Narrative:

I was PNF and we were on the dingo 5 arrival to tus. It was VFR. The captain flew the beginning of the arrival properly, but did not arm the 'localizer' button and flew through final. On the dingo 5, a 75 degree heading from mavva puts you on the ILS approach course. After flying through the final approach course he said, 'there are 2 airports out here, ask her if we're cleared for the approach.' I then realized that he was heading toward davis-monthan AFB and hadn't transtioned. I asked approach if we were cleared for the approach and she remarked, 'if you call the airport in sight.' I asked the captain if he had the airport in sight and he replied, 'yes.' we then turned 90 degrees to about a 170 degree heading and rejoined the approach close to the airport. The captain said, 'she was supposed to clear us for the approach!' I tried to explain that we were expected to join final from the heading, but I didn't convince him. Looking back, I believe he was reading the instructions for runway 29R (not the active, runway 11L) where one gets vectors from mavva and is most often flown. I also believe he was heading for the military base, since it was very well lit. I didn't have tus in sight, I was expecting to see it once we were established. I do not believe he had it in sight until after we were well past course. We were certainly mi off our arrival, I can't even estimate how many since we remained on the 075 degree heading through full-scale deflection on the ILS and continued. I felt we were very close to the AFB by the time we turned, but it was a clear night and hopefully I was wrong. Neither approach nor tower mentioned anything, so perhaps no harm no foul. I learned that just because I understand an arrival doesn't mean the guy sitting next to me does, and I have to keep a vigilant eye on what is selected/not selected (in this case, the 'localizer' button) and the CDI, even in perfectly clear, VFR WX. I did not have the airport in sight, I was trusting that if we remained on the arrival, I would see it. Had we remained on the arrival, I imagine I would have been correct. But I should have caught the mistake. To top off a perfect day, at the gate (we were using 'gate services' where we don't start the APU, but leave an engine running until ground power is connected) the captain, through habit, cut both engines before waiting for ground power, plunging the airplane into emergency lighting confusion/darkness for about 20 seconds.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW OVERSHOT THE LOC ON RWY 11L AT TUS, AFTER THE CAPT DID NOT ARM THE LOC FOR AN AUTOPLT CAPTURE.

Narrative: I WAS PNF AND WE WERE ON THE DINGO 5 ARR TO TUS. IT WAS VFR. THE CAPT FLEW THE BEGINNING OF THE ARR PROPERLY, BUT DID NOT ARM THE 'LOC' BUTTON AND FLEW THROUGH FINAL. ON THE DINGO 5, A 75 DEG HDG FROM MAVVA PUTS YOU ON THE ILS APCH COURSE. AFTER FLYING THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE HE SAID, 'THERE ARE 2 ARPTS OUT HERE, ASK HER IF WE'RE CLRED FOR THE APCH.' I THEN REALIZED THAT HE WAS HEADING TOWARD DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AND HADN'T TRANSTIONED. I ASKED APCH IF WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND SHE REMARKED, 'IF YOU CALL THE ARPT IN SIGHT.' I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND HE REPLIED, 'YES.' WE THEN TURNED 90 DEGS TO ABOUT A 170 DEG HDG AND REJOINED THE APCH CLOSE TO THE ARPT. THE CAPT SAID, 'SHE WAS SUPPOSED TO CLR US FOR THE APCH!' I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT WE WERE EXPECTED TO JOIN FINAL FROM THE HDG, BUT I DIDN'T CONVINCE HIM. LOOKING BACK, I BELIEVE HE WAS READING THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR RWY 29R (NOT THE ACTIVE, RWY 11L) WHERE ONE GETS VECTORS FROM MAVVA AND IS MOST OFTEN FLOWN. I ALSO BELIEVE HE WAS HEADING FOR THE MIL BASE, SINCE IT WAS VERY WELL LIT. I DIDN'T HAVE TUS IN SIGHT, I WAS EXPECTING TO SEE IT ONCE WE WERE ESTABLISHED. I DO NOT BELIEVE HE HAD IT IN SIGHT UNTIL AFTER WE WERE WELL PAST COURSE. WE WERE CERTAINLY MI OFF OUR ARR, I CAN'T EVEN ESTIMATE HOW MANY SINCE WE REMAINED ON THE 075 DEG HDG THROUGH FULL-SCALE DEFLECTION ON THE ILS AND CONTINUED. I FELT WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE AFB BY THE TIME WE TURNED, BUT IT WAS A CLR NIGHT AND HOPEFULLY I WAS WRONG. NEITHER APCH NOR TWR MENTIONED ANYTHING, SO PERHAPS NO HARM NO FOUL. I LEARNED THAT JUST BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND AN ARR DOESN'T MEAN THE GUY SITTING NEXT TO ME DOES, AND I HAVE TO KEEP A VIGILANT EYE ON WHAT IS SELECTED/NOT SELECTED (IN THIS CASE, THE 'LOC' BUTTON) AND THE CDI, EVEN IN PERFECTLY CLR, VFR WX. I DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT, I WAS TRUSTING THAT IF WE REMAINED ON THE ARR, I WOULD SEE IT. HAD WE REMAINED ON THE ARR, I IMAGINE I WOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECT. BUT I SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE MISTAKE. TO TOP OFF A PERFECT DAY, AT THE GATE (WE WERE USING 'GATE SVCS' WHERE WE DON'T START THE APU, BUT LEAVE AN ENG RUNNING UNTIL GND PWR IS CONNECTED) THE CAPT, THROUGH HABIT, CUT BOTH ENGS BEFORE WAITING FOR GND PWR, PLUNGING THE AIRPLANE INTO EMER LIGHTING CONFUSION/DARKNESS FOR ABOUT 20 SECONDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.