Narrative:

On jan/sat/04, I may have inadvertently flown the aircraft illegally. The aircraft may have had 2 deferred items which conflicted with each other. One was MEL 21-24-066 (a deferred overboard exhaust shutoff valve) and the other was MEL 52-70-01A (a deferred passenger door indication system). MEL 21-24-066 states that passenger door indication system must be operative in order to defer the overboard exhaust shutoff valve. This information was brought to me 2 days later by another captain. This flight was the first leg of a 4 day trip. Originally I was scheduled to operate another aircraft. Upon arrival at the first aircraft I found maintenance was working on the crew oxygen system. I got myself situated in the cockpit and started performing the appropriate checklists. At about 25 mins prior to departure, maintenance informed me we would be changing aircraft. My crew and I proceeded to the new aircraft which was on the other side of the concourse. We arrived there approximately 15 mins prior to departure. I discovered the aircraft had been ferried in from the maintenance base and so required a security check. So, on top of running all the other checklists, I had to make sure my crew performed a security check. I also had to get the flight release amended which also took some more time. I did look at the maintenance log as required, but somehow must have overlooked the passenger door indication system deferral. I recalled briefing my crew of the overboard exhaust shutoff valve deferral and a few other minor deferrals. I asked my crew, when I found out the discrepancy, if I had mentioned the passenger door indication system deferral and they did not recall I said anything about it. I believe that my eagerness to get the flight out on time caused me to perform my duties in a hurried fashion. While I believe that the last min aircraft change and the increased pace of ground and gate crew to get the flight out on time were contributing factors, the error lies in the fact I let myself go faster than I normally would. While the flight was uneventful, a problem would have arose due to my not catching the discrepancy. In order to correct this for the future, not only will I make a conscious effort not to let myself get hurried but I will also let my crew look at the maintenance log so as to double-check myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC RPT REGARDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF A CL65 WITH 2 CONFLICTING ITEMS ON A MULTIPLE DEFERMENT THAT WAS NOT DETECTED UNTIL POSTFLT AT ZZZ, US.

Narrative: ON JAN/SAT/04, I MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY FLOWN THE ACFT ILLEGALLY. THE ACFT MAY HAVE HAD 2 DEFERRED ITEMS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH EACH OTHER. ONE WAS MEL 21-24-066 (A DEFERRED OVERBOARD EXHAUST SHUTOFF VALVE) AND THE OTHER WAS MEL 52-70-01A (A DEFERRED PAX DOOR INDICATION SYS). MEL 21-24-066 STATES THAT PAX DOOR INDICATION SYS MUST BE OPERATIVE IN ORDER TO DEFER THE OVERBOARD EXHAUST SHUTOFF VALVE. THIS INFO WAS BROUGHT TO ME 2 DAYS LATER BY ANOTHER CAPT. THIS FLT WAS THE FIRST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP. ORIGINALLY I WAS SCHEDULED TO OPERATE ANOTHER ACFT. UPON ARR AT THE FIRST ACFT I FOUND MAINT WAS WORKING ON THE CREW OXYGEN SYS. I GOT MYSELF SITUATED IN THE COCKPIT AND STARTED PERFORMING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS. AT ABOUT 25 MINS PRIOR TO DEP, MAINT INFORMED ME WE WOULD BE CHANGING ACFT. MY CREW AND I PROCEEDED TO THE NEW ACFT WHICH WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CONCOURSE. WE ARRIVED THERE APPROX 15 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. I DISCOVERED THE ACFT HAD BEEN FERRIED IN FROM THE MAINT BASE AND SO REQUIRED A SECURITY CHK. SO, ON TOP OF RUNNING ALL THE OTHER CHKLISTS, I HAD TO MAKE SURE MY CREW PERFORMED A SECURITY CHK. I ALSO HAD TO GET THE FLT RELEASE AMENDED WHICH ALSO TOOK SOME MORE TIME. I DID LOOK AT THE MAINT LOG AS REQUIRED, BUT SOMEHOW MUST HAVE OVERLOOKED THE PAX DOOR INDICATION SYS DEFERRAL. I RECALLED BRIEFING MY CREW OF THE OVERBOARD EXHAUST SHUTOFF VALVE DEFERRAL AND A FEW OTHER MINOR DEFERRALS. I ASKED MY CREW, WHEN I FOUND OUT THE DISCREPANCY, IF I HAD MENTIONED THE PAX DOOR INDICATION SYS DEFERRAL AND THEY DID NOT RECALL I SAID ANYTHING ABOUT IT. I BELIEVE THAT MY EAGERNESS TO GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME CAUSED ME TO PERFORM MY DUTIES IN A HURRIED FASHION. WHILE I BELIEVE THAT THE LAST MIN ACFT CHANGE AND THE INCREASED PACE OF GND AND GATE CREW TO GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, THE ERROR LIES IN THE FACT I LET MYSELF GO FASTER THAN I NORMALLY WOULD. WHILE THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL, A PROB WOULD HAVE AROSE DUE TO MY NOT CATCHING THE DISCREPANCY. IN ORDER TO CORRECT THIS FOR THE FUTURE, NOT ONLY WILL I MAKE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT NOT TO LET MYSELF GET HURRIED BUT I WILL ALSO LET MY CREW LOOK AT THE MAINT LOG SO AS TO DOUBLE-CHK MYSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.