Narrative:

On arrival at ord, we were told to expect the ILS runway 22R approach. The WX was VFR with winds about 260 degrees at 20 KTS gusting to 30 KTS. The visibility was 6 mi and it was fairly turbulent. There was a cloud deck between 3000 ft and 4000 ft MSL. We were given a right downwind vector followed by a right base vector of 110 degrees (requiring a right turn of at least 110 degrees to final approach). Due to the high winds and an ATC late turn to intercept, we overshot the final considerably which necessitated an aggressive return to the final approach course. To recover from the overshoot, we flew a heading of 250-260 degrees. At our altitude of 4000 ft MSL, the winds were about 40 KTS on our nose. As you can imagine, our ground speed progress towards the runway was slowed considerably. Once we were back on final, it required about a 20-25 degree crab angle. When on the GS and about 3 mi out from the FAF, I urged the first officer (PF) to finish configuring the airplane for landing (final flaps). In this process, our speed slowed to about 145 KIAS. We were assigned 160 KIAS to the FAF. Between 2 NM and 2.5 NM out from the FAF, I switched to tower frequency in preparation to contact them at the FAF. Prior to my call to the tower, they called us and requested we increase our speed, which we did. The spacing between us and the aircraft following became such that ATC broke them out of the sequence. ATC asked that we contact them via telephone after we parked. I talked to the approach controller and we reviewed what had happened. I acknowledged that we had let our IAS deteriorate below assigned. We had no discussion on the ramifications of the late turn to intercept the final approach course, which I believe aggravated the spacing situation. We also did not have any conversation regarding the approach control frequency congestion due to certain 'heavy' aircraft inquiries regarding runway assignments, runways 22R versus runway 27L (the long runway). Apparently runway 27L was not available as had been indicated on arrival ATIS and these 'heavies' had not anticipated a runway 22R assignment. Certainly, our premature speed reduction contributed to the spacing problem. But, my observation based on our TCASII display indicated to me that the spacing problem began much earlier in the approach sequence. Frequency congestion leading to a late ATC turn assignment to us and the stronger than usual wind factor certainly ganged up on all involved. The turbulent and cloudy conditions added to the confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C90 NOT ALLOWING FOR SIGNIFICANT WINDS RESULTS IN A CRJ2 FINAL APCH OVERSHOOT WITH SPD REDUCTION TO ADJUST FOR LNDG CONFIGN CAUSING SUBSEQUENT ACFT GAR.

Narrative: ON ARR AT ORD, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT THE ILS RWY 22R APCH. THE WX WAS VFR WITH WINDS ABOUT 260 DEGS AT 20 KTS GUSTING TO 30 KTS. THE VISIBILITY WAS 6 MI AND IT WAS FAIRLY TURBULENT. THERE WAS A CLOUD DECK BTWN 3000 FT AND 4000 FT MSL. WE WERE GIVEN A R DOWNWIND VECTOR FOLLOWED BY A R BASE VECTOR OF 110 DEGS (REQUIRING A R TURN OF AT LEAST 110 DEGS TO FINAL APCH). DUE TO THE HIGH WINDS AND AN ATC LATE TURN TO INTERCEPT, WE OVERSHOT THE FINAL CONSIDERABLY WHICH NECESSITATED AN AGGRESSIVE RETURN TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. TO RECOVER FROM THE OVERSHOOT, WE FLEW A HEADING OF 250-260 DEGS. AT OUR ALT OF 4000 FT MSL, THE WINDS WERE ABOUT 40 KTS ON OUR NOSE. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, OUR GND SPD PROGRESS TOWARDS THE RWY WAS SLOWED CONSIDERABLY. ONCE WE WERE BACK ON FINAL, IT REQUIRED ABOUT A 20-25 DEG CRAB ANGLE. WHEN ON THE GS AND ABOUT 3 MI OUT FROM THE FAF, I URGED THE FO (PF) TO FINISH CONFIGURING THE AIRPLANE FOR LNDG (FINAL FLAPS). IN THIS PROCESS, OUR SPD SLOWED TO ABOUT 145 KIAS. WE WERE ASSIGNED 160 KIAS TO THE FAF. BTWN 2 NM AND 2.5 NM OUT FROM THE FAF, I SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ IN PREPARATION TO CONTACT THEM AT THE FAF. PRIOR TO MY CALL TO THE TWR, THEY CALLED US AND REQUESTED WE INCREASE OUR SPD, WHICH WE DID. THE SPACING BTWN US AND THE ACFT FOLLOWING BECAME SUCH THAT ATC BROKE THEM OUT OF THE SEQUENCE. ATC ASKED THAT WE CONTACT THEM VIA TELEPHONE AFTER WE PARKED. I TALKED TO THE APCH CTLR AND WE REVIEWED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD LET OUR IAS DETERIORATE BELOW ASSIGNED. WE HAD NO DISCUSSION ON THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE LATE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE, WHICH I BELIEVE AGGRAVATED THE SPACING SIT. WE ALSO DID NOT HAVE ANY CONVERSATION REGARDING THE APCH CTL FREQ CONGESTION DUE TO CERTAIN 'HVY' ACFT INQUIRIES REGARDING RWY ASSIGNMENTS, RWYS 22R VERSUS RWY 27L (THE LONG RWY). APPARENTLY RWY 27L WAS NOT AVAILABLE AS HAD BEEN INDICATED ON ARR ATIS AND THESE 'HEAVIES' HAD NOT ANTICIPATED A RWY 22R ASSIGNMENT. CERTAINLY, OUR PREMATURE SPD REDUCTION CONTRIBUTED TO THE SPACING PROB. BUT, MY OBSERVATION BASED ON OUR TCASII DISPLAY INDICATED TO ME THAT THE SPACING PROB BEGAN MUCH EARLIER IN THE APCH SEQUENCE. FREQ CONGESTION LEADING TO A LATE ATC TURN ASSIGNMENT TO US AND THE STRONGER THAN USUAL WIND FACTOR CERTAINLY GANGED UP ON ALL INVOLVED. THE TURBULENT AND CLOUDY CONDITIONS ADDED TO THE CONFUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.