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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 599678 |
Time | |
Date | 200311 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : aus.airport |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl single value : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : aus.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 4400 flight time type : 1500 |
ASRS Report | 599678 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : birds maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : inspection |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Company Flight Crew Human Performance FAA Environmental Factor |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Shortly after takeoff from aus, I saw a flash to the left of the aircraft, similar to a bird passing through an illuminated landing light, and heard a loud 'thump' that seemed to originate on the lower left side of the aircraft. On landing in dal, we told the mechanic who met the aircraft that we believed we had sustained a bird strike. He asked if it was a bird strike, which would require a logbook entry and inspection (we were trying to make up time after running behind schedule for most of the day), or if we would be willing to say it was a 'suspected bird strike,' and he'd take a look to determine if there was one. In the absence of any visible evidence at that point (neither of us had yet left the flight deck), we were willing to characterize it as a 'suspected bird strike,' and nothing was entered into the logbook. The mechanic reported back to us that there was a bird strike, but he'd taken care of it and cleaned it up. At the time, I interpreted this to mean that he had taken all the actions that would have been associated with a write-up, except the paperwork (ie, he had inspected the area and found no damage). He seemed to believe that it was 'no big deal' and showed no inclination to put anything into the logbook, so I let it go. The next leg (to tul) was the last one of the night for us and the aircraft, and on my postflt walkaround, I observed dried blood on the leading edge of the left wing inboard of the #1 engine. I related this to the captain when I got back to the jetway. He said, 'I'll take care of it' or words to that effect, and went downstairs. When he returned, he indicated that he'd removed the blood from the leading edge. If he called maintenance, he didn't say so. We departed to the hotel. The more I think about the evening's events, the less comfortable I am with the way things played out. How thorough could the mechanic's inspection have been, if there was an area of dried blood on the leading edge? Is it possible to sustain damage to the leading edge devices that isn't apparent from a visual inspection of the leading edge itself? Should this sort of information be tracked in some form for future reference? Skipping the write-up in the name of getting back on schedule was cutting a corner, and that's not the right answer. There is a 'gray area' associated with writing up 'minor' problems, in that capts sometimes delay writing up a problem until reaching a maintenance base, and give a mechanic the opportunity to fix it without the documentation. I think tonight we crossed the line from the realm of getting the job done right (although without all the technically required paperwork) into the realm of omitting documentation (and perhaps more) that needs to be done. In the future, I will be more conservative about what I'm comfortable not documenting.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-200 CREW HAD A BIRD STRIKE DEPARTING AUS. THE CAPT DID NOT LIST THE BIRD STRIKE IN THE ACFT MAINT LOGBOOK.
Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM AUS, I SAW A FLASH TO THE L OF THE ACFT, SIMILAR TO A BIRD PASSING THROUGH AN ILLUMINATED LNDG LIGHT, AND HEARD A LOUD 'THUMP' THAT SEEMED TO ORIGINATE ON THE LOWER L SIDE OF THE ACFT. ON LNDG IN DAL, WE TOLD THE MECH WHO MET THE ACFT THAT WE BELIEVED WE HAD SUSTAINED A BIRD STRIKE. HE ASKED IF IT WAS A BIRD STRIKE, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A LOGBOOK ENTRY AND INSPECTION (WE WERE TRYING TO MAKE UP TIME AFTER RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE FOR MOST OF THE DAY), OR IF WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SAY IT WAS A 'SUSPECTED BIRD STRIKE,' AND HE'D TAKE A LOOK TO DETERMINE IF THERE WAS ONE. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY VISIBLE EVIDENCE AT THAT POINT (NEITHER OF US HAD YET LEFT THE FLT DECK), WE WERE WILLING TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS A 'SUSPECTED BIRD STRIKE,' AND NOTHING WAS ENTERED INTO THE LOGBOOK. THE MECH RPTED BACK TO US THAT THERE WAS A BIRD STRIKE, BUT HE'D TAKEN CARE OF IT AND CLEANED IT UP. AT THE TIME, I INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT HE HAD TAKEN ALL THE ACTIONS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A WRITE-UP, EXCEPT THE PAPERWORK (IE, HE HAD INSPECTED THE AREA AND FOUND NO DAMAGE). HE SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS 'NO BIG DEAL' AND SHOWED NO INCLINATION TO PUT ANYTHING INTO THE LOGBOOK, SO I LET IT GO. THE NEXT LEG (TO TUL) WAS THE LAST ONE OF THE NIGHT FOR US AND THE ACFT, AND ON MY POSTFLT WALKAROUND, I OBSERVED DRIED BLOOD ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L WING INBOARD OF THE #1 ENG. I RELATED THIS TO THE CAPT WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE JETWAY. HE SAID, 'I'LL TAKE CARE OF IT' OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT, AND WENT DOWNSTAIRS. WHEN HE RETURNED, HE INDICATED THAT HE'D REMOVED THE BLOOD FROM THE LEADING EDGE. IF HE CALLED MAINT, HE DIDN'T SAY SO. WE DEPARTED TO THE HOTEL. THE MORE I THINK ABOUT THE EVENING'S EVENTS, THE LESS COMFORTABLE I AM WITH THE WAY THINGS PLAYED OUT. HOW THOROUGH COULD THE MECH'S INSPECTION HAVE BEEN, IF THERE WAS AN AREA OF DRIED BLOOD ON THE LEADING EDGE? IS IT POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES THAT ISN'T APPARENT FROM A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE LEADING EDGE ITSELF? SHOULD THIS SORT OF INFO BE TRACKED IN SOME FORM FOR FUTURE REF? SKIPPING THE WRITE-UP IN THE NAME OF GETTING BACK ON SCHEDULE WAS CUTTING A CORNER, AND THAT'S NOT THE RIGHT ANSWER. THERE IS A 'GRAY AREA' ASSOCIATED WITH WRITING UP 'MINOR' PROBS, IN THAT CAPTS SOMETIMES DELAY WRITING UP A PROB UNTIL REACHING A MAINT BASE, AND GIVE A MECH THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIX IT WITHOUT THE DOCUMENTATION. I THINK TONIGHT WE CROSSED THE LINE FROM THE REALM OF GETTING THE JOB DONE RIGHT (ALTHOUGH WITHOUT ALL THE TECHNICALLY REQUIRED PAPERWORK) INTO THE REALM OF OMITTING DOCUMENTATION (AND PERHAPS MORE) THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MORE CONSERVATIVE ABOUT WHAT I'M COMFORTABLE NOT DOCUMENTING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.