Narrative:

Around XA00 central time, I was informed by a chief dispatcher that a problem had been discovered with the 700 series aircraft with winglet installation. We were told if we had any of them on the ground to make sure they did not depart and any of them in the air should continue to their destination. I questioned the chief as to the nature of the problem. I was told it was only a precautionary inspection. I then asked for information about the inspection and was finally told it was for a possible fuel leak. I questioned why it was important enough to ground the aircraft on the ground, shouldn't we think about diverting those in the air. Both the maintenance controller and the chief were adamantly against diverting. I then asked if we should at least inform the captain and brief him on the situation. Again I was told no, that the chief pilots wanted to talk to the capts themselves. After waiting about 10 mins, I decided to go ahead and notify my captain via ACARS, much to the chagrin of management. Several mgrs came to my desk and asked me to pull up the radio and contact my flight. I informed them the aircraft had ACARS and that I had already informed the pilot of the situation. I then asked them what instructions they wanted me to relay to the captain. They had me carefully word an instruction to turn off all navigation lights and strobes and that then there would be no danger. I refused to include the part about no danger, after I questioned the reliability of this information. I then questioned them about operating at night without position lights. They relayed that we still had anti-collision beacons, and that under the circumstances, that would be sufficient to operate. In hindsight, I believe that continuing this flight possibly violates far 121.627 and operating without navigation lights violates far 91.209 in absence of an emergency (no emergency was declared). Also, I was encouraged by management to withhold information from the captain which would have violated my responsibility under far 121.601. Additionally, I felt as if management attempted to usurp my responsibility of operational control by trying to talk with my captain and by their involvement in preparing instructions to my captain. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the air carrier is modifying all the B737-700's with winglets. The air carrier has contracted the installation to a private maintenance contractor. Air carrier maintenance has nothing to do with the winglet installation, nor does the aircraft manufacturer. Air carrier maintenance found significant fuel leaks at the wingtips of modified aircraft. A more detailed inspection revealed that the installation was not according to blueprint drawings. Excessive fuel tank gaps existed that were filled with sealant. Of the 17 aircraft that were modified, 14 had fuel leaks. This led to grounding all aircraft until an inspection took place. Dispatcher's management has backpedaled in what they told the reporter to do. They now say, after the fact, that the dispatcher was correct in his actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 DISPATCHER WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACFT ON THE GND WERE NOT TO TAKE OFF BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE FUEL LEAKS IN THE WINGLET AREA. THE DISPATCHER ASKED ABOUT ACFT INFLT. HE WAS TOLD NOT TO CONTACT THE FLT CREWS, OR DIVERT ANY ACFT. THE DISPATCHER CONSIDERED IT HIS DUTY TO NOTIFY CREWS INFLT, AND HE DID SO VIA ACARS.

Narrative: AROUND XA00 CENTRAL TIME, I WAS INFORMED BY A CHIEF DISPATCHER THAT A PROB HAD BEEN DISCOVERED WITH THE 700 SERIES ACFT WITH WINGLET INSTALLATION. WE WERE TOLD IF WE HAD ANY OF THEM ON THE GND TO MAKE SURE THEY DID NOT DEPART AND ANY OF THEM IN THE AIR SHOULD CONTINUE TO THEIR DEST. I QUESTIONED THE CHIEF AS TO THE NATURE OF THE PROB. I WAS TOLD IT WAS ONLY A PRECAUTIONARY INSPECTION. I THEN ASKED FOR INFO ABOUT THE INSPECTION AND WAS FINALLY TOLD IT WAS FOR A POSSIBLE FUEL LEAK. I QUESTIONED WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO GND THE ACFT ON THE GND, SHOULDN'T WE THINK ABOUT DIVERTING THOSE IN THE AIR. BOTH THE MAINT CTLR AND THE CHIEF WERE ADAMANTLY AGAINST DIVERTING. I THEN ASKED IF WE SHOULD AT LEAST INFORM THE CAPT AND BRIEF HIM ON THE SIT. AGAIN I WAS TOLD NO, THAT THE CHIEF PLTS WANTED TO TALK TO THE CAPTS THEMSELVES. AFTER WAITING ABOUT 10 MINS, I DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND NOTIFY MY CAPT VIA ACARS, MUCH TO THE CHAGRIN OF MGMNT. SEVERAL MGRS CAME TO MY DESK AND ASKED ME TO PULL UP THE RADIO AND CONTACT MY FLT. I INFORMED THEM THE ACFT HAD ACARS AND THAT I HAD ALREADY INFORMED THE PLT OF THE SIT. I THEN ASKED THEM WHAT INSTRUCTIONS THEY WANTED ME TO RELAY TO THE CAPT. THEY HAD ME CAREFULLY WORD AN INSTRUCTION TO TURN OFF ALL NAV LIGHTS AND STROBES AND THAT THEN THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER. I REFUSED TO INCLUDE THE PART ABOUT NO DANGER, AFTER I QUESTIONED THE RELIABILITY OF THIS INFO. I THEN QUESTIONED THEM ABOUT OPERATING AT NIGHT WITHOUT POS LIGHTS. THEY RELAYED THAT WE STILL HAD ANTI-COLLISION BEACONS, AND THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO OPERATE. IN HINDSIGHT, I BELIEVE THAT CONTINUING THIS FLT POSSIBLY VIOLATES FAR 121.627 AND OPERATING WITHOUT NAV LIGHTS VIOLATES FAR 91.209 IN ABSENCE OF AN EMER (NO EMER WAS DECLARED). ALSO, I WAS ENCOURAGED BY MGMNT TO WITHHOLD INFO FROM THE CAPT WHICH WOULD HAVE VIOLATED MY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER FAR 121.601. ADDITIONALLY, I FELT AS IF MGMNT ATTEMPTED TO USURP MY RESPONSIBILITY OF OPERATIONAL CTL BY TRYING TO TALK WITH MY CAPT AND BY THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS TO MY CAPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ACR IS MODIFYING ALL THE B737-700'S WITH WINGLETS. THE ACR HAS CONTRACTED THE INSTALLATION TO A PVT MAINT CONTRACTOR. ACR MAINT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE WINGLET INSTALLATION, NOR DOES THE ACFT MANUFACTURER. ACR MAINT FOUND SIGNIFICANT FUEL LEAKS AT THE WINGTIPS OF MODIFIED ACFT. A MORE DETAILED INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE INSTALLATION WAS NOT ACCORDING TO BLUEPRINT DRAWINGS. EXCESSIVE FUEL TANK GAPS EXISTED THAT WERE FILLED WITH SEALANT. OF THE 17 ACFT THAT WERE MODIFIED, 14 HAD FUEL LEAKS. THIS LED TO GNDING ALL ACFT UNTIL AN INSPECTION TOOK PLACE. DISPATCHER'S MGMNT HAS BACKPEDALED IN WHAT THEY TOLD THE RPTR TO DO. THEY NOW SAY, AFTER THE FACT, THAT THE DISPATCHER WAS CORRECT IN HIS ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.