Narrative:

Multiple compressor stalls left engine and suspected main landing gear tire failure. During preflight while the captain was reviewing the logbook, the relief pilot informed the captain that he had flown this aircraft on feb/sat/04 from rjaa to jfk. During takeoff that night, they had experienced a high N2 vibration indication. Severe enough that the secondary engine indications popped up and showed the vibration of N2 of 4.0. A write-up was generated but the relief pilot did not know what the fix had been. He was concerned that our present MEL -- left engine turbine overheat -- may be related. Captain and relief pilot asked the maintenance personnel in the cockpit of any relationship. Maintenance said the feb/sat/04 write-up is closed since there is not an MEL for the N2 vibration, but he would pass their concerns along. Our logbook did not contain the feb/sat/04 pages. The captain then noted to maintenance that there were 3 identical entries on 3 consecutive pages in the oil log making it appear that oil had been added 3 times. Maintenance explained that the oil added is not usually displayed in this manner, but that the references of when oil had been added were correct and that oil had only been svced once. Maintenance was unable to correct the pages since the maintenance copies had already been removed from the book. We then took a delay because the fuel sheet was over the acceptable allowance of 450 pounds. The mechanic sticked the tanks and recomputed the fuel density. It was determined the initial fuel density reading had been wrong. After a new density reading was taken, the paperwork was completed correctly. Pushback, engine start and taxi were normal. Captain performed a rolling takeoff from runway 32L. Captain advanced the throttles to 1.05 EPR and waited for the engines to stabilize. During this time the confign warning for main gear steering activated momentarily and extinguished as the main landing gear steering centered and locked. After engine stabilization, captain advanced the throttles and simultaneously pressed the toga switches. Due to the 28 KT headwind, our indicated airspeed was above 50 KTS, so the autothrottles did not engage. I manually set takeoff power and checked engine parameters. I missed the 80 KT callout and substituted with a 120 KT callout at V1. Airspeed stagnated momentarily catching up with the airspeed trend vector, then quickly accelerating through vr and V2 (V2 169 KTS). Aircraft rotated normally. As the main landing gear broke ground, a loud bang was heard to the left and behind the cockpit. The aircraft yawed to the right and the airframe shuddered. My initial thought was we blew a main landing gear tire and the shudder was the unbalanced damaged wheel spooling down but that the noise should not have been that loud. A few seconds later, a second loud bang was heard followed by the same right yaw and shudder. Following the second bang, the relief pilot noted left engine N1 spool back and announced left engine compressor stall and advised the captain to retard the throttle. The captain followed the recommendation and began the engine failure on takeoff procedure for runway 32L. I declared an emergency, stated we had a left engine failure, that we were going to return to the airport, requested crash fire rescue equipment and that we were going to dump fuel. The relief pilot began preparing the aircraft for a possible engine shutdown, recommending to the captain we should start the APU and begin dumping fuel. The captain gave the order. After the initial radio communications, the first officer took over the communication. I began to determine what our problems were while the relief pilot kept busy answering the cabin calls alerting us to the loud bangs, shudders, and vapors coming off the wings (fuel jettison). The relief pilot ran the emergency landing checklist with the first flight attendant. With the left engine at idle, all engine indications were normal. We had no EICAS messages. The relief pilot said he saw an EICAS message appear during the second bang, but was unable to read it before it extinguished. I ran the engine stall checklist. Since the captain's initial action of retarding the throttle after the second bang appeared to have cleared the stall, we advanced the throttle and restored normal ctlof the engine. We next concentrated on a probable main landing gear problem. We had left the gear down after takeoff fearing that a tire failure may have been ingested into the left engine. After checking tire pressures on the gear synoptic and having no hydraulic abnormalities, we determined the gear was sound. Having recovered the engine and with the landing gear functional, I suggested we make an overweight landing and abort the fuel dump. We performed the overweight landing checklist, stopped the fuel jettison and returned to the airport for landing. Approach and landing were normal to runway 32L. We dumped 100000 pounds, landed at gross weight 520K. We taxied off the runway and stopped for crash fire rescue equipment to inspect the engine for visible damage and brakes for signs of overheating. Finding nothing abnormal, we taxied to the gate. Maintenance was able to retrieve our elusive EICAS message. 'Engine thrust left' engine is not producing commanded thrust. Aircraft was taken OTS and the left engine replaced. Supplemental information from acn 609934: I would have liked to have known that the engine was on a watch list due to previous problems that were not in logbook. If the engine is on a watch list, perhaps it should fly domestic or on rtes that require lower takeoff weights. Supplemental information from acn 609029: left engine compressor stalled and started to roll back at 175 KTS after vr on initial takeoff from ZZZ. 'Engine thrust left' annunciated on EICAS. Retarding left throttle cleared compressor stalls and engine recovered. Declared emergency with tower. Climbed to 2000 ft, dumped fuel (100000 pounds) and started APU. Set up for landing on runway 31L. Overweight landing at 520000 pounds nominal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777-200 CREW HAD A SERIES OF COMPRESSOR STALLS AFTER V1. THE CREW DUMPED FUEL, RETURNED TO THE DEP ARPT AND MADE AN OVERWT LNDG.

Narrative: MULTIPLE COMPRESSOR STALLS L ENG AND SUSPECTED MAIN LNDG GEAR TIRE FAILURE. DURING PREFLT WHILE THE CAPT WAS REVIEWING THE LOGBOOK, THE RELIEF PLT INFORMED THE CAPT THAT HE HAD FLOWN THIS ACFT ON FEB/SAT/04 FROM RJAA TO JFK. DURING TKOF THAT NIGHT, THEY HAD EXPERIENCED A HIGH N2 VIBRATION INDICATION. SEVERE ENOUGH THAT THE SECONDARY ENG INDICATIONS POPPED UP AND SHOWED THE VIBRATION OF N2 OF 4.0. A WRITE-UP WAS GENERATED BUT THE RELIEF PLT DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE FIX HAD BEEN. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT OUR PRESENT MEL -- L ENG TURBINE OVERHEAT -- MAY BE RELATED. CAPT AND RELIEF PLT ASKED THE MAINT PERSONNEL IN THE COCKPIT OF ANY RELATIONSHIP. MAINT SAID THE FEB/SAT/04 WRITE-UP IS CLOSED SINCE THERE IS NOT AN MEL FOR THE N2 VIBRATION, BUT HE WOULD PASS THEIR CONCERNS ALONG. OUR LOGBOOK DID NOT CONTAIN THE FEB/SAT/04 PAGES. THE CAPT THEN NOTED TO MAINT THAT THERE WERE 3 IDENTICAL ENTRIES ON 3 CONSECUTIVE PAGES IN THE OIL LOG MAKING IT APPEAR THAT OIL HAD BEEN ADDED 3 TIMES. MAINT EXPLAINED THAT THE OIL ADDED IS NOT USUALLY DISPLAYED IN THIS MANNER, BUT THAT THE REFS OF WHEN OIL HAD BEEN ADDED WERE CORRECT AND THAT OIL HAD ONLY BEEN SVCED ONCE. MAINT WAS UNABLE TO CORRECT THE PAGES SINCE THE MAINT COPIES HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED FROM THE BOOK. WE THEN TOOK A DELAY BECAUSE THE FUEL SHEET WAS OVER THE ACCEPTABLE ALLOWANCE OF 450 LBS. THE MECH STICKED THE TANKS AND RECOMPUTED THE FUEL DENSITY. IT WAS DETERMINED THE INITIAL FUEL DENSITY READING HAD BEEN WRONG. AFTER A NEW DENSITY READING WAS TAKEN, THE PAPERWORK WAS COMPLETED CORRECTLY. PUSHBACK, ENG START AND TAXI WERE NORMAL. CAPT PERFORMED A ROLLING TKOF FROM RWY 32L. CAPT ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO 1.05 EPR AND WAITED FOR THE ENGS TO STABILIZE. DURING THIS TIME THE CONFIGN WARNING FOR MAIN GEAR STEERING ACTIVATED MOMENTARILY AND EXTINGUISHED AS THE MAIN LNDG GEAR STEERING CTRED AND LOCKED. AFTER ENG STABILIZATION, CAPT ADVANCED THE THROTTLES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PRESSED THE TOGA SWITCHES. DUE TO THE 28 KT HEADWIND, OUR INDICATED AIRSPD WAS ABOVE 50 KTS, SO THE AUTOTHROTTLES DID NOT ENGAGE. I MANUALLY SET TKOF PWR AND CHKED ENG PARAMETERS. I MISSED THE 80 KT CALLOUT AND SUBSTITUTED WITH A 120 KT CALLOUT AT V1. AIRSPD STAGNATED MOMENTARILY CATCHING UP WITH THE AIRSPD TREND VECTOR, THEN QUICKLY ACCELERATING THROUGH VR AND V2 (V2 169 KTS). ACFT ROTATED NORMALLY. AS THE MAIN LNDG GEAR BROKE GND, A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD TO THE L AND BEHIND THE COCKPIT. THE ACFT YAWED TO THE R AND THE AIRFRAME SHUDDERED. MY INITIAL THOUGHT WAS WE BLEW A MAIN LNDG GEAR TIRE AND THE SHUDDER WAS THE UNBALANCED DAMAGED WHEEL SPOOLING DOWN BUT THAT THE NOISE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THAT LOUD. A FEW SECONDS LATER, A SECOND LOUD BANG WAS HEARD FOLLOWED BY THE SAME R YAW AND SHUDDER. FOLLOWING THE SECOND BANG, THE RELIEF PLT NOTED L ENG N1 SPOOL BACK AND ANNOUNCED L ENG COMPRESSOR STALL AND ADVISED THE CAPT TO RETARD THE THROTTLE. THE CAPT FOLLOWED THE RECOMMENDATION AND BEGAN THE ENG FAILURE ON TKOF PROC FOR RWY 32L. I DECLARED AN EMER, STATED WE HAD A L ENG FAILURE, THAT WE WERE GOING TO RETURN TO THE ARPT, REQUESTED CFR AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO DUMP FUEL. THE RELIEF PLT BEGAN PREPARING THE ACFT FOR A POSSIBLE ENG SHUTDOWN, RECOMMENDING TO THE CAPT WE SHOULD START THE APU AND BEGIN DUMPING FUEL. THE CAPT GAVE THE ORDER. AFTER THE INITIAL RADIO COMS, THE FO TOOK OVER THE COM. I BEGAN TO DETERMINE WHAT OUR PROBS WERE WHILE THE RELIEF PLT KEPT BUSY ANSWERING THE CABIN CALLS ALERTING US TO THE LOUD BANGS, SHUDDERS, AND VAPORS COMING OFF THE WINGS (FUEL JETTISON). THE RELIEF PLT RAN THE EMER LNDG CHKLIST WITH THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT. WITH THE L ENG AT IDLE, ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. WE HAD NO EICAS MESSAGES. THE RELIEF PLT SAID HE SAW AN EICAS MESSAGE APPEAR DURING THE SECOND BANG, BUT WAS UNABLE TO READ IT BEFORE IT EXTINGUISHED. I RAN THE ENG STALL CHKLIST. SINCE THE CAPT'S INITIAL ACTION OF RETARDING THE THROTTLE AFTER THE SECOND BANG APPEARED TO HAVE CLRED THE STALL, WE ADVANCED THE THROTTLE AND RESTORED NORMAL CTLOF THE ENG. WE NEXT CONCENTRATED ON A PROBABLE MAIN LNDG GEAR PROB. WE HAD LEFT THE GEAR DOWN AFTER TKOF FEARING THAT A TIRE FAILURE MAY HAVE BEEN INGESTED INTO THE L ENG. AFTER CHKING TIRE PRESSURES ON THE GEAR SYNOPTIC AND HAVING NO HYD ABNORMALITIES, WE DETERMINED THE GEAR WAS SOUND. HAVING RECOVERED THE ENG AND WITH THE LNDG GEAR FUNCTIONAL, I SUGGESTED WE MAKE AN OVERWT LNDG AND ABORT THE FUEL DUMP. WE PERFORMED THE OVERWT LNDG CHKLIST, STOPPED THE FUEL JETTISON AND RETURNED TO THE ARPT FOR LNDG. APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL TO RWY 32L. WE DUMPED 100000 LBS, LANDED AT GROSS WT 520K. WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY AND STOPPED FOR CFR TO INSPECT THE ENG FOR VISIBLE DAMAGE AND BRAKES FOR SIGNS OF OVERHEATING. FINDING NOTHING ABNORMAL, WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. MAINT WAS ABLE TO RETRIEVE OUR ELUSIVE EICAS MESSAGE. 'ENG THRUST L' ENG IS NOT PRODUCING COMMANDED THRUST. ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS AND THE L ENG REPLACED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 609934: I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE ENG WAS ON A WATCH LIST DUE TO PREVIOUS PROBS THAT WERE NOT IN LOGBOOK. IF THE ENG IS ON A WATCH LIST, PERHAPS IT SHOULD FLY DOMESTIC OR ON RTES THAT REQUIRE LOWER TKOF WTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 609029: L ENG COMPRESSOR STALLED AND STARTED TO ROLL BACK AT 175 KTS AFTER VR ON INITIAL TKOF FROM ZZZ. 'ENG THRUST L' ANNUNCIATED ON EICAS. RETARDING L THROTTLE CLRED COMPRESSOR STALLS AND ENG RECOVERED. DECLARED EMER WITH TWR. CLBED TO 2000 FT, DUMPED FUEL (100000 LBS) AND STARTED APU. SET UP FOR LNDG ON RWY 31L. OVERWT LNDG AT 520000 LBS NOMINAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.