Narrative:

This was a part 91 trip from phx to slc. I was the PF accompanies by a highly competent and efficient co-captain. We received our ATC clearance which was read back correctly as: cleared to slc via silow 1 departure, bryce canyon transition, maintain 7000 ft, expect FL350 within 10 mins, etc. The silow 1 departure initial climb procedure from runway 25L is 'climb runway heading to 1550 ft, then climbing right turn heading 265 degrees, at 9 DME west of pxr, climbing right turn heading 360 degrees.' at approximately XA46Z we were cleared for takeoff on runway 25L at the H7 intersection. My co-captain and I recall hearing our takeoff clearance as 'fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.' to the best of our recollection we read back 'runway heading, cleared for takeoff.' after takeoff, and the airplane was cleaned up and configured for the climb, I asked my co-captain to remind me of the departure instructions. He replied 'runway heading,' I concurred. We were cleared early in the climb to a higher altitude than original clearance limit of 7000 ft. I think it was FL230. At that time, I remember thinking to myself, how long are they going to send us west before releasing us from the runway heading and allowing us to start north on course? Shortly thereafter, I heard the controller call traffic to another aircraft as a 'falcon 2000, 12 O'clock position, turning northbound.' I said to my co-captain 'he's talking about us, were we supposed to turn north?' the co-captain tried to contact center to confirm our clearance and ask if we were supposed to have resumed the departure. Before he could break in to contact center, center called us and asked, 'are you in the turn or had we started our turn? You were supposed to turn about 4 mi back!' my suspicion of a misunderstanding was confirmed. Center told us to turn right to 360 des, told us of a possible pilot deviation and gave us a phone number for the phx TRACON. Embarrassed beyond words, we made our turn and the rest of the flight was uneventful. Upon arrival at slc, I contacted the phx TRACON and discussed the situation. When we told them that we thought we heard our takeoff clearance as 'fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff' they said that if that was indeed the case we did the right thing. They said that they would pull all the tapes and review them before taking further action. Although we did go through the checklists and even doublechked our before start and pre taxi checklists, I rushed through my crew briefing and in doing so, did not ask to carefully review the silow 1 departure procedure. Although the clearance 'fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff' usually means just that until amended or otherwise told to resume the departure procedure, an earlier attempt to clarify ATC's expectations may have prevented this situation. Supplemental information from acn 595872: as PNF, it was my responsibility to advise the PF of the departure procedure requirements but failed to do so. Contributing factors were: 1) an FMS that did not graphically display the turning points of the initial part of the departure procedure, 2) inattn to the task at hand on my part, including an incomplete takeoff briefing to the PF on the departure procedure, 3) a breakdown of CRM best practices causes by a last second departure runway change and a misplaced sense of urgency imparted by passenger arriving 1 hour early with only 10 mins notice to the flight crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA2000 FLT CREW FLIES THE WRONG DEP CLRNC DEPARTING PHX.

Narrative: THIS WAS A PART 91 TRIP FROM PHX TO SLC. I WAS THE PF ACCOMPANIES BY A HIGHLY COMPETENT AND EFFICIENT CO-CAPT. WE RECEIVED OUR ATC CLRNC WHICH WAS READ BACK CORRECTLY AS: CLRED TO SLC VIA SILOW 1 DEP, BRYCE CANYON TRANSITION, MAINTAIN 7000 FT, EXPECT FL350 WITHIN 10 MINS, ETC. THE SILOW 1 DEP INITIAL CLB PROC FROM RWY 25L IS 'CLB RWY HDG TO 1550 FT, THEN CLBING R TURN HDG 265 DEGS, AT 9 DME W OF PXR, CLBING R TURN HDG 360 DEGS.' AT APPROX XA46Z WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 25L AT THE H7 INTXN. MY CO-CAPT AND I RECALL HEARING OUR TKOF CLRNC AS 'FLY RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF.' TO THE BEST OF OUR RECOLLECTION WE READ BACK 'RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF.' AFTER TKOF, AND THE AIRPLANE WAS CLEANED UP AND CONFIGURED FOR THE CLB, I ASKED MY CO-CAPT TO REMIND ME OF THE DEP INSTRUCTIONS. HE REPLIED 'RWY HDG,' I CONCURRED. WE WERE CLRED EARLY IN THE CLB TO A HIGHER ALT THAN ORIGINAL CLRNC LIMIT OF 7000 FT. I THINK IT WAS FL230. AT THAT TIME, I REMEMBER THINKING TO MYSELF, HOW LONG ARE THEY GOING TO SEND US W BEFORE RELEASING US FROM THE RWY HDG AND ALLOWING US TO START N ON COURSE? SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I HEARD THE CTLR CALL TFC TO ANOTHER ACFT AS A 'FALCON 2000, 12 O'CLOCK POS, TURNING NBOUND.' I SAID TO MY CO-CAPT 'HE'S TALKING ABOUT US, WERE WE SUPPOSED TO TURN N?' THE CO-CAPT TRIED TO CONTACT CTR TO CONFIRM OUR CLRNC AND ASK IF WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE RESUMED THE DEP. BEFORE HE COULD BREAK IN TO CONTACT CTR, CTR CALLED US AND ASKED, 'ARE YOU IN THE TURN OR HAD WE STARTED OUR TURN? YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO TURN ABOUT 4 MI BACK!' MY SUSPICION OF A MISUNDERSTANDING WAS CONFIRMED. CTR TOLD US TO TURN R TO 360 DES, TOLD US OF A POSSIBLE PLTDEV AND GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER FOR THE PHX TRACON. EMBARRASSED BEYOND WORDS, WE MADE OUR TURN AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON ARR AT SLC, I CONTACTED THE PHX TRACON AND DISCUSSED THE SIT. WHEN WE TOLD THEM THAT WE THOUGHT WE HEARD OUR TKOF CLRNC AS 'FLY RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF' THEY SAID THAT IF THAT WAS INDEED THE CASE WE DID THE RIGHT THING. THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD PULL ALL THE TAPES AND REVIEW THEM BEFORE TAKING FURTHER ACTION. ALTHOUGH WE DID GO THROUGH THE CHKLISTS AND EVEN DOUBLECHKED OUR BEFORE START AND PRE TAXI CHKLISTS, I RUSHED THROUGH MY CREW BRIEFING AND IN DOING SO, DID NOT ASK TO CAREFULLY REVIEW THE SILOW 1 DEP PROC. ALTHOUGH THE CLRNC 'FLY RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF' USUALLY MEANS JUST THAT UNTIL AMENDED OR OTHERWISE TOLD TO RESUME THE DEP PROC, AN EARLIER ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY ATC'S EXPECTATIONS MAY HAVE PREVENTED THIS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 595872: AS PNF, IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE THE PF OF THE DEP PROC REQUIREMENTS BUT FAILED TO DO SO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) AN FMS THAT DID NOT GRAPHICALLY DISPLAY THE TURNING POINTS OF THE INITIAL PART OF THE DEP PROC, 2) INATTN TO THE TASK AT HAND ON MY PART, INCLUDING AN INCOMPLETE TKOF BRIEFING TO THE PF ON THE DEP PROC, 3) A BREAKDOWN OF CRM BEST PRACTICES CAUSES BY A LAST SECOND DEP RWY CHANGE AND A MISPLACED SENSE OF URGENCY IMPARTED BY PAX ARRIVING 1 HR EARLY WITH ONLY 10 MINS NOTICE TO THE FLT CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.