Narrative:

Aircraft #1 was eastbound at FL410. Aircraft #2 was wbound at FL410. Thunderstorms were in and adjacent to the sector. Numerous aircraft were in the sector. Multiple separation sits at various altitudes and locations. I overlooked aircraft #2 turn long back on course from a deviation. Aircraft #1 and #2 passed 3 mi abeam each other on parallel courses. Flow control: sector had high volume counts for the 2 hours I worked it before the error. Rerouting requested, but marginally acted upon. '70' counts per hour. Time on position: I was on position for 1 hour 57 mins at the time of the error. A recent change in facility policy has increased the fatigue factor greatly. I was mentally exhausted at the time of the error. Supplemental information from acn 595011: the F2TH was approved wrong altitude for direction of flight at FL410 deviating left off course, direct tth cap BQS2 mci when able. Radar controller was advised of this coordination. Radar controller advised the F2TH to proceed direct cap when able. This put the F2TH in confliction with the boeing 737 at vhp that was eastbound at FL410. WX was in the area which forced more traffic than usual into the sector. Traffic management did nothing to help the sector. Fatigue was a factor in that the radar controller had been working busy traffic for 2 hours. This long time on position was a result of a mandated staffing requirement that 75% of all controllers in the area be plugged in at all times, no matter what the traffic level. Sectors are open and d-sides open that do not need to be. This just increases time on position and when it gets busy and you need sectors open there are no breaks available to get people out that have been at sectors for long periods of time.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID RADAR AND ASSOCIATE HDOF CTLR FAIL TO OBSERVE DEVELOPING CONFLICT BTWN B737 AND F2TH-WRONG ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT, DURING RTE DEVS DUE TO WX. CTLR TIME ON POS BLAMED.

Narrative: ACFT #1 WAS EBOUND AT FL410. ACFT #2 WAS WBOUND AT FL410. TSTMS WERE IN AND ADJACENT TO THE SECTOR. NUMEROUS ACFT WERE IN THE SECTOR. MULTIPLE SEPARATION SITS AT VARIOUS ALTS AND LOCATIONS. I OVERLOOKED ACFT #2 TURN LONG BACK ON COURSE FROM A DEV. ACFT #1 AND #2 PASSED 3 MI ABEAM EACH OTHER ON PARALLEL COURSES. FLOW CTL: SECTOR HAD HIGH VOLUME COUNTS FOR THE 2 HRS I WORKED IT BEFORE THE ERROR. REROUTING REQUESTED, BUT MARGINALLY ACTED UPON. '70' COUNTS PER HR. TIME ON POS: I WAS ON POS FOR 1 HR 57 MINS AT THE TIME OF THE ERROR. A RECENT CHANGE IN FACILITY POLICY HAS INCREASED THE FATIGUE FACTOR GREATLY. I WAS MENTALLY EXHAUSTED AT THE TIME OF THE ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 595011: THE F2TH WAS APPROVED WRONG ALT FOR DIRECTION OF FLT AT FL410 DEVIATING L OFF COURSE, DIRECT TTH CAP BQS2 MCI WHEN ABLE. RADAR CTLR WAS ADVISED OF THIS COORD. RADAR CTLR ADVISED THE F2TH TO PROCEED DIRECT CAP WHEN ABLE. THIS PUT THE F2TH IN CONFLICTION WITH THE BOEING 737 AT VHP THAT WAS EBOUND AT FL410. WX WAS IN THE AREA WHICH FORCED MORE TFC THAN USUAL INTO THE SECTOR. TFC MGMNT DID NOTHING TO HELP THE SECTOR. FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR IN THAT THE RADAR CTLR HAD BEEN WORKING BUSY TFC FOR 2 HRS. THIS LONG TIME ON POS WAS A RESULT OF A MANDATED STAFFING REQUIREMENT THAT 75% OF ALL CTLRS IN THE AREA BE PLUGGED IN AT ALL TIMES, NO MATTER WHAT THE TFC LEVEL. SECTORS ARE OPEN AND D-SIDES OPEN THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE. THIS JUST INCREASES TIME ON POS AND WHEN IT GETS BUSY AND YOU NEED SECTORS OPEN THERE ARE NO BREAKS AVAILABLE TO GET PEOPLE OUT THAT HAVE BEEN AT SECTORS FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.