Narrative:

I was on a routine training mission en route from fvx to hef with 2 non-pilots on board. I had established contact with potomac TRACON for RA's (flight following) and was idented as radar contact in the vicinity of gve at 5500 ft MSL direct to csn VOR. Conditions were VMC with a layer of haze at about 4500 ft MSL, clear above with unrestr visibilities. Shortly after radar contact was established, the TRACON issued an advisory that traffic was at our 12 O'clock position, descending. We began to scan the area in front of the aircraft along with the front right seat passenger and the rear right seat passenger. I scanned the area and could not identify the target's location. Just as I was beginning to refocus my scan to the 10-11 O'clock position, the front seat passenger said, 'there it is!' I looked to my 1 O'clock high position, and a single engine low wing aircraft, probably a piper aircraft, passed just above and to my right of the aircraft. The aircraft had come from my upper left quadrant maybe 10-11 O'clock position, and passed abeam my 4-5 O'clock position. The aircraft was, so close that I could easily see the registration numbers in white over a red stripe. I estimated that I saw the aircraft for a fraction of a second before it disappeared over my right wing. I immediately reported that I saw the aircraft and may have said it almost hit me. No further acknowledgement from the TRACON was noted. I routinely fly on either an IFR flight plan or receive RA's while flying. Under the circumstances, the training flight was for aerial observers involved in aerial surveillance operations which required numerous changes in directions and altitudes, hence, flying on an IFR flight plan was not a viable option. During this particular phase of flight, the training for the observers had been completed long before this phase of the flight commenced. Following the training, I requested flight following and was receiving advisories. Prior to descent, I commented that the once clear windscreen was covered with a lot of dead bugs. I told the front seat passenger that the dead bugs were causing problems with identing traffic because my eyes were focusing on the bugs rather than distant targets. Prior to the flight, each passenger had been briefed on how to scan for traffic in the aircraft and that they were to report my 'perceived' conflicts to the PIC. Up until that point, they had both idented numerous targets. Following the TA from ATC, we began scanning the sky. After I could not identify the target, I did not notify ATC that I did not have the traffic in sight. Instead I continued to scan and gave directions to the passenger to continue to look for a descending target at our 12 O'clock position. Anticipating that the aircraft was very close, based upon the elapsed time of the advisory, 1-2 mins, I placed both hands on the controls and took the aircraft off autoplt with the anticipation of maneuvering the aircraft to avoid the target. We continued to look and did not hear any communications from ATC for either our aircraft or other aircraft in their sector. In retrospect, I should have immediately reported that I did not have the traffic in sight in the hopes that ATC would reissue the target's new position, issue a traffic alert or recommend a change in heading or altitude. Once the passenger yelled she had the aircraft in sight, I spotted the plane, however, I could not react. By the time I idented the plane, the plane was out of sight and I could not dive or turn the aircraft away from the target. I was surprised at how suddenly the aircraft appeared and was even more surprised that I did not have a quick enough reaction time to maneuver our aircraft to avoid a possible impact even though I was prepared to do so. The combination of our high wing aircraft and the descending aircraft's low-wing contributed to the near midair collision. I perceived that I was at a safe enough altitude near the gve VOR because I wrongly believed that most aircraft would start their dscnts further out to land at the few airports in the area. The lack of airports in the area gave me the impression that gve was more on an en route NAVAID where aircraft would generally be flying at an en route phase rather than an approach phase. Although I recognized that extra vigilance wasrequired near VOR's, I felt that I was at a safe altitude and felt reassured that since I was in radar contact I would have helped in identing targets. Our aircraft is equipped with a GPS, a satellite WX downlink and a mode south transponder. In this instance, the traffic information system (tis) was not available since I was too far from the washington dc class B airspace infrastructure. I was not relying on the system since it was flagged with the term 'traffic unavailable.' had the 'tis' system been expanded to outlying areas bordering the washington class B airspace, the 'tis' system would have alerted me to the target and that it was not actually at my 12 O'clock position, but was instead at my 10-11 O'clock position, I could have maneuvered the aircraft to better identify the target.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HIGH WING SEL ACFT AND A LOW WING DSNDING SEL ACFT PASS WITHIN 100 FT OF EACH OTHER AT 5500 FT EVEN THOUGH ATC TA WAS GIVEN.

Narrative: I WAS ON A ROUTINE TRAINING MISSION ENRTE FROM FVX TO HEF WITH 2 NON-PLTS ON BOARD. I HAD ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH POTOMAC TRACON FOR RA'S (FLT FOLLOWING) AND WAS IDENTED AS RADAR CONTACT IN THE VICINITY OF GVE AT 5500 FT MSL DIRECT TO CSN VOR. CONDITIONS WERE VMC WITH A LAYER OF HAZE AT ABOUT 4500 FT MSL, CLR ABOVE WITH UNRESTR VISIBILITIES. SHORTLY AFTER RADAR CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED, THE TRACON ISSUED AN ADVISORY THAT TFC WAS AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS, DSNDING. WE BEGAN TO SCAN THE AREA IN FRONT OF THE ACFT ALONG WITH THE FRONT R SEAT PAX AND THE REAR R SEAT PAX. I SCANNED THE AREA AND COULD NOT IDENT THE TARGET'S LOCATION. JUST AS I WAS BEGINNING TO REFOCUS MY SCAN TO THE 10-11 O'CLOCK POS, THE FRONT SEAT PAX SAID, 'THERE IT IS!' I LOOKED TO MY 1 O'CLOCK HIGH POS, AND A SINGLE ENG LOW WING ACFT, PROBABLY A PIPER ACFT, PASSED JUST ABOVE AND TO MY R OF THE ACFT. THE ACFT HAD COME FROM MY UPPER L QUADRANT MAYBE 10-11 O'CLOCK POS, AND PASSED ABEAM MY 4-5 O'CLOCK POS. THE ACFT WAS, SO CLOSE THAT I COULD EASILY SEE THE REGISTRATION NUMBERS IN WHITE OVER A RED STRIPE. I ESTIMATED THAT I SAW THE ACFT FOR A FRACTION OF A SECOND BEFORE IT DISAPPEARED OVER MY R WING. I IMMEDIATELY RPTED THAT I SAW THE ACFT AND MAY HAVE SAID IT ALMOST HIT ME. NO FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM THE TRACON WAS NOTED. I ROUTINELY FLY ON EITHER AN IFR FLT PLAN OR RECEIVE RA'S WHILE FLYING. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRAINING FLT WAS FOR AERIAL OBSERVERS INVOLVED IN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OPS WHICH REQUIRED NUMEROUS CHANGES IN DIRECTIONS AND ALTS, HENCE, FLYING ON AN IFR FLT PLAN WAS NOT A VIABLE OPTION. DURING THIS PARTICULAR PHASE OF FLT, THE TRAINING FOR THE OBSERVERS HAD BEEN COMPLETED LONG BEFORE THIS PHASE OF THE FLT COMMENCED. FOLLOWING THE TRAINING, I REQUESTED FLT FOLLOWING AND WAS RECEIVING ADVISORIES. PRIOR TO DSCNT, I COMMENTED THAT THE ONCE CLR WINDSCREEN WAS COVERED WITH A LOT OF DEAD BUGS. I TOLD THE FRONT SEAT PAX THAT THE DEAD BUGS WERE CAUSING PROBS WITH IDENTING TFC BECAUSE MY EYES WERE FOCUSING ON THE BUGS RATHER THAN DISTANT TARGETS. PRIOR TO THE FLT, EACH PAX HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON HOW TO SCAN FOR TFC IN THE ACFT AND THAT THEY WERE TO RPT MY 'PERCEIVED' CONFLICTS TO THE PIC. UP UNTIL THAT POINT, THEY HAD BOTH IDENTED NUMEROUS TARGETS. FOLLOWING THE TA FROM ATC, WE BEGAN SCANNING THE SKY. AFTER I COULD NOT IDENT THE TARGET, I DID NOT NOTIFY ATC THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE TFC IN SIGHT. INSTEAD I CONTINUED TO SCAN AND GAVE DIRECTIONS TO THE PAX TO CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR A DSNDING TARGET AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. ANTICIPATING THAT THE ACFT WAS VERY CLOSE, BASED UPON THE ELAPSED TIME OF THE ADVISORY, 1-2 MINS, I PLACED BOTH HANDS ON THE CTLS AND TOOK THE ACFT OFF AUTOPLT WITH THE ANTICIPATION OF MANEUVERING THE ACFT TO AVOID THE TARGET. WE CONTINUED TO LOOK AND DID NOT HEAR ANY COMS FROM ATC FOR EITHER OUR ACFT OR OTHER ACFT IN THEIR SECTOR. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY RPTED THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE TFC IN SIGHT IN THE HOPES THAT ATC WOULD REISSUE THE TARGET'S NEW POS, ISSUE A TFC ALERT OR RECOMMEND A CHANGE IN HEADING OR ALT. ONCE THE PAX YELLED SHE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT, I SPOTTED THE PLANE, HOWEVER, I COULD NOT REACT. BY THE TIME I IDENTED THE PLANE, THE PLANE WAS OUT OF SIGHT AND I COULD NOT DIVE OR TURN THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE TARGET. I WAS SURPRISED AT HOW SUDDENLY THE ACFT APPEARED AND WAS EVEN MORE SURPRISED THAT I DID NOT HAVE A QUICK ENOUGH REACTION TIME TO MANEUVER OUR ACFT TO AVOID A POSSIBLE IMPACT EVEN THOUGH I WAS PREPARED TO DO SO. THE COMBINATION OF OUR HIGH WING ACFT AND THE DSNDING ACFT'S LOW-WING CONTRIBUTED TO THE NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION. I PERCEIVED THAT I WAS AT A SAFE ENOUGH ALT NEAR THE GVE VOR BECAUSE I WRONGLY BELIEVED THAT MOST ACFT WOULD START THEIR DSCNTS FURTHER OUT TO LAND AT THE FEW ARPTS IN THE AREA. THE LACK OF ARPTS IN THE AREA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT GVE WAS MORE ON AN ENRTE NAVAID WHERE ACFT WOULD GENERALLY BE FLYING AT AN ENRTE PHASE RATHER THAN AN APCH PHASE. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZED THAT EXTRA VIGILANCE WASREQUIRED NEAR VOR'S, I FELT THAT I WAS AT A SAFE ALT AND FELT REASSURED THAT SINCE I WAS IN RADAR CONTACT I WOULD HAVE HELPED IN IDENTING TARGETS. OUR ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A GPS, A SATELLITE WX DOWNLINK AND A MODE S XPONDER. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE TFC INFO SYS (TIS) WAS NOT AVAILABLE SINCE I WAS TOO FAR FROM THE WASHINGTON DC CLASS B AIRSPACE INFRASTRUCTURE. I WAS NOT RELYING ON THE SYS SINCE IT WAS FLAGGED WITH THE TERM 'TFC UNAVAILABLE.' HAD THE 'TIS' SYS BEEN EXPANDED TO OUTLYING AREAS BORDERING THE WASHINGTON CLASS B AIRSPACE, THE 'TIS' SYS WOULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO THE TARGET AND THAT IT WAS NOT ACTUALLY AT MY 12 O'CLOCK POS, BUT WAS INSTEAD AT MY 10-11 O'CLOCK POS, I COULD HAVE MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO BETTER IDENT THE TARGET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.