Narrative:

Ccs ATC control. Descent for landing delayed. TCASII showed an aircraft 2000 ft below us. Handed to ccs approach 128.5. Finally approximately 70 mi from ccs we were given descent clearance to 7000 ft 'at no more than 1500 FPM.' we immediately tried to advise that we would not be able to descend to land with that restr. We also initially complied. We were not able to get a response mainly because there was extensive spanish conversation between the DC8 below us and ccs approach. The DC8 was complaining about being slowed to 280 KTS. We were asked our speed. When we replied 300 KTS, the controller was clearly bothered. We were able to repeat that we could not descend for landing with the 1500 FPM restr. The controller responded by instructing us to 'fly heading 120 degrees.' since this would have been even more direct to the field we declined the clearance. It was repeated and declined twice more. The controller did not appear to understand. He then cleared us direct ccs, which was essentially the same as heading 120 degrees. Requested instead to fly cleared routing to ccs. Controller then cleared us to the next fix to hold (approximately 50 mi from ccs). No holding instructions given. Further descent clearance given to 4000 ft in holding. We were asked to report entering holding and did so. When the DC8 was not visible on TCASII we stopped descent at 1500 FPM and requested his position. Never given his position. I was only told the traffic was #1 for landing. We continued to descend after turning outbound in holding. During the descent in holding we received a single TCASII 'traffic' call with a solid yellow circle target. The target changed to a hollow diamond with no further warnings. It moved in a manner impossible for an aircraft. We remained clear of clouds until the target vanished. When finally on an acceptable descent profile we requested to continue to the field. Again communication was difficult. We were finally handed to the final ccs approach controller and communication improved greatly. He called traffic we were #2 behind. We were slowed to 210 KTS. Told to call 12 mi, we did and were told we were 8 mi behind traffic. Asked to call 3 mi. We did and were cleared to land. At 3 mi the plane ahead of us was just clearing the runway. We would have been much closer if we had not slowed within legal limits so as to optimize spacing. In the interest of safety I suggest strong consideration be given to not accepting radar vectors from ccs approach. I have never been cleared to descend over another aircraft with a restr rate of descent. Additionally communication with this one ccs approach controller did not inspire confidence. Separate experience earlier at ccs. Mentioned now only because of the trend combined with this incident. Approaching ccs to land, an ATR was idented as traffic. We were told to keep our speed at 300 KTS and held at altitude pending passing the ATR. The ATR objected, telling ATC that we were above him, he was on the glide path (neither of us were on final heading) and that we could not descend to land. Ccs approach then told us in rapid succession to 1) turn to a heading away from the field, 2) slow to 250 KTS, 3) turn to a heading further away from the airport and 4) slow to 210 KTS. I asked the first officer to ask our sequence and the position of the traffic we were told we were suddenly #2 behind. When the first officer spoke one phrase in spanish we were immediately cleared direct to the airport and cleared for the ILS. We were on taxi halfway to our gate before the ATR landed. The ATR pilot clearly lacked any experience to know what our B737 could do in order to land. Yet the controller initially was willing to accept his input, until it was clear someone on our flight also knew what was being said. The reason this is all known is because my first officer was a fluent spanish speaker. I mention this now to show a trend. I did not mention it before as I have come to know this second type of handling is not uncommon. However, the complaints by the DC8 in spanish coupled with the ccs approach control handling in the latest incident demonstrates this environment has a growing potential for hazards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CREW WAS MISHANDLED BY THE INITIAL APCH CTLR GOING INTO SVMI.

Narrative: CCS ATC CTL. DSCNT FOR LNDG DELAYED. TCASII SHOWED AN ACFT 2000 FT BELOW US. HANDED TO CCS APCH 128.5. FINALLY APPROX 70 MI FROM CCS WE WERE GIVEN DSCNT CLRNC TO 7000 FT 'AT NO MORE THAN 1500 FPM.' WE IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO ADVISE THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DSND TO LAND WITH THAT RESTR. WE ALSO INITIALLY COMPLIED. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO GET A RESPONSE MAINLY BECAUSE THERE WAS EXTENSIVE SPANISH CONVERSATION BTWN THE DC8 BELOW US AND CCS APCH. THE DC8 WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT BEING SLOWED TO 280 KTS. WE WERE ASKED OUR SPD. WHEN WE REPLIED 300 KTS, THE CTLR WAS CLRLY BOTHERED. WE WERE ABLE TO REPEAT THAT WE COULD NOT DSND FOR LNDG WITH THE 1500 FPM RESTR. THE CTLR RESPONDED BY INSTRUCTING US TO 'FLY HEADING 120 DEGS.' SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE DIRECT TO THE FIELD WE DECLINED THE CLRNC. IT WAS REPEATED AND DECLINED TWICE MORE. THE CTLR DID NOT APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND. HE THEN CLRED US DIRECT CCS, WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS HEADING 120 DEGS. REQUESTED INSTEAD TO FLY CLRED ROUTING TO CCS. CTLR THEN CLRED US TO THE NEXT FIX TO HOLD (APPROX 50 MI FROM CCS). NO HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. FURTHER DSCNT CLRNC GIVEN TO 4000 FT IN HOLDING. WE WERE ASKED TO RPT ENTERING HOLDING AND DID SO. WHEN THE DC8 WAS NOT VISIBLE ON TCASII WE STOPPED DSCNT AT 1500 FPM AND REQUESTED HIS POS. NEVER GIVEN HIS POS. I WAS ONLY TOLD THE TFC WAS #1 FOR LNDG. WE CONTINUED TO DSND AFTER TURNING OUTBOUND IN HOLDING. DURING THE DSCNT IN HOLDING WE RECEIVED A SINGLE TCASII 'TFC' CALL WITH A SOLID YELLOW CIRCLE TARGET. THE TARGET CHANGED TO A HOLLOW DIAMOND WITH NO FURTHER WARNINGS. IT MOVED IN A MANNER IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN ACFT. WE REMAINED CLR OF CLOUDS UNTIL THE TARGET VANISHED. WHEN FINALLY ON AN ACCEPTABLE DSCNT PROFILE WE REQUESTED TO CONTINUE TO THE FIELD. AGAIN COM WAS DIFFICULT. WE WERE FINALLY HANDED TO THE FINAL CCS APCH CTLR AND COM IMPROVED GREATLY. HE CALLED TFC WE WERE #2 BEHIND. WE WERE SLOWED TO 210 KTS. TOLD TO CALL 12 MI, WE DID AND WERE TOLD WE WERE 8 MI BEHIND TFC. ASKED TO CALL 3 MI. WE DID AND WERE CLRED TO LAND. AT 3 MI THE PLANE AHEAD OF US WAS JUST CLRING THE RWY. WE WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH CLOSER IF WE HAD NOT SLOWED WITHIN LEGAL LIMITS SO AS TO OPTIMIZE SPACING. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY I SUGGEST STRONG CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO NOT ACCEPTING RADAR VECTORS FROM CCS APCH. I HAVE NEVER BEEN CLRED TO DSND OVER ANOTHER ACFT WITH A RESTR RATE OF DSCNT. ADDITIONALLY COM WITH THIS ONE CCS APCH CTLR DID NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE. SEPARATE EXPERIENCE EARLIER AT CCS. MENTIONED NOW ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TREND COMBINED WITH THIS INCIDENT. APCHING CCS TO LAND, AN ATR WAS IDENTED AS TFC. WE WERE TOLD TO KEEP OUR SPD AT 300 KTS AND HELD AT ALT PENDING PASSING THE ATR. THE ATR OBJECTED, TELLING ATC THAT WE WERE ABOVE HIM, HE WAS ON THE GLIDE PATH (NEITHER OF US WERE ON FINAL HEADING) AND THAT WE COULD NOT DSND TO LAND. CCS APCH THEN TOLD US IN RAPID SUCCESSION TO 1) TURN TO A HEADING AWAY FROM THE FIELD, 2) SLOW TO 250 KTS, 3) TURN TO A HEADING FURTHER AWAY FROM THE ARPT AND 4) SLOW TO 210 KTS. I ASKED THE FO TO ASK OUR SEQUENCE AND THE POS OF THE TFC WE WERE TOLD WE WERE SUDDENLY #2 BEHIND. WHEN THE FO SPOKE ONE PHRASE IN SPANISH WE WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED DIRECT TO THE ARPT AND CLRED FOR THE ILS. WE WERE ON TAXI HALFWAY TO OUR GATE BEFORE THE ATR LANDED. THE ATR PLT CLRLY LACKED ANY EXPERIENCE TO KNOW WHAT OUR B737 COULD DO IN ORDER TO LAND. YET THE CTLR INITIALLY WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT HIS INPUT, UNTIL IT WAS CLR SOMEONE ON OUR FLT ALSO KNEW WHAT WAS BEING SAID. THE REASON THIS IS ALL KNOWN IS BECAUSE MY FO WAS A FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKER. I MENTION THIS NOW TO SHOW A TREND. I DID NOT MENTION IT BEFORE AS I HAVE COME TO KNOW THIS SECOND TYPE OF HANDLING IS NOT UNCOMMON. HOWEVER, THE COMPLAINTS BY THE DC8 IN SPANISH COUPLED WITH THE CCS APCH CTL HANDLING IN THE LATEST INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES THIS ENVIRONMENT HAS A GROWING POTENTIAL FOR HAZARDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.