Narrative:

In cruise at FL350, 25 NM north of omn VOR. Jax center issued holding instructions; omn 090/20 DME, left turns, 20 NM legs, but no efc issued, told to expect efc shortly, center was issuing holding instructions to all aircraft on frequency, stated miami center airspace shutdown, controller sounded stressed, very busy on radio, very difficult to get a word in edgewise, asked controller twice to confirm. Reached omn, turned on the 090 radial. Approximately 5 miles from the 20 NM point, center instructed us to make right turns in hold, aircraft was slowed to 225 KTS (the FMC computed hold speed), and the autopilot engaged. Upon reaching 20 DME, aircraft began left turn to heading of 045 for teardrop entry into the right holding pattern. Shortly after wings level on the 045 heading, TCAS issued 'traffic' alert. TCAS showed aircraft our level, 11 O'clock, approximately 7 miles and closing. TCAS quickly changed to RA 'climb', with target vertical speed 2000 FPM. TCAS maneuver immediately executed, but at hold speed and high altitude (FL350), aircraft slow to respond and encountered a aerodynamic buffet upon pitch up, maximum climb was 700-800 FPM climb to avoid buffet. Center was very busy. We were finally able to say 'air carrier responding to RA'. Center eventually replied asking who was responding to RA. We quickly replied, 'aircraft X' and controller began to question, then argue about our holding entry, saying he had issued right turns. We were still in escape maneuver, said we had aircraft in sight at our 11 O'clock, approximately 2 miles. Quickly heard radio transmission of 'aircraft Y descending' from other aircraft, and was seen in descending left turn at out 12:30 position, approximately 1 mile ahead, and 400 ft below. Controller continued asking about our holding direction, when we firmly said, 'both of us are at FL350.' there was a brief pause, then controller asked aircraft Y his altitude. Center instructed aircraft Y to descend to and maintain FL330. We descended from 35700 back to FL350 and reentered hold. ATC did not have any comments or instructions for us until we were released from hold. We never were issued an efc time. RA event never mentioned. Although we train in the simulator for an RA event, it is at cruise speed. The combination of a slow holding speed, especially at high altitude, came as a very unwelcome surprise when we attempted the climb escape maneuver. The stick shaker never activated, but there was very pronounced aerodynamic buffet upon initial pitch up. Although we never could reach the target vertical speed of approximately 2000 FPM, we did the best we could, which was 700-800 FPM. We never did receive a 'clear of conflict' aural advisory from our TCAS - the red and green led's around the ivsi gauge simply disappeared. In retrospect, I was very surprised that center would inquire, then argue about holding instructions and directions while we were in the midst of a high altitude RA maneuver - the problem wasn't lateral, it was a vertical issue of 2 aircraft both at FL350. I also feel that we blindly followed the FMC in allowing our holding speed to go the computed value of 225 knots - yes, that is the most efficient holding speed at that altitude and weight, but it left almost no rapid acceleration or climb capability available in case of an RA. Performing a climb at high altitude and slow speed from a hold is an event that I have never contemplated (nor I might add, that I ever want to experience again). In the future, I will not allow that to happen again, opting instead to fly at the maximum holding speed of 265 KIAS when above 14000 ft. We were also discussing before the RA event took place about the real possibility of another terrorist or hijacking event taking place, because of the weather being VFR through florida, most carriers were on a reduced holiday schedule, and how center was suddenly giving holding instructions in a stressed and rapid tone with no efc's issued to anyone, even those aircraft who were informing center of a fuel critical situation. Furthermore, all the holding points were between 20 NM and 40 NM offshore. After the raevent, the same controller was still on the radio, and again, we never heard anything more from him directed to either us or air carrier Y about the conflict. It was after the conflict was resolved when the controller did state to another aircraft frequency who was nearing minimum fuel and was asking about efc, that he had 'unknown aircraft in my sector'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B757 EXPERIENCE TFC CONFLICT WITH B737 WHILE ENTERING HOLDING PATTERN NEAR OMN, RESULTING IN TCAS RECOVERY MANEUVER.

Narrative: IN CRUISE AT FL350, 25 NM NORTH OF OMN VOR. JAX CENTER ISSUED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS; OMN 090/20 DME, L TURNS, 20 NM LEGS, BUT NO EFC ISSUED, TOLD TO EXPECT EFC SHORTLY, CENTER WAS ISSUING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL ACFT ON FREQUENCY, STATED MIAMI CENTER AIRSPACE SHUTDOWN, CONTROLLER SOUNDED STRESSED, VERY BUSY ON RADIO, VERY DIFFICULT TO GET A WORD IN EDGEWISE, ASKED CONTROLLER TWICE TO CONFIRM. REACHED OMN, TURNED ON THE 090 RADIAL. APPROX 5 MILES FROM THE 20 NM POINT, CENTER INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE R TURNS IN HOLD, ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 225 KTS (THE FMC COMPUTED HOLD SPEED), AND THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGED. UPON REACHING 20 DME, ACFT BEGAN L TURN TO HDG OF 045 FOR TEARDROP ENTRY INTO THE R HOLDING PATTERN. SHORTLY AFTER WINGS LEVEL ON THE 045 HDG, TCAS ISSUED 'TRAFFIC' ALERT. TCAS SHOWED ACFT OUR LEVEL, 11 O'CLOCK, APPROX 7 MILES AND CLOSING. TCAS QUICKLY CHANGED TO RA 'CLIMB', WITH TARGET VERTICAL SPEED 2000 FPM. TCAS MANEUVER IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED, BUT AT HOLD SPEED AND HIGH ALT (FL350), ACFT SLOW TO RESPOND AND ENCOUNTERED A AERODYNAMIC BUFFET UPON PITCH UP, MAXIMUM CLIMB WAS 700-800 FPM CLIMB TO AVOID BUFFET. CENTER WAS VERY BUSY. WE WERE FINALLY ABLE TO SAY 'ACR RESPONDING TO RA'. CENTER EVENTUALLY REPLIED ASKING WHO WAS RESPONDING TO RA. WE QUICKLY REPLIED, 'ACFT X' AND CONTROLLER BEGAN TO QUESTION, THEN ARGUE ABOUT OUR HOLDING ENTRY, SAYING HE HAD ISSUED R TURNS. WE WERE STILL IN ESCAPE MANEUVER, SAID WE HAD ACFT IN SIGHT AT OUR 11 O'CLOCK, APPROX 2 MILES. QUICKLY HEARD RADIO TRANSMISSION OF 'ACFT Y DESCENDING' FROM OTHER ACFT, AND WAS SEEN IN DESCENDING L TURN AT OUT 12:30 POSITION, APPROX 1 MILE AHEAD, AND 400 FT BELOW. CONTROLLER CONTINUED ASKING ABOUT OUR HOLDING DIRECTION, WHEN WE FIRMLY SAID, 'BOTH OF US ARE AT FL350.' THERE WAS A BRIEF PAUSE, THEN CONTROLLER ASKED ACFT Y HIS ALT. CENTER INSTRUCTED ACFT Y TO DESCEND TO AND MAINTAIN FL330. WE DESCENDED FROM 35700 BACK TO FL350 AND REENTERED HOLD. ATC DID NOT HAVE ANY COMMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS FOR US UNTIL WE WERE RELEASED FROM HOLD. WE NEVER WERE ISSUED AN EFC TIME. RA EVENT NEVER MENTIONED. ALTHOUGH WE TRAIN IN THE SIMULATOR FOR AN RA EVENT, IT IS AT CRUISE SPEED. THE COMBINATION OF A SLOW HOLDING SPEED, ESPECIALLY AT HIGH ALT, CAME AS A VERY UNWELCOME SURPRISE WHEN WE ATTEMPTED THE CLIMB ESCAPE MANEUVER. THE STICK SHAKER NEVER ACTIVATED, BUT THERE WAS VERY PRONOUNCED AERODYNAMIC BUFFET UPON INITIAL PITCH UP. ALTHOUGH WE NEVER COULD REACH THE TARGET VERTICAL SPEED OF APPROX 2000 FPM, WE DID THE BEST WE COULD, WHICH WAS 700-800 FPM. WE NEVER DID RECEIVE A 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' AURAL ADVISORY FROM OUR TCAS - THE RED AND GREEN LED'S AROUND THE IVSI GAUGE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED. IN RETROSPECT, I WAS VERY SURPRISED THAT CENTER WOULD INQUIRE, THEN ARGUE ABOUT HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIONS WHILE WE WERE IN THE MIDST OF A HIGH ALT RA MANEUVER - THE PROBLEM WASN'T LATERAL, IT WAS A VERTICAL ISSUE OF 2 ACFT BOTH AT FL350. I ALSO FEEL THAT WE BLINDLY FOLLOWED THE FMC IN ALLOWING OUR HOLDING SPEED TO GO THE COMPUTED VALUE OF 225 KNOTS - YES, THAT IS THE MOST EFFICIENT HOLDING SPEED AT THAT ALT AND WEIGHT, BUT IT LEFT ALMOST NO RAPID ACCELERATION OR CLIMB CAPABILITY AVAILABLE IN CASE OF AN RA. PERFORMING A CLIMB AT HIGH ALT AND SLOW SPEED FROM A HOLD IS AN EVENT THAT I HAVE NEVER CONTEMPLATED (NOR I MIGHT ADD, THAT I EVER WANT TO EXPERIENCE AGAIN). IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN AGAIN, OPTING INSTEAD TO FLY AT THE MAXIMUM HOLDING SPEED OF 265 KIAS WHEN ABOVE 14000 FT. WE WERE ALSO DISCUSSING BEFORE THE RA EVENT TOOK PLACE ABOUT THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER TERRORIST OR HIJACKING EVENT TAKING PLACE, BECAUSE OF THE WEATHER BEING VFR THROUGH FLORIDA, MOST CARRIERS WERE ON A REDUCED HOLIDAY SCHEDULE, AND HOW CENTER WAS SUDDENLY GIVING HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS IN A STRESSED AND RAPID TONE WITH NO EFC'S ISSUED TO ANYONE, EVEN THOSE ACFT WHO WERE INFORMING CENTER OF A FUEL CRITICAL SITUATION. FURTHERMORE, ALL THE HOLDING POINTS WERE BETWEEN 20 NM AND 40 NM OFFSHORE. AFTER THE RAEVENT, THE SAME CONTROLLER WAS STILL ON THE RADIO, AND AGAIN, WE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING MORE FROM HIM DIRECTED TO EITHER US OR ACR Y ABOUT THE CONFLICT. IT WAS AFTER THE CONFLICT WAS RESOLVED WHEN THE CONTROLLER DID STATE TO ANOTHER ACFT FREQUENCY WHO WAS NEARING MINIMUM FUEL AND WAS ASKING ABOUT EFC, THAT HE HAD 'UNKNOWN ACFT IN MY SECTOR'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.