Narrative:

After landing on runway 19, taxiing into parking gate, right engine nacelle contacted beltloader. Created approximately 6 inch long, nearly vertical, about 1/4 to 1/2 inch crease in nacelle at about 5 O'clock position. Taxi to the gate is short. In the alley approaching the gate, which is used for overnight parking and not a regular air carrier gate, no guideman was present. Slowed to a near stop when guide person drove up on tug and with wands walked to lead-in line and began signaling us in. The area was well-lit. There were no equipment free lines painted on the ramp. Both the first officer and I observed and commented on an unattended beltloader parked perpendicular to and close to the lead-in line. I stated that the guide person must be able to see it and continued toward the gate. We shut down #2 engine as is procedure approaching the gate. No other ramp personnel were present though I could see an agent in the jetbridge. As we neared the gate, I lost sight of the beltloader. The first officer opened his sliding widow and stated that we would clear the beltloader. I continued to follow the guide person's signals. As the guide person began to signal a stop, the first officer said, 'stop.' I was already braking from a slower than normal taxi (as we were concerned with the proximity of the beltloader) so I continued to stop. The first officer stated that he thought we had impacted the beltloader. More ramp and station personnel arrived and gathered at tne nacelle. The jetbridge would not meet the aircraft and after a few mins we were first pushed a foot or so back by the tug so the beltloader could be moved, then pulled about 6 ft forward to mate with the jetbridge. In retrospect, upon noting how close the beltloader was, we should have stopped and waited for more personnel to arrive and move the beltloader. Having been marshalled in to gates and parking spots for better than 30 yrs, I am conditioned to trust the guideman. While we were on time, I am also conditioned to get the airplane and passenger to the gate on time, so I did not want to wait for who knows how long and with who knows how much coordination problems to get the beltloader moved when we got close and saw we would clear it. I never considered taxiing so far forward that we would contact it with a nacelle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW HIT A BELT LOADER WHILE BEING MARSHALLED INTO THE GATE.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 19, TAXIING INTO PARKING GATE, R ENG NACELLE CONTACTED BELTLOADER. CREATED APPROX 6 INCH LONG, NEARLY VERT, ABOUT 1/4 TO 1/2 INCH CREASE IN NACELLE AT ABOUT 5 O'CLOCK POS. TAXI TO THE GATE IS SHORT. IN THE ALLEY APCHING THE GATE, WHICH IS USED FOR OVERNIGHT PARKING AND NOT A REGULAR ACR GATE, NO GUIDEMAN WAS PRESENT. SLOWED TO A NEAR STOP WHEN GUIDE PERSON DROVE UP ON TUG AND WITH WANDS WALKED TO LEAD-IN LINE AND BEGAN SIGNALING US IN. THE AREA WAS WELL-LIT. THERE WERE NO EQUIP FREE LINES PAINTED ON THE RAMP. BOTH THE FO AND I OBSERVED AND COMMENTED ON AN UNATTENDED BELTLOADER PARKED PERPENDICULAR TO AND CLOSE TO THE LEAD-IN LINE. I STATED THAT THE GUIDE PERSON MUST BE ABLE TO SEE IT AND CONTINUED TOWARD THE GATE. WE SHUT DOWN #2 ENG AS IS PROC APCHING THE GATE. NO OTHER RAMP PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT THOUGH I COULD SEE AN AGENT IN THE JETBRIDGE. AS WE NEARED THE GATE, I LOST SIGHT OF THE BELTLOADER. THE FO OPENED HIS SLIDING WIDOW AND STATED THAT WE WOULD CLR THE BELTLOADER. I CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE GUIDE PERSON'S SIGNALS. AS THE GUIDE PERSON BEGAN TO SIGNAL A STOP, THE FO SAID, 'STOP.' I WAS ALREADY BRAKING FROM A SLOWER THAN NORMAL TAXI (AS WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE PROX OF THE BELTLOADER) SO I CONTINUED TO STOP. THE FO STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD IMPACTED THE BELTLOADER. MORE RAMP AND STATION PERSONNEL ARRIVED AND GATHERED AT TNE NACELLE. THE JETBRIDGE WOULD NOT MEET THE ACFT AND AFTER A FEW MINS WE WERE FIRST PUSHED A FOOT OR SO BACK BY THE TUG SO THE BELTLOADER COULD BE MOVED, THEN PULLED ABOUT 6 FT FORWARD TO MATE WITH THE JETBRIDGE. IN RETROSPECT, UPON NOTING HOW CLOSE THE BELTLOADER WAS, WE SHOULD HAVE STOPPED AND WAITED FOR MORE PERSONNEL TO ARRIVE AND MOVE THE BELTLOADER. HAVING BEEN MARSHALLED IN TO GATES AND PARKING SPOTS FOR BETTER THAN 30 YRS, I AM CONDITIONED TO TRUST THE GUIDEMAN. WHILE WE WERE ON TIME, I AM ALSO CONDITIONED TO GET THE AIRPLANE AND PAX TO THE GATE ON TIME, SO I DID NOT WANT TO WAIT FOR WHO KNOWS HOW LONG AND WITH WHO KNOWS HOW MUCH COORD PROBS TO GET THE BELTLOADER MOVED WHEN WE GOT CLOSE AND SAW WE WOULD CLR IT. I NEVER CONSIDERED TAXIING SO FAR FORWARD THAT WE WOULD CONTACT IT WITH A NACELLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.