Narrative:

On takeoff from elp, the tower controller talked to us almost non stop from just before rotation to 1200 ft AGL (5200 ft MSL). First he gave us runway heading, then he changed his mind and asked us to turn to 060 degrees, then he changed his mind back to runway heading and changed the leveloff from 17000 ft to 5500 ft. We were given the 5500 ft while approaching 5000 ft. This continuous talking at such a critical time proved very distracting and unnecessary. On takeoff roll, we noticed another aircraft off the departure end much too high to be a factor. We were never concerned about this traffic as a conflict. We assumed that the controller felt the same way when he issued us takeoff clearance. However, the controller seemed like he just noticed this aircraft after we were well into the takeoff roll. This after rushing us into the takeoff position. Because of the distraction this controller caused for almost 20-25 mins, we unintentionally delayed the first few items of our after takeoff/climb checklist. As a side note, this same controller initially sent us to runway 8 for takeoff where we soon discovered that we would have a direct 6 KT tailwind on the shortest of the runways to choose from. Elp is at 4000 ft MSL and this caused us to be at almost a balanced field condition. Runway 4 was what ATIS was advertising and had no tailwind. Yet, this controller sent us to runway 8 and then right after, sent an airbus to runway 4. Why would a controller send us to the shortest runway with a tailwind when that is not even the runway that ATIS says is in use.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 DEP FROM ELP GIVEN NUMEROUS ATC INSTRUCTIONS DURING CRITICAL FLT PHASE.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM ELP, THE TWR CTLR TALKED TO US ALMOST NON STOP FROM JUST BEFORE ROTATION TO 1200 FT AGL (5200 FT MSL). FIRST HE GAVE US RWY HDG, THEN HE CHANGED HIS MIND AND ASKED US TO TURN TO 060 DEGS, THEN HE CHANGED HIS MIND BACK TO RWY HDG AND CHANGED THE LEVELOFF FROM 17000 FT TO 5500 FT. WE WERE GIVEN THE 5500 FT WHILE APCHING 5000 FT. THIS CONTINUOUS TALKING AT SUCH A CRITICAL TIME PROVED VERY DISTRACTING AND UNNECESSARY. ON TKOF ROLL, WE NOTICED ANOTHER ACFT OFF THE DEP END MUCH TOO HIGH TO BE A FACTOR. WE WERE NEVER CONCERNED ABOUT THIS TFC AS A CONFLICT. WE ASSUMED THAT THE CTLR FELT THE SAME WAY WHEN HE ISSUED US TKOF CLRNC. HOWEVER, THE CTLR SEEMED LIKE HE JUST NOTICED THIS ACFT AFTER WE WERE WELL INTO THE TKOF ROLL. THIS AFTER RUSHING US INTO THE TKOF POS. BECAUSE OF THE DISTR THIS CTLR CAUSED FOR ALMOST 20-25 MINS, WE UNINTENTIONALLY DELAYED THE FIRST FEW ITEMS OF OUR AFTER TKOF/CLB CHKLIST. AS A SIDE NOTE, THIS SAME CTLR INITIALLY SENT US TO RWY 8 FOR TKOF WHERE WE SOON DISCOVERED THAT WE WOULD HAVE A DIRECT 6 KT TAILWIND ON THE SHORTEST OF THE RWYS TO CHOOSE FROM. ELP IS AT 4000 FT MSL AND THIS CAUSED US TO BE AT ALMOST A BALANCED FIELD CONDITION. RWY 4 WAS WHAT ATIS WAS ADVERTISING AND HAD NO TAILWIND. YET, THIS CTLR SENT US TO RWY 8 AND THEN RIGHT AFTER, SENT AN AIRBUS TO RWY 4. WHY WOULD A CTLR SEND US TO THE SHORTEST RWY WITH A TAILWIND WHEN THAT IS NOT EVEN THE RWY THAT ATIS SAYS IS IN USE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.