Narrative:

Airbus arrived sju on flight ZZZ-sju. Flight declared an emergency after manually extending the nose gear. After landing at sju, aircraft was assigned to delayed flight sju-ZZZ1. As the dispatcher picking up flight feb/thu/04 from the previous shift, I first learned of the nose gear problem when the captain for flight contacted dispatch. The reason flight feb/thu sju-ZZZZ1 was operating on feb/fri (even though there was no revenue) was a decision by the company to hold the cockpit crew to that flight number. If the company had designated the flight as a ferry flight then another crew would have to be assigned to fly it. The captain for flight feb/thu/04 sju-ZZZ1 advised dispatch that aircraft X was OTS and that there was no one working on the aircraft. At this time the captain and the dispatcher did not know that previous flight had manually extended the gear. We were only aware that the previous flight had declared an emergency for a gear problem. I contacted the sector manager and expressed my concerns about aircraft. In the summer of 2003 a flight departed sju and could not get the right main to retract. Flight returned to sju and maintenance declared a positive fix. Maintenance would not jack up the aircraft and swing the gear because of not enough personnel. That flight departed a second time and the right main would not retract. Back in the summer of 2003 maintenance stated then that there was nothing in the manual that required a gear swing for this situation. I advised the sector manager that I did not want to go down this road again and that if an emergency was declared on previous flight for a gear problem then I think it would be prudent to have the gear swung. Sector manager said that there were no jacks in sju. I contacted sju and determined that there were aircraft jacks available. Captain contacted dispatch again and advised that after reading the logbook he had discovered that the previous crew had to crank down the gear. I told him that, due to the seriousness of this, I thought the prudent thing to do was a gear swing. He agreed and said he would advise maintenance. The captain contacted dispatch and said maintenance was not going to do the gear swing. I then had a conference call with the manager on duty at moc, myself, and the captain. The manager on duty patched in A300 technician. Their position was that because the manual did not say to swing the gear, they were not going to do it. Technician convinced the captain that the gear was fixed and the captain said he would take the aircraft. I reluctantly agreed to let the flight go and stated again that the only way we could ensure that the gear was working was to swing it while the aircraft was on jacks. Sector manager (mr X) was standing next to my desk. I told him that the issue was resolved. At this time he told me that I had no business questioning maintenance about this aircraft and it was not my job. I reminded him that it was my decision to release the flight and I had every right to determine the safe operation of that flight. He then told me in front of other dispatchers that if maintenance says the aircraft is ok, I have to release the flight. I believe that sju maintenance wanted to put the aircraft on jacks and swing the gear and was intimidated by moc not to. The same mantra is used: the maintenance manual does not say anything about a gear swing. There seems to be a cavalier attitude at moc regarding gear problems. I hope that someone will review the maintenance procedures regarding gear problems and when a gear swing is required.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 DISPATCHER QUESTIONS THE MAINT PERFORMED, WHEN THE INBOUND CREW WAS REQUIRED TO MANUALLY EXTEND THE NOSE GEAR.

Narrative: AIRBUS ARRIVED SJU ON FLT ZZZ-SJU. FLT DECLARED AN EMER AFTER MANUALLY EXTENDING THE NOSE GEAR. AFTER LNDG AT SJU, ACFT WAS ASSIGNED TO DELAYED FLT SJU-ZZZ1. AS THE DISPATCHER PICKING UP FLT FEB/THU/04 FROM THE PREVIOUS SHIFT, I FIRST LEARNED OF THE NOSE GEAR PROB WHEN THE CAPT FOR FLT CONTACTED DISPATCH. THE REASON FLT FEB/THU SJU-ZZZZ1 WAS OPERATING ON FEB/FRI (EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO REVENUE) WAS A DECISION BY THE COMPANY TO HOLD THE COCKPIT CREW TO THAT FLT NUMBER. IF THE COMPANY HAD DESIGNATED THE FLT AS A FERRY FLT THEN ANOTHER CREW WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSIGNED TO FLY IT. THE CAPT FOR FLT FEB/THU/04 SJU-ZZZ1 ADVISED DISPATCH THAT ACFT X WAS OTS AND THAT THERE WAS NO ONE WORKING ON THE ACFT. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT AND THE DISPATCHER DID NOT KNOW THAT PREVIOUS FLT HAD MANUALLY EXTENDED THE GEAR. WE WERE ONLY AWARE THAT THE PREVIOUS FLT HAD DECLARED AN EMER FOR A GEAR PROB. I CONTACTED THE SECTOR MGR AND EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS ABOUT ACFT. IN THE SUMMER OF 2003 A FLT DEPARTED SJU AND COULD NOT GET THE R MAIN TO RETRACT. FLT RETURNED TO SJU AND MAINT DECLARED A POSITIVE FIX. MAINT WOULD NOT JACK UP THE ACFT AND SWING THE GEAR BECAUSE OF NOT ENOUGH PERSONNEL. THAT FLT DEPARTED A SECOND TIME AND THE R MAIN WOULD NOT RETRACT. BACK IN THE SUMMER OF 2003 MAINT STATED THEN THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE MANUAL THAT REQUIRED A GEAR SWING FOR THIS SIT. I ADVISED THE SECTOR MGR THAT I DID NOT WANT TO GO DOWN THIS ROAD AGAIN AND THAT IF AN EMER WAS DECLARED ON PREVIOUS FLT FOR A GEAR PROB THEN I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO HAVE THE GEAR SWUNG. SECTOR MGR SAID THAT THERE WERE NO JACKS IN SJU. I CONTACTED SJU AND DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE ACFT JACKS AVAILABLE. CAPT CONTACTED DISPATCH AGAIN AND ADVISED THAT AFTER READING THE LOGBOOK HE HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE PREVIOUS CREW HAD TO CRANK DOWN THE GEAR. I TOLD HIM THAT, DUE TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS, I THOUGHT THE PRUDENT THING TO DO WAS A GEAR SWING. HE AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD ADVISE MAINT. THE CAPT CONTACTED DISPATCH AND SAID MAINT WAS NOT GOING TO DO THE GEAR SWING. I THEN HAD A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE MGR ON DUTY AT MOC, MYSELF, AND THE CAPT. THE MGR ON DUTY PATCHED IN A300 TECHNICIAN. THEIR POS WAS THAT BECAUSE THE MANUAL DID NOT SAY TO SWING THE GEAR, THEY WERE NOT GOING TO DO IT. TECHNICIAN CONVINCED THE CAPT THAT THE GEAR WAS FIXED AND THE CAPT SAID HE WOULD TAKE THE ACFT. I RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO LET THE FLT GO AND STATED AGAIN THAT THE ONLY WAY WE COULD ENSURE THAT THE GEAR WAS WORKING WAS TO SWING IT WHILE THE ACFT WAS ON JACKS. SECTOR MGR (MR X) WAS STANDING NEXT TO MY DESK. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ISSUE WAS RESOLVED. AT THIS TIME HE TOLD ME THAT I HAD NO BUSINESS QUESTIONING MAINT ABOUT THIS ACFT AND IT WAS NOT MY JOB. I REMINDED HIM THAT IT WAS MY DECISION TO RELEASE THE FLT AND I HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE SAFE OP OF THAT FLT. HE THEN TOLD ME IN FRONT OF OTHER DISPATCHERS THAT IF MAINT SAYS THE ACFT IS OK, I HAVE TO RELEASE THE FLT. I BELIEVE THAT SJU MAINT WANTED TO PUT THE ACFT ON JACKS AND SWING THE GEAR AND WAS INTIMIDATED BY MOC NOT TO. THE SAME MANTRA IS USED: THE MAINT MANUAL DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT A GEAR SWING. THERE SEEMS TO BE A CAVALIER ATTITUDE AT MOC REGARDING GEAR PROBS. I HOPE THAT SOMEONE WILL REVIEW THE MAINT PROCS REGARDING GEAR PROBS AND WHEN A GEAR SWING IS REQUIRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.