SURMISES THAT THE REASON HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE S80 WAS BECAUSE OF THE CALL TO GC, THEN LC, WITH THE S80 HAVING ALREADY BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND ON DEP ROLL. IN LATER DISCUSSIONS WITH TWR, RPTR WAS ADVISED THAT AS THE PLT OF THE S80 XMITTED FOR 'HELICOPTER, TURN R,' ANOTHER CTLR INTERVENED AND SIMULTANEOUSLY XMITTED ON LC FREQ FOR, 'HELICOPTER, TURN RIGHT, RIGHT, RIGHT'. THE RPTR ALLEGED, 'HAD THE ACFT BEEN A B737, I WOULD HAVE BEEN SUCKED INTO THE ENG. I DON'T KNOW WHY WE DIDN'T HIT EACH OTHER.' COMMENTS WERE MADE TO THE RPTR THAT THE CTLR THOUGHT HE WAS AT THE OTHER FBO. THE RPTR DISCOUNTS THIS BECAUSE THE TWO ARE ADJOINING BUILDINGS IN THE SAME RAMP AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.