Narrative:

ATIS supplied virtually no information concerning braking actions on ramps and txwys. Dialogue with approach control revealed fair braking on left runway and good on right runway. Our flight was set up for the longer of the two. Taxiway between A3 and A5 was closed. Briefed possible turnoff at A5 high speed to transition to taxiway B. Briefed low autobrakes. Approach and landing normal, decelerated to 15 KTS to turn off on high speed A5. Once tail was clear of the runway crossing hold short line, called for after landing checklist while continuing to slow for 135 degree turn onto taxiway B. Aircraft began to slide uncontrollably. High speed A5 was clear ice with no apparent treatment, physically or chemically. Estimate aircraft skidding a good 25 ft before it came under control. Continued on taxiway B at 3 KTS GS indication with extreme caution. Saw reason for taxiway closure: another air carrier jet left taxiway! Made wide turn alignment at 2 KTS. When brakes applied to slow for 90 degree turn for ramp, aircraft entered skid again, uncontrolled toward parked aircraft. After 15 ft skid, aircraft was back under control as ramp had been sanded. It appeared A1 had not. 2 main points: mci facility's treatment of the txwys was totally, totally unsatisfactory. Airport should have been shut down. Second, there appeared to be no communication between the facility and ATC. No aircraft had any idea of the conditions of the txwys, therefore no forewarning, no planning. ATIS should have contained details. The tower should have offered such information, not to mention ground control. This operation is totally unprofessional and detrimental to safe aircraft operations.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRBUS CAPT RPTS TXWY BRAKING ACTION AT MCI WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH SAFE OPS. CITES LACK OF BRAKING CONDITIONS ADVISORIES FROM ATC.

Narrative: ATIS SUPPLIED VIRTUALLY NO INFO CONCERNING BRAKING ACTIONS ON RAMPS AND TXWYS. DIALOGUE WITH APCH CTL REVEALED FAIR BRAKING ON L RWY AND GOOD ON R RWY. OUR FLT WAS SET UP FOR THE LONGER OF THE TWO. TXWY BTWN A3 AND A5 WAS CLOSED. BRIEFED POSSIBLE TURNOFF AT A5 HIGH SPD TO TRANSITION TO TXWY B. BRIEFED LOW AUTOBRAKES. APCH AND LNDG NORMAL, DECELERATED TO 15 KTS TO TURN OFF ON HIGH SPD A5. ONCE TAIL WAS CLR OF THE RWY XING HOLD SHORT LINE, CALLED FOR AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WHILE CONTINUING TO SLOW FOR 135 DEG TURN ONTO TXWY B. ACFT BEGAN TO SLIDE UNCONTROLLABLY. HIGH SPD A5 WAS CLEAR ICE WITH NO APPARENT TREATMENT, PHYSICALLY OR CHEMICALLY. ESTIMATE ACFT SKIDDING A GOOD 25 FT BEFORE IT CAME UNDER CTL. CONTINUED ON TXWY B AT 3 KTS GS INDICATION WITH EXTREME CAUTION. SAW REASON FOR TXWY CLOSURE: ANOTHER ACR JET LEFT TXWY! MADE WIDE TURN ALIGNMENT AT 2 KTS. WHEN BRAKES APPLIED TO SLOW FOR 90 DEG TURN FOR RAMP, ACFT ENTERED SKID AGAIN, UNCTLED TOWARD PARKED ACFT. AFTER 15 FT SKID, ACFT WAS BACK UNDER CTL AS RAMP HAD BEEN SANDED. IT APPEARED A1 HAD NOT. 2 MAIN POINTS: MCI FACILITY'S TREATMENT OF THE TXWYS WAS TOTALLY, TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. ARPT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN. SECOND, THERE APPEARED TO BE NO COM BTWN THE FACILITY AND ATC. NO ACFT HAD ANY IDEA OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE TXWYS, THEREFORE NO FOREWARNING, NO PLANNING. ATIS SHOULD HAVE CONTAINED DETAILS. THE TWR SHOULD HAVE OFFERED SUCH INFO, NOT TO MENTION GND CTL. THIS OP IS TOTALLY UNPROFESSIONAL AND DETRIMENTAL TO SAFE ACFT OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.