Narrative:

Our pushback, for flight from bur was on time and uneventful. The day was one of those beautiful, slow and quiet days. ATIS: (standard 15/26 operations, calm and clear, 14C/9C, 30.07). The ATOG, actual takeoff gross weight, 105700 pounds. After pushback from gate and the takeoff checklist was completed we were cleared to taxi to runway 15. Since pushback was along side the takeoff end of runway 26 we asked ground control if the traffic was quiet enough to depart on runway 26 and the response was 'no problem, contact tower.' the revised engine out and departure procedures were reviewed. Tower granted takeoff clearance and we then departed. The climb out was completely normal with the exception that, in the back of my mind, something was amiss. Passing 15000 ft, it suddenly came to me that the performance manual had not been consulted (severe sinking feeling in pit of stomach). After grabbing the performance manual, my fears were confirmed. Our ATOG was 1000 pounds too heavy for 26 operations. Since I am a strong believer in the use of the performance manual (it is the greatest of tools), why it was not checked is a complete mystery. It is very painfully obvious that this was a major foul-up and that such mistakes are not limited to a rushed environment. The pure shock of such an error has already added to my procedural awareness. Anything less is not an option.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CAPT, PNF, ADMITTED THAT HE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH HIS COMPANY'S PERFORMANCE MANUAL DURING DEP FROM BUR.

Narrative: OUR PUSHBACK, FOR FLT FROM BUR WAS ON TIME AND UNEVENTFUL. THE DAY WAS ONE OF THOSE BEAUTIFUL, SLOW AND QUIET DAYS. ATIS: (STANDARD 15/26 OPS, CALM AND CLR, 14C/9C, 30.07). THE ATOG, ACTUAL TKOF GROSS WT, 105700 LBS. AFTER PUSHBACK FROM GATE AND THE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 15. SINCE PUSHBACK WAS ALONG SIDE THE TKOF END OF RWY 26 WE ASKED GND CTL IF THE TFC WAS QUIET ENOUGH TO DEPART ON RWY 26 AND THE RESPONSE WAS 'NO PROB, CONTACT TWR.' THE REVISED ENG OUT AND DEP PROCS WERE REVIEWED. TWR GRANTED TKOF CLRNC AND WE THEN DEPARTED. THE CLBOUT WAS COMPLETELY NORMAL WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT, IN THE BACK OF MY MIND, SOMETHING WAS AMISS. PASSING 15000 FT, IT SUDDENLY CAME TO ME THAT THE PERFORMANCE MANUAL HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED (SEVERE SINKING FEELING IN PIT OF STOMACH). AFTER GRABBING THE PERFORMANCE MANUAL, MY FEARS WERE CONFIRMED. OUR ATOG WAS 1000 LBS TOO HVY FOR 26 OPS. SINCE I AM A STRONG BELIEVER IN THE USE OF THE PERFORMANCE MANUAL (IT IS THE GREATEST OF TOOLS), WHY IT WAS NOT CHKED IS A COMPLETE MYSTERY. IT IS VERY PAINFULLY OBVIOUS THAT THIS WAS A MAJOR FOUL-UP AND THAT SUCH MISTAKES ARE NOT LIMITED TO A RUSHED ENVIRONMENT. THE PURE SHOCK OF SUCH AN ERROR HAS ALREADY ADDED TO MY PROCEDURAL AWARENESS. ANYTHING LESS IS NOT AN OPTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.