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Attributes | |
ACN | 607019 |
Time | |
Date | 200401 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 140 flight time total : 23000 flight time type : 900 |
ASRS Report | 607019 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | aircraft : automation overrode flight crew other |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : testing performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : repair |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
During preflight planning upon reading the aircraft log history, I noticed the following previous write-up for jan/fri/04. Defective. Elac 3 pitch fault displayed on upper ECAM screen. F-ctl elac pitch fault at cruise FL310. Uncommanded pitch up 900 FPM. Action: reset breaker R-20. Did bite check of efcs system. Checked ok. Could not duplicate message of elac 2 pitch fault. I immediately called the maintenance controller to consult with maintenance controller. We discussed the matter and I expressed my concern about the seriousness of this write-up and the action taken to clear it. Naturally, the maintenance controller was questioning the fact that this was a closed write-up and that I should not be concerned since the aircraft had flown 2 legs after the event with no other problems. Somehow, everybody was missing the fact that this aircraft had an uncommanded flight control movement. My judgement tells me that any aircraft that has experienced an uncommanded flight input at any time is very serious. The simple way in which this particular event was cleared did not convince me that everything was ok. Further investigation should be accomplished to at least determine whether this was caused by an electronic signal or a true mechanical fault. Needless to say, my feeling was safety at all cost. Uncommanded inputs of any control surface in any aircraft should be of great concern to all involved. Maintenance controller did a conference call with dispatch and mr Y came on the line. Again, we had the same discussion and initially my view was that we needed to get a different aircraft. And that aircraft should not be on the line until further checks are performed. After my discussion with both maintenance controllers and dispatch, I called the flight duty manager and expressed again my concern on this matter. He was very pleasant and understood my issue. We subsequently spoke again and discussed the matter further. I made a courtesy call to local maintenance and he seemed to want to intimidate me into taking the aircraft and was more concerned about the fact that he had just received word at the last min and that I should have called him first. He was not really concerned about the seriousness of the write-up and again, the feeling was that this was a closed write-up. Almost 1 hour had passed since I made the initial call to maintenance controller and local maintenance started to get the word. I had started the ball rolling, but evidently the word was not getting to all the interested departments in a timely manner. After some period of time, the first maintenance controller called back to give me assurances that a more extensive check had been performed to create a more comprehensive view of this event. At the same time, the supervisor from local maintenance had an extensive discussion with me and my first officer to convince both of us that a new, more extensive check had been performed, and that elac 2 had been replaced. We launched approximately 2 hours late. No further incidents occurred in-flight and a safe landing was made at ord.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 CAPT WAS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR AN UNCOMMANDED FLT CTL MOVEMENT, OF PULLING AND RESEATING A CIRCUIT BREAKER AND DOING A SELF TEST.
Narrative: DURING PREFLT PLANNING UPON READING THE ACFT LOG HISTORY, I NOTICED THE FOLLOWING PREVIOUS WRITE-UP FOR JAN/FRI/04. DEFECTIVE. ELAC 3 PITCH FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM SCREEN. F-CTL ELAC PITCH FAULT AT CRUISE FL310. UNCOMMANDED PITCH UP 900 FPM. ACTION: RESET BREAKER R-20. DID BITE CHK OF EFCS SYS. CHKED OK. COULD NOT DUPLICATE MESSAGE OF ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE MAINT CTLR TO CONSULT WITH MAINT CTLR. WE DISCUSSED THE MATTER AND I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS WRITE-UP AND THE ACTION TAKEN TO CLR IT. NATURALLY, THE MAINT CTLR WAS QUESTIONING THE FACT THAT THIS WAS A CLOSED WRITE-UP AND THAT I SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED SINCE THE ACFT HAD FLOWN 2 LEGS AFTER THE EVENT WITH NO OTHER PROBS. SOMEHOW, EVERYBODY WAS MISSING THE FACT THAT THIS ACFT HAD AN UNCOMMANDED FLT CTL MOVEMENT. MY JUDGEMENT TELLS ME THAT ANY ACFT THAT HAS EXPERIENCED AN UNCOMMANDED FLT INPUT AT ANY TIME IS VERY SERIOUS. THE SIMPLE WAY IN WHICH THIS PARTICULAR EVENT WAS CLRED DID NOT CONVINCE ME THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED TO AT LEAST DETERMINE WHETHER THIS WAS CAUSED BY AN ELECTRONIC SIGNAL OR A TRUE MECHANICAL FAULT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, MY FEELING WAS SAFETY AT ALL COST. UNCOMMANDED INPUTS OF ANY CTL SURFACE IN ANY ACFT SHOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO ALL INVOLVED. MAINT CTLR DID A CONFERENCE CALL WITH DISPATCH AND MR Y CAME ON THE LINE. AGAIN, WE HAD THE SAME DISCUSSION AND INITIALLY MY VIEW WAS THAT WE NEEDED TO GET A DIFFERENT ACFT. AND THAT ACFT SHOULD NOT BE ON THE LINE UNTIL FURTHER CHKS ARE PERFORMED. AFTER MY DISCUSSION WITH BOTH MAINT CTLRS AND DISPATCH, I CALLED THE FLT DUTY MGR AND EXPRESSED AGAIN MY CONCERN ON THIS MATTER. HE WAS VERY PLEASANT AND UNDERSTOOD MY ISSUE. WE SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE AGAIN AND DISCUSSED THE MATTER FURTHER. I MADE A COURTESY CALL TO LCL MAINT AND HE SEEMED TO WANT TO INTIMIDATE ME INTO TAKING THE ACFT AND WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FACT THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED WORD AT THE LAST MIN AND THAT I SHOULD HAVE CALLED HIM FIRST. HE WAS NOT REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE WRITE-UP AND AGAIN, THE FEELING WAS THAT THIS WAS A CLOSED WRITE-UP. ALMOST 1 HR HAD PASSED SINCE I MADE THE INITIAL CALL TO MAINT CTLR AND LCL MAINT STARTED TO GET THE WORD. I HAD STARTED THE BALL ROLLING, BUT EVIDENTLY THE WORD WAS NOT GETTING TO ALL THE INTERESTED DEPTS IN A TIMELY MANNER. AFTER SOME PERIOD OF TIME, THE FIRST MAINT CTLR CALLED BACK TO GIVE ME ASSURANCES THAT A MORE EXTENSIVE CHK HAD BEEN PERFORMED TO CREATE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THIS EVENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SUPVR FROM LCL MAINT HAD AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH ME AND MY FO TO CONVINCE BOTH OF US THAT A NEW, MORE EXTENSIVE CHK HAD BEEN PERFORMED, AND THAT ELAC 2 HAD BEEN REPLACED. WE LAUNCHED APPROX 2 HRS LATE. NO FURTHER INCIDENTS OCCURRED INFLT AND A SAFE LNDG WAS MADE AT ORD.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.