Narrative:

I was the captain and PF the morning of the occurrence. When I received the clearance from las clearance, the SID was the shead Q. The aircraft had been in maintenance away from its home base for 2 weeks prior to the flight, and did not return to its home base before leaving on the trip to las (chain of event and contributing factor). Also, the captain that was responsible for maintaining the commercial charts subscription left the company 3 weeks before the flight (contributing factor). I could not find the shead 1 departure in our charts, so I called clearance back and requested the mccarran departure, which is a vector SID that I did have on board, and was familiar with and had flown before. I did not want to fly a departure if I did not have a copy of it. The controller granted my request and cleared me via the mccarran 2 departure. I, however, did not hear the controller specify the sequence number of the departure. I read back 'thanks, cleared via the mccarran departure.' the SID that I actually had on board was the mccarran 1. I did not hear mccarran 2 in the clearance. My main focus was on the name of the departure and not the number. On departure, I flew the mccarran 1 which calls for runway heading off of runway 25L. I was beginning to think that we should have been given a turn to the south as we had in the past when las departure asked us if we were in the turn to heading 180 degrees. We said 'no, we are flying runway heading.' the controller then gave us a turn to 180 degrees and informed us that the mccarran 2 requires a left turn to 180 degrees at 3 DME las. That was the first time I had heard or functioned on the mccarran 2. Contributing factors were: 1) the aircraft being away from home base and lack of recent chart updates. 2) previous captain had not updated the charts properly. 3) getting a revised clearance with the passenger already at the airplane resulted in thinking about other issues at hand. 4) I had an inexperienced part-time first officer that added to my workload. 5) we were on the first leg of 6 and an 8 hour day of flying, with 2 international legs. 6) me not catching the 'mccarran 2' prevented the error chain from being broken. 7) the clearance delivery controller did not correct me when I read back 'cleared via the mccarran departure.' the busy upcoming day and the inexperienced first officer combined with the passenger already at the plane may have overloaded my ability to absorb details. I will always pay more attention to clrncs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FA-10 CREW FLEW THE MCCARRAN 1 SID, WHEN THEY WERE CLRED THE MCCARRAN 2 SID. THE CREW DID NOT HAVE UP-TO-DATE COMMERCIAL CHARTS ABOARD.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PF THE MORNING OF THE OCCURRENCE. WHEN I RECEIVED THE CLRNC FROM LAS CLRNC, THE SID WAS THE SHEAD Q. THE ACFT HAD BEEN IN MAINT AWAY FROM ITS HOME BASE FOR 2 WKS PRIOR TO THE FLT, AND DID NOT RETURN TO ITS HOME BASE BEFORE LEAVING ON THE TRIP TO LAS (CHAIN OF EVENT AND CONTRIBUTING FACTOR). ALSO, THE CAPT THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMERCIAL CHARTS SUBSCRIPTION LEFT THE COMPANY 3 WKS BEFORE THE FLT (CONTRIBUTING FACTOR). I COULD NOT FIND THE SHEAD 1 DEP IN OUR CHARTS, SO I CALLED CLRNC BACK AND REQUESTED THE MCCARRAN DEP, WHICH IS A VECTOR SID THAT I DID HAVE ON BOARD, AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH AND HAD FLOWN BEFORE. I DID NOT WANT TO FLY A DEP IF I DID NOT HAVE A COPY OF IT. THE CTLR GRANTED MY REQUEST AND CLRED ME VIA THE MCCARRAN 2 DEP. I, HOWEVER, DID NOT HEAR THE CTLR SPECIFY THE SEQUENCE NUMBER OF THE DEP. I READ BACK 'THANKS, CLRED VIA THE MCCARRAN DEP.' THE SID THAT I ACTUALLY HAD ON BOARD WAS THE MCCARRAN 1. I DID NOT HEAR MCCARRAN 2 IN THE CLRNC. MY MAIN FOCUS WAS ON THE NAME OF THE DEP AND NOT THE NUMBER. ON DEP, I FLEW THE MCCARRAN 1 WHICH CALLS FOR RWY HDG OFF OF RWY 25L. I WAS BEGINNING TO THINK THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A TURN TO THE S AS WE HAD IN THE PAST WHEN LAS DEP ASKED US IF WE WERE IN THE TURN TO HDG 180 DEGS. WE SAID 'NO, WE ARE FLYING RWY HDG.' THE CTLR THEN GAVE US A TURN TO 180 DEGS AND INFORMED US THAT THE MCCARRAN 2 REQUIRES A L TURN TO 180 DEGS AT 3 DME LAS. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD HEARD OR FUNCTIONED ON THE MCCARRAN 2. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) THE ACFT BEING AWAY FROM HOME BASE AND LACK OF RECENT CHART UPDATES. 2) PREVIOUS CAPT HAD NOT UPDATED THE CHARTS PROPERLY. 3) GETTING A REVISED CLRNC WITH THE PAX ALREADY AT THE AIRPLANE RESULTED IN THINKING ABOUT OTHER ISSUES AT HAND. 4) I HAD AN INEXPERIENCED PART-TIME FO THAT ADDED TO MY WORKLOAD. 5) WE WERE ON THE FIRST LEG OF 6 AND AN 8 HR DAY OF FLYING, WITH 2 INTL LEGS. 6) ME NOT CATCHING THE 'MCCARRAN 2' PREVENTED THE ERROR CHAIN FROM BEING BROKEN. 7) THE CLRNC DELIVERY CTLR DID NOT CORRECT ME WHEN I READ BACK 'CLRED VIA THE MCCARRAN DEP.' THE BUSY UPCOMING DAY AND THE INEXPERIENCED FO COMBINED WITH THE PAX ALREADY AT THE PLANE MAY HAVE OVERLOADED MY ABILITY TO ABSORB DETAILS. I WILL ALWAYS PAY MORE ATTN TO CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.